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ABSTRACT 
Since 2000, the comic-book superhero blockbuster has become Hollywood’s most salient 
genre. “Heroes, Incorporated: A Political Economy of the Superhero Blockbuster” examines 
these seemingly reactionary fantasies of American power, analyzing their role in transmedia 
storytelling for a conglomerated and world-spanning entertainment industry. This dissertation 
argues that for all their apparent investment in the status quo and the hegemony of white men, 
superhero blockbusters actually reveal the disruptive and inhuman logic of capital, which drives 
both technological and cultural change. Although focused on the superhero film from 2000 to 
2015, this project also considers the print and electronic media across which conglomerates 
extend their franchises. It thereby contributes to the materialist study of popular culture and 
transmedia adaptation, showing how 21st century Hollywood adapts old media for new 
platforms, technologies, and audiences.  
The first chapter traces the ideology of these films to their commercial roots, arguing that 
screen superheroes function as allegories of intellectual property. The hero’s “brand” identity 
signifies stability, even as the character’s corporate owners continually revise him (rarely her). 
Because young men spend the most on ancillary merchandise, studios favor iconic characters and 
repeatable coming-of-age narratives that flatter this audience without alienating others. In this 
production regime, economic and intellectual capital takes human shape in superheroes and their 
logos, trademarks that outlive both their creators and the filmmakers who depict them.  
The second chapter examines Time Warner’s Batman films directed by Christopher 
Nolan, arguing that they dramatize the work of bricolage involved in making a commercial 
brand. Producers assemble blockbuster movies from disparate sources, and each movie in turn 
becomes a new source from which the studio can borrow elements to extend the brand across 
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other media. By combining elements drawn from many Batman comic books (sold by Time 
Warner subsidiary DC Comics), Nolan’s films simultaneously address a mass audience that 
interprets them as a more self-contained texts, and a cult audience that interprets them as remixes 
and revues of familiar scenes and narrative elements, often decades old. Moreover, these films 
justify the ways of brand management to the audience, preparing us for future Batman narratives 
by different filmmakers or featuring different actors. 
 The third chapter looks at Watchmen (Zack Snyder, 2009) as an example of a 
conglomerate’s attempt to convert a modernist, “off-brand” superhero comic book into a 
transmedia franchise. Although this film fared poorly at the box office, its release sent reprints of 
the 1987 Watchmen graphic novel to the top of the bestseller lists. The film adapts Watchmen as 
prestige films adapt novels, transferring narrative and even dialogue to the screen, and producers 
marketed the film explicitly in terms of its “fidelity” to its source. Yet the franchise’s mixed 
results show the company’s failure to bridge mass and cult audiences. Where the graphic novel 
indicts US conglomerates’ exploitation of superheroes as intellectual property, the movie 
franchise performs that exploitation. My study of this franchise thereby illuminates the processes 
at work as producers decide which texts to adapt, how to adapt them, and for what audience 
segments.  
The fourth chapter analyzes the cultural logic of Blackness in superhero movies, perhaps 
the most visible way that studios negotiate between the segments of their core US audience while 
modeling racial inclusion for global audiences. Superhero blockbusters both show and suppress 
racial difference, reinforcing white hegemony in the US through gestures that appear inclusive. 
Bricolage here operates at the intersection of race, textual source, and star image, as filmmakers 
cast internationally famous Black actors, creating an aura of diversity without 
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American race relations. Wary of alienating whites, superhero blockbusters either keep silent 
about race or treat racism as part of a remote past even in films set in the past. In their handling 
of race, superhero movies once again ask viewers to feel pleased with the world they inhabit, and 
not to make, or even to remember, organized attempts to change that world. 
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Prologue: Pinocchio in the Age of Ultron  
The teaser trailer for Marvel Studios’ Avengers: Age of Ultron begins with shots of urban 
destruction, the kind ubiquitous in Hollywood blockbusters since September 11: clouds of smoke 
in a wobbly frame, explosions, white people screaming in the streets. A sinister male voice-over 
threatens: “I’m going to show you something beautiful: everyone screaming for mercy.” Shots of 
Captain America, Black Widow, and Iron Man appear, as the voice says, “You want to protect 
the world, but you don’t want it to change.” This montage coalesces briefly into a series of close-
ups of the film’s stars reacting in horror to a humanoid robot shambling toward them. The voice-
over continues: “You’re all puppets, tangled in strings.” Another montage presents superheroes 
in action, and a crowd of matching robots taking flight, while over the soundtrack drifts a slow, 
minor-key, and non-diegetic arrangement of “I’ve Got No Strings” from the 1940 Disney film 
Pinocchio, sung by a child. The trailer ends by revealing the speaker of the voice-over as the 
murderous robot Ultron, a perennial villain from Avengers comics. He steps into a close up, 
declaring to the camera, “There are no strings on me.” Ultron now addresses the refrain of the 
Pinocchio song directly to the audience. 
As I watched this trailer for the first time—on Facebook, where friends, colleagues, and 
acquaintances had shared it—three things struck me in rapid succession. First, the voice-over 
narration offers a concise and de-mystifying summary of what American superheroes have done 
since their birth in Action Comics #1, in June 1938: they protect the existing order while 
preventing change. Second, the voice-over’s puppet metaphor seemed to comment on the 
Avengers simultaneously on multiple levels. Inside the diegesis, one might view the Avengers as 
puppets, since they work as adjuncts of American state power. Outside the diegesis, the 
copyrighted characters constitute not autonomous entities but intellectual property, owned and 
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exploited commercially by Marvel Studios and Marvel’s corporate parent the Walt Disney 
Company. Moreover, the actors who play the Avengers have multi-film contracts tying them to 
Marvel’s franchise, legal strings that attach them to a controlling brand. 
However, the trailer’s montage of destruction gave me little time to process the puppet 
metaphor before something else struck me: nostalgia. When I recognized “I’ve Got No Strings,” 
I recalled my grandparents’ Zenith console record player, its odor of wood and aging record 
album sleeves; on that console I had listened to the Pinocchio soundtrack LP as a little boy. This 
sudden consciousness of distance, always widening, between my childhood and the present, 
made my chest tighten. I felt nostalgia in the word’s original, medical-psychiatric sense: a 
longing for home (nostos, Homer’s word for the goal of Odysseus) accompanied by pain (algia). 
Returning to the present, I considered the trailer’s integration of two different brands: a 
2015 Marvel Studios movie cross-promoting a 1940 Disney movie. I wondered if a dark and 
gritty Pinocchio reboot might be in the works. Disney-Marvel’s marketing strategy seemed to be 
working: in my Facebook feed and other online spaces where people talk about movie trailers, 
commentators remarked on the power of the trailer’s spooky inversion of a hit children’s song 
from a classical Hollywood film—one they remembered from childhood—repurposed as a 
warning of a robot apocalypse. Yet nobody remarked on the marketing logic evident in that 
inversion.  
Where the Age of Ultron teaser ostensibly suggests the science-fiction disaster scenario of 
a self-replicating machine running amok, I read it as an unintentional allegory of the 
concentrated corporate ownership of intellectual property. In my initial, horrified reading of the 
trailer, the Walt Disney Company—which also own the Muppets, Lucasfilm, and Pixar—had 
taken mass culture a step closer to a kind of branding singularity. Although the lurching, 
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monster-from-its-slab gait of Ultron the robot had primed me to read the trailer for horror, in my 
more self-possessed moments—when a trailer has not also ambushed me with the remembrance 
of lost time—I know better than to imagine even Disney as a world-eating menace. I know that 
no corporation can assimilate and copyright all fictional narratives and likenesses. Alienation, in 
Marx’s sense, does turn labor against labor. Characters created by work-for-hire or freelance 
labor generate profits for corporations, profits that corporations can then use to pay lawyers; 
corporate lawyers can oppose unionization drives, draft contracts more favorable to 
management, and defend corporations against lawsuits from the Joe Siegels and the Jack Kirbys 
when they or their estates sue, seeking compensation for characters now advertised on posters at 
every bus stop in Shanghai. Media workers within conglomerates do resist, subvert, and 
confound managerial attempts to direct and exploit their labor; moreover, the decisions of 
managers sometimes subvert corporate aims, as even films engineered by thoughtful marketing 
teams can fail. Conglomeration and divestiture constitute opposing currents in the same system. I 
know all this—but still. 
I recognized in my reluctance to abandon my fantasy of Disney as apocalyptic branding 
singularity a pattern like that of fetishistic disavowal: like the neurotic patient who knows better, 
I clung to my fear. Taking an inspiration from Slavoj Žižek, I decided that maybe this is what the 
study of Hollywood needs in 2016: not just skepticism about conglomerate filmmaking, but 
renewed skepticism about the ways that our own pleasures, our own apparently spontaneous 
affective responses to mass media, turn us into unpaid laborers in the culture industries, as we 
share advertisements under the sign of just “talking” about an upcoming movie.1 Few films made 
                                                
1 As Christian Fuchs (and others) have argued, using Facebook constitutes a kind of disguised, 
unpaid labor: users create “value” in the form of traffic and personal data that Facebook then 
uses to sell targeted ads (“Today” 57). In commercial social media, ideology functions through 
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under Disney’s name venture into territory dark as Pinocchio: human traffickers lure boys to 
Pleasure Island, where the boys’ own indulgence turns them into donkeys. Amid shadows out of 
German Expressionist cinema, the terrified donkeys scream for their mothers; when those 
donkeys lose even the power of speech, the Coachman sells them to work in salt mines. Pleasure 
Island seems a marketer’s dream, in that it uses the boys’ own pleasures to turn them into unpaid 
labor. Maybe I recognized too much of myself in the poor jackasses, but I decided to make 
strategic use of my horror, my revulsion, over the corporate brand management that worked on 
my own flesh through the Age of Ultron trailer. I decided to embrace the possibility of neurosis, 
to enjoy my symptom.  
Although I embrace a strategic horror at my own pleasure, I still recognize that the 
superhero genre has long shown critical self-reflexivity about branding. While some media 
industry workers (say, in marketing) see recurring characters as licensing opportunities, others 
(say, in scriptwriting) see them as occasions to examine ethical, political, aesthetic, or narrative 
problems; this clash disrupts simplistic attempts to dismiss superheroes, in whatever medium, as 
pure indoctrination into brand loyalty. Marvel Studios’ Iron Man films do feature characters who 
comment on Tony Stark’s cynical uses of the Iron Man armor to promote both his company, 
Stark Industries, and himself, a tradition continued from the comics. The Age of Ultron trailer 
shows Stark in his oversized “Hulkbuster” Iron Man armor, battling the Hulk; in the Hulkbuster 
armor’s first appearance in the comics, a more articulate Hulk taunted Stark, “Which do you 
design first, the specialty armors, or the action figures?” (Kaminski 5). Superhero comics have 
contained such critiques since their first year: In Action Comics #6, November 1938, writer Jerry 
                                                                                                                                                       
“presentation of social media as form of participatory culture” and through the “hidden 
appearance of exploitation as play” (“Digital Labor” 727). For this reason, Fuchs argues, “Using 
ad-block software is digital class struggle” (“Today” 60). 
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Siegel and artist Jerry Shuster had Superman contend with a dishonest marketing agent who 
licensed the hero’s image to sell breakfast cereal, gasoline, and automobiles (Siegel, 
“Superman’s Phony Manager” 71-72). National Allied Publications had hired Siegel and Shuster 
after seeing their early Superman stories; in 1938, National bought from the creators the rights to 
the character for $130 (“Check”).2 Yet as Gerard Jones has shown, Siegel and Shuster knew the 
comics business well enough to hope, from the start, to create something they could license. 
Drafts of Superman stories from 1935 show Siegel trying out marketing slogans, and Shuster 
sketching “boxes for cereal and whole wheat crackers with Superman’s likeness” (114-15). In 
1947, Siegel and Shuster sued National for $5 million and a return of the rights to their creation 
(247), and when they lost, National fired them and resumed exploiting the character.3 
Hollywood has used comic-book superheroes as an occasion to refine earlier models of 
transmedia franchising. To explain the nature and meanings of Hollywood’s changes to 
superhero narratives, I must disavow my nightmares of a robotic avatar of Walt Disney 
assembling itself in a factory and then lurching forth to conquer, even as I suspect that the Walt 
Disney Company, in the words of Florida novelist Carl Hiaasen, “devours the world.” However, 
I will not disavow my fear that my own pleasures can be used against me by marketers and the 
corporations and the class interests that they serve. I will resist conversion into unpaid labor, 
whether as a civilian fan or as an “aca-fan” in the manner of Henry Jenkins, embracing and 
                                                
2 National Allied Publications later created a subsidiary, Detective Comics Inc., and later still 
merged with Detective to form National Comics, which they renamed National Periodical 
Publications in 1944. Fans still called them “DC,” after the Detective Comics series that 
published the first Batman stories. Only in 1977 did the company officially change its name to 
DC Comics. See Gerard Jones, Men of Tomorrow and “Company Overview of DC Comics, Inc.” 
3 Siegel and Shuster would sue National again, as their heirs would repeatedly sue DC and Time 
Warner. After a series of cases in the 21st century, a judge ruled that Siegel and Shuster created 
some elements of the Superman franchise (his alien origins, great strength, and costume)  
before their work-for-hire contracts took effect, but that they created others (weakness to 
Kryptonite, the villain Lex Luthor) after the contracts took effect. See Graser. 
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embraced by the culture industries. Understanding the interaction between hegemonic class or 
industrial powers and resistant subjects—whether those subjects are media workers, media 
audiences, or media scholars—remains the responsibility of any cultural studies worth the name. 
Moreover, historicist attention to industrial and power relations also characterizes the better 
studies of film adaptation from the last twenty years. Therefore, to do credible scholarship on 
superhero movies, I cannot adopt the stance of the comic-shop fanboy defending the integrity of 
the comics against faithless Hollywood producers, nor that of an Adornian high modernist who 
sneers at all mass culture as irredeemably stupefying and ideological. The comics industry and 
the film industry both work to absorb and to commodify challenges to their ability to generate 
profits; both function as sites of cynical exploitation as well as principled critique, invention and 
repetition, co-optation and resistance. Hence, this project looks for moments of oppositional or 
liberatory potential even amid the most seemingly compromised and instrumental Hollywood 
commodities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Theorizing a Corporate Genre, I: Proprietary Forms 
This dissertation uses the rise of the superhero blockbuster franchise as an occasion to 
better understand the cultural and material work of conglomerated movie studios in the early 21st 
century. In particular, the project seeks to understand the kinds of work that these seemingly 
escapist, “popcorn” movies ask their audiences to do: the affective work into which these 
transmedia brands seek to conscript their key audience segment of young men. These films 
interpellate viewers into the position of the admiring, nostalgic, but undeluded fan, recruiting 
them into brand loyalty that can endure disappointments—a failed blockbuster, a joyless 
computer game, an unloved run in a comics title—without souring on the character. Popular 
journalism on Hollywood focuses on box-office figures, but as Edward Jay Epstein argues, they 
only do this because studios ritually announce those figures. In the 21st century, the major studios 
are primarily in the business of “creating rights that can be licensed, sold, and leveraged over 
different platforms” (22). The adaptation of superheroes and their narratives across media forms 
has shifted from a peripheral activity to become the central aim of this business, now that the 
other divisions of a conglomerate represent internal markets for that superhero property.4 As 
Clare Parody puts it, adaptation across media offers  
an efficient way of getting maximum use out of a fictional creation, and where the source 
text is successful and established enough, a useful strategy for ensuring a consumer base 
will follow a franchise as it moves across platforms; its pleasures of re-visioning, re-
versioning, and revisiting, meanwhile, resonate strongly with the balance of familiarity 
and novelty so crucial to the appeal of franchise fiction. (211) 
                                                
4 See Eileen Meehan’s 1991 essay “Holy Commodity Fetish, Batman!” which maps Time 
Warner’s use of the 1989 Batman film to provide grist for many of its subsidiary mills. 
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Superheroes, with their iconic visual designs, decades’ worth of catchphrases and supporting 
characters, and their history of previous adaptations for screens large and small, offer the ideal 
material for transmedia adaptation by conglomerates. In this system, movies function as 
expensive, high-profile commodities, but they double as advertising for larger brands—say, 
Spider-Man, or Marvel—and the commodities that instantiate those brands.  
This reading of a Hollywood genre seeks to understand interplay between the proprietary 
elements of these movie franchises, that is, the copyrighted characters and their likenesses, and 
their non-proprietary elements, which these films adapt and disseminate across corporate and 
generic boundaries. In this interplay we can see the ways that 21st-century filmmakers work 
within a historically particular intersection of narrative materials, industrial practices, legal 
fictions, and commercial arrangements. I will usually call that intersection “Hollywood,” though 
in the knowledge that larger conglomerates now own the so-called “Big Six” major studios, 
historically based in Los Angeles County: 20th Century Fox, Columbia Pictures, The Walt 
Disney Company, Paramount Pictures, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.  
Genre becomes a useful category for discussing superhero blockbusters once we clarify 
the word’s economic registers. In Film/Genre Altman examines competing models of defining a 
film genre, both from the perspectives of critics and from the perspectives of movie producers. 
The model most useful to this project defines genre against its obverse, the cycle, in terms of 
intellectual property:  
genres are broad public categories shared across the entire industry, and Hollywood 
studios have little interest in anything that must be shared with their competitors. On the 
contrary, they are primarily concerned to create cycles of films that will be identified 
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with only a single studio. […] studios prefer to establish cycles (which are proprietary), 
rather than genres (which are sharable) [….] (59) 
This definition has the virtues of simplicity and relationality, and its emphasis on intellectual 
property makes it especially useful here. Anyone can make a generic superhero movie because 
nobody has a monopoly on the tropes of superhero stories under the current system of 
intellectual property laws. Hollywood has produced superhero movies not adapted from comic 
books—Darkman (Sam Raimi, 1990), The Meteor Man (Robert Townsend, 1993), Unbreakable 
(M. Night Shyamalan, 2000), Sky High (Mike Mitchell, 2005), My Super Ex-Girlfriend (Ivan 
Reitman, 2006)—but none of these films became household names. None spawned blockbuster 
sequels or reboots, and none enjoyed long afterlives in other media.  
Although some of these generic superhero films do feature major stars, their lack of a 
character with existing brand equity limits their commercial power. Generic in the grocery-store 
sense, they contain the necessary ingredients, assembled using technical processes standard 
within the industry, but they lack the authority of an established brand. They lack a proprietary 
character with a host of comic-book titles, computer games, and television shows that could 
serve as platforms for cross-promotion by a conglomerate. Marvel Studios may copy non-
proprietary elements from Warner Brothers’ Batman films, but they may not copy Batman, 
because Time Warner holds a monopoly on him. Instead, Marvel must find ways of imitating 
and integrating successful, non-proprietary elements of Batman films into their own films (as I 
will argue they did with their Black mentors and sidekicks in the Avengers films). Although 
journalists often decry the formulaic and repetitive quality of Hollywood blockbusters, Thomas 
Leitch points out that the valorization of originality in Hollywood has a more complex and 
contingent history: “Early and late,” writes Leitch, “with important exceptions like the 1960s and 
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early 1970s, the American film industry in particular has depended on producing cinematic texts 
that could in turn encourage the production of other texts, from fan magazines to iPhone apps” 
(“What” 159). In contrast to the ambiguity and open endings borrowed from European art 
cinema during the New Hollywood, Leitch characterizes the industry’s dominant practice as one 
of “pragmatic and projective incompleteness” (159). The incompleteness of the “to be 
continued” converts the text into the advertisement for its successor; it also makes seriality 
normative, both in narratives for the big screen and for other platforms. However, it requires that 
the studio or its corporate parent holds a limited monopoly on key marketing elements, because 
without that monopoly, anyone could supply the next episode. 
Although I have adopted Altman’s relational definition of genre, I use a definition of the 
superhero genre grounded in the specific content and history of this form’s emergence in the 
comics. Peter Coogan offers a concise definition to distinguish the superhero from other pulp and 
science-fiction characters using three properties: mission, powers, and identity. 
The superhero’s mission is pro-social and selfless, which means that his fight against evil 
must fit in with the existing, professed mores of society and must not be intended to 
benefit or further himself. […] Superpowers [go beyond] the abilities of the science-
fiction supermen who came before [….] The identity element comprises the codename 
and the costume, with the secret identity being a customary counterpart to the codename. 
(25-26) 
The first and third appear in other genres, and the second intensifies pulp tropes, but the three 
taken together, coupled with the visual iconography that Action Comics #1 introduced—that 
close-fitting, circus-acrobat costume—constitute a recognizable constellation. Yet for all the 
lucidity of Coogan’s definition, I find more remarkable a piece of evidence that Coogan adduces 
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to support it: judge Learned Hand’s 29 April 1940 opinion in the case of Detective Comics, Inc., 
v. Bruns Publications, Inc., et al. Detective Comics had sued Bruns Publications for unlawfully 
copying Superman in Bruns’s Wonderman series. Hand notes three ways that Wonderman copies 
Superman: Wonderman styles its star “champion of the oppressed,” as Action Comics styled 
Superman; Wonderman possesses preternatural strength and immunity to firearms; and 
Wonderman “at times conceals his strength beneath ordinary clothing” only to reveal “a skintight 
acrobatic costume” beneath. Moreover, judge Hand’s opinion cites two precedents, Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation and Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. The specifics of 
those two cases matter less to me than what judge Hand’s citation tells us about industrial 
practice: since at least April 1940 the comics business and Hollywood have influenced one 
another. The cross-pollination between the comics and movie industries has exchanged not just 
“content” to remediate but also legal precedents, a body of intellectual property law that 
regulated the two industries even before conglomeration brought them together. 
 
Theorizing a Corporate Genre, II: Adaptation  
Many critics have regarded adaptation from print to screen media as impure, aesthetically 
and even morally. I will therefore aim in this project to develop a critical and politically minded 
analysis while also avoiding simplistic complaints about the venality of Hollywood or the 
supposed autonomy of less commercial spheres of aesthetic production, such as art film or 
autobiographical indie comics. I see the adaptation of superheroes by Hollywood as a process in 
which both commercial and aesthetic impulses clash, productively, resulting neither in the 
enslavement of the artistic by the instrumental, nor in a free and egalitarian space of intermedial 
play. Linda Hutcheon defines the word adaptation as having three complementary senses: first as 
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“a formal entity or product”; second as a “process” of “(re-) interpretation and then (re-) 
creation”; and third as a mode of reception, in that “we experience adaptations […] as 
palimpsests through our memory of other works” (7-8). My understanding of adaptation involves 
all three senses, in that the industrial process informs my reception of the works themselves. My 
later chapters on the Warner Brothers’ Batman films of the 2000s and Watchmen (Zack Snyder, 
2009) will examine those films in detail as case studies of these aesthetic and institutional 
practices. However, first I must outline the five major premises about Hollywood’s adaptation of 
superheroes that underlie my allegorical reading of the hero as a proprietary brand. 
First, unlike adaptations of Shakespeare plays or recent young-adult novels, films of 
comic-book superhero stories do not adapt a single text. Case studies of novels adapted for the 
screen have long constituted the bulk of academic articles on transmedia adaptation involving 
cinema, with works like George Bluestone’s Novels to Film and Kamila Elliott’s Rethinking the 
Novel-Film Debate predominating among monographs. Since 2000, adaptation studies has 
increasingly looked beyond the novel-film pairing; work on what Leitch calls “post-literary 
adaptation” in Film Adaptation and its Discontents (257-59) has gained an increasing share of 
the field, as scholars look at the ways that cinema adapts non-literary texts like serial comics. 
Furthermore, the newer (and predominantly European) subfield of intermediality studies 
abandons the typically one-directional interest in adaptations of media to the screen, instead 
looking at adaptation as a variety of processes that obtain wherever artists look to media outside 
those in which they work. This project treats Hollywood’s adaptations of superheroes less as a 
flow from the comics page to the screen and more as a circulation among these two media and 
others both within a conglomerate and between franchisor and franchisee. Leitch argues that 
“adaptation studies has been haunted by concepts and premises it has repudiated in principle but 
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continued to rely on in practice” (“Adaptation” 63); among those premises he lists the “fallacy” 
that “[a]daptations are adapting exactly one text apiece” (“Twelve,” 164). As Marvel and DC 
integrate formerly separate superhero franchises into more coherent, comic-book-style 
“universes”—in which Iron Man and Captain America team up, or in which Superman and 
Batman fight—it has become obvious that we must treat the sources of these films as radically 
multiple. The films’ aesthetic work thus becomes legible as the creation of temporary coherence 
out of a mass of incoherent originals and alternate versions. 
 Second, this project presumes that superheroes exist as a narrative content that can be 
separated from the medium of monthly comics. Hutcheon characterizes two broad schools 
among adaptation scholars: “either a story can exist independently of any embodiment in any 
particular signifying system or, on the contrary, it cannot be considered separately from its 
material mode of mediation” (10). In the case of relatively self-contained source works like 
novels, I hew closer to the latter position. However, with superhero comics, we rarely find a 
“self-contained” source; the films instead raid characters and stories as their makers see fit, 
ranging over decades of monthly issues and prior adaptations for the screen; therefore, I hew 
closer to the first position when it comes to a character like Spider-Man, who (now) exists 
autonomously from Amazing Fantasy #15, where he debuted in 1962. André Bazin noted that 
scenarists and directors in the “tradition of quality” treated characters as something to extract 
from their narrative and stylistic contexts; these filmmakers use novels as a source of 
characters and adventures largely independent of their literary framework. Javert or 
D’Artagnan have become part of a mythology existing outside the novels. They enjoy in 
some measure an autonomous existence of which the original works are no longer 
anything more than an accidental and almost superfluous manifestation. (53) 
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Contra Truffaut, Bazin did not see this as aesthetically crippling for the cinema. Nor did their 
contemporary George Bluestone, who admired the filmmaker who “looks not to the organic 
novel, whose language in inseparable from its theme, but to characters and incidents which have 
somehow detached themselves form language and, like the heroes of folk legends, have achieved 
a mythic life of their own” (62). In his 2000 Batman Unmasked: Analyzing a Cultural Icon, Will 
Brooker offers a similar argument, calling Batman “a staple of popular culture” whose narratives 
“must contain elements of the familiar for the public’s investment in him to remain fluid and 
active. The public interest in Batman stems from collective memory of Batman’s origins and 
stylistic elements rather than the minute details of the comic book narratives” (40). And in his 
2012 Hunting the Dark Knight: Twenty-First Century Batman, Brooker argues that because of 
the multiplicity of Batman texts, a Batman film, “even when drawn from a manageable set of 
texts, is more akin to a new film of Robin Hood’s adventures than to a film of Jane Austen’s 
Emma; that is, its source is closer to folklore than to a literary novel” (65). In strictly formal 
terms, I agree with Brooker on this point. Today, most commentators treat superheroes as 
mobile, disconnected from any originary text.  
Third, despite their ubiquity, and against Brooker’s folklore comparison, DC and Marvel 
superheroes do not constitute a common heritage in any economic or legal sense, because 
corporate executives not accountable to the public manage this intellectual property on behalf of 
shareholders. Brooker, arguing against the tendency of journalists and fans to battle over the 
merits of different eras and styles of Batman, ends Hunting the Dark Knight by claiming that the 
multiplicity of the character supports an effectively infinite number of interpretations: “Who is 
the Batman? […] Imagine him. Feel free. He’s yours” (219). Against Brooker, I argue that 
treating Batman as “popular” culture reifies a corporate brand in precisely the way that marketers 
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want brand-loyal customers to reify it. Treating a corporate superhero as “mine” mystifies my 
relationship to the commodities I buy, the texts I read or watch, and the culture that I inhabit. 
That many people who do not read comics know the basics of the Batman universe does not 
mean that Batman represents any “public interest,” let alone “the public’s investment,” as many 
people also know the basics of McDonalds’ costumed mascots or which athletes Nike sponsors, 
whether or not they buy products from either company. However, to conflate familiarity with a 
brand with the public’s “investment” in that brand not only misunderstands the nature of the 
economic relationship that we call the corporation (even the “publicly” traded corporation), it 
also does the work of that corporation’s marketing department for them. 
This project therefore recognizes that although superhero adaptations draw on a wide 
array of sources produced over decades, we must not carelessly conflate them with narrative 
traditions hailing from before or outside the regimes of intellectual property in which media 
conglomerates operate. Against Bluestone’s reference to the “folk” and the “mythic,” we must 
remember that the culture industries produce copyrighted myth, or, as Adorno put it, “synthetic 
folklore” (“How” 175). And against Brooker’s argument about Emma, we must remember that 
both Austen’s novel and Robin Hood, but not Batman, constitute public domain, which anyone 
may use without paying licensing fees. Caren Irr describes the development of copyright law in 
the 18th century as advancing the interests of booksellers, on the model of anti-piracy laws 
advancing the interests of mercantilist trade companies moving commodities on the high seas; 
these laws directly benefitted traders while only incidentally benefitting producers (798). In the 
past century of “this enclosure of the global textual commons,” Irr writes, “Disney has seized 
monopolistic hold over the folk and fairy tales of a Brothers-Grimm-type heritage,” and “Time 
Warner aims to acquire exclusive access to recent history in the form of the Zapruder tapes” 
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(797). Although the Internet has created opportunities for people with little or no capital to fund, 
create, and disseminate artworks, proprietary media brands constitute a significant part of the 
means of cultural production. An outsider’s original superhero comic or film script could not 
compete with DC or Marvel heroes in the marketplace on the duopoly’s terms. Even people 
within the culture industries who express excitement about “the radical democratization of access 
toward creative tools, media, and audience engagement” also express alarm at “the trend toward 
consolidation and centralization in the business” (Salkowitz 1). I read the remediation of 
established comic-book superheroes as one of capital’s strategies for consolidating and 
centralizing, increasing their control over labor while reducing risk. By channeling creative work 
within established brands, corporations orchestrate the creation new intellectual property on the 
foundations of the old, which in turn becomes the means of producing later narratives. As Marx 
and Engels put it in The German Ideology, “man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to 
him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him” (53). New labor in the culture 
industries confronts the alienated labor of previous generations.  
 Fourth, in my analyses, I consider useful the question of how a film deviates from or 
revises its source material, whether that material hails from comic books or from earlier film 
adaptations. Inevitably in the study of adaptation arises the question of the film’s fidelity to its 
source(s), but rather than give a simple answer, we should respond with refining questions, such 
as, fidelity to what—style or fabula, character or syuzhet? Who desires fidelity, and why? And 
who tells me that I should desire fidelity?5 Leitch argues that another fallacy has haunted 
                                                
5 Pascal LeFèvre points out that a superhero film truly concerned with “fidelity” would use 
cartoon animation rather than live action (or even CG). The question of the visual ontology of a 
live-action film version comic-book character, while provocative, lies beyond the interests of this 
study, especially because more and more of that movie hero’s screen time is generated by digital 
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adaptation studies: the normative, moralistic idea “that adaptations ought to be faithful to their 
ostensible source texts” (64). Yet as Elliott points out, “fidelity has always been robustly 
challenged in adaptation studies” (24). I will therefore treat fidelity not as a normative ideal for 
the art object but instead as hermeneutic tool for the critic: comparison of a film with its sources 
reveals the choices that filmmakers and brand-managers have made, and these choices tell us 
about their goals and their ideas about the audience. I agree with John Bryant that fidelity offers 
one means of “measuring” “the critical distances between and among adaptive versions,” thereby 
aiding the critic’s “analysis of the strategies of revision perceived in the making of these textual 
distances” (49). However, Bryant’s interest lies with the strategies of individual filmmakers, 
insofar as the critic can reconstruct them; my interest centers on industrial strategies for 
exploiting intellectual property not just in a given film but also across a larger transmedia 
franchise. For movie audiences and journalists, fidelity seems to have little normative value, at 
least where superheroes are concerned; as Liam Burke puts it, “fidelity is the stick used to beat a 
film if it is bad” (“From Static to Motion” 31). When a movie succeeds, conglomerates can 
afford to pay little attention to comic fandom’s demands about fidelity to textual sources. 
 Fifth, this project assumes that the adaptation of comic-book superheroes for the screen 
has effects not just on the screen but in the comics and in other media as well. I do not claim 
novelty in this; Elliott notes that too many adaptation scholars claim to have invented the wheel 
of “two-way exchanges” between source and adaptation (25). Instead, I recognize how 
conglomerates manage narrative brands. Companies like Marvel curate proprietary characters for 
a multiplicity of platforms, including platforms not yet launched. Adorno saw adaptation as the 
paradigm of capital’s instrumentalization of art:  
                                                                                                                                                       
means. See LeFèvre, “Incompatible Visual Ontologies?” and Burke, The Comic Book Film 
Adaptation.  
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All mass culture is fundamentally adaptation. However, this adaptive character, the 
monopolistic filter which protects it from any external rays of influence which have not 
already been safely accommodated within its reified schema, represents an adjustment of 
the consumers as well. The pre-digested quality of the product prevails, justifies itself and 
establishes itself all the more firmly in so far as it constantly refers to those who cannot 
digest anything not already pre-digested. (“Schema” 67) 
The re-working of past successes does diminish capital’s risks. However, Adorno wrongly 
(though maybe strategically) invests high or modernist art forms with an aura of originality and 
autonomy despite their constant re-working of and responses to the topoi and techniques of past 
arts, and their production according to institutional and economic logics of their own. Bazin, in 
optimistic contrast, sees adaptation as a cultural good, in that it motivates some fraction of the 
film’s audience to seek out and “know the original” (65). However, he points out that “[t]his 
argument is supported by publishers’ statistics that show a rise in the sale of literary works after 
they have been adapted to the screen” (65). Bazin’s grounds for optimism constitute grounds for 
Adornian critique, especially in the context of media conglomerates that own both the film studio 
and the book publisher (and the computer game studio, and the home video manufacturer, and so 
on). Apart from unlicensed versions of proprietary characters—what Henry Jenkins, after Michel 
de Certeau, called the work of textual poachers—no version of these trademarked characters 
operates outside the supervision of corporate managers. Yet we need not see this as dooming 
proprietary characters to serve only reactionary or acquisitive ends; compromised by corporate 
logic, superhero narratives still offer glimpses of ways to live outside the logic of neoliberal 
capitalism. Therein, I argue, lies their appeal. 
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Theorizing a Corporate Genre, III: A History of Superhero Media 
This dissertation will primarily examine DC and Marvel superhero films released 
between 2000 and 2012. With 20th Century Fox’s summer hit X-Men (Bryan Singer, 2000), the 
struggling Marvel Entertainment established a mass market for their films. By 2012, Marvel’s 
Avengers (Joss Whedon, 2012) had solidified their developing Marvel Cinematic Universe, 
linking cross-referenced films (Iron Man, The Incredible Hulk, Thor, and Captain America: The 
First Avenger). Meanwhile, in 2005 DC Comics and Warner Brothers, experienced blockbuster 
players, rebooted their Batman cycle with Batman Begins (Christopher Nolan), in the process 
refining non-proprietary elements of the superhero genre formula that Marvel would then 
borrow. Warner Brothers set a new bar for critical acclaim and box-office performance with The 
Dark Knight (Christopher Nolan, 2008), sequel to Batman Begins, which grossed a billion 
dollars worldwide. Again, box office figures only hint at the scale of Time Warner’s revenues 
from all the Batman-related sales and licensing that this film cycle motivated. 
Commerce has always shaped the superhero genre, as have the intellectual property laws 
that allow the profitable licensing of characters into other media. Comic books themselves began 
as a remediation of newspaper strips, collections of previously published material, printed on 
cheap paper and saddle stapled (Gardner 64). Superman and other characters of the so-called 
“Golden Age” of American comics combined elements that writers borrowed or stole from 
pulps, folklore, and contemporary film. Managers then codified those combinations in ways that 
would allow them to secure copyrights to the creations of their employees. Behind every 
trademarked character stands intellectual property law and the state’s power to enforce it; as Paul 
Grainge reminds us in Brand Hollywood, “Ultimately, the status of any brand is secured by its 
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legal recognition as intellectual property” (11). Using this framework of law, comics publishers 
could license characters to producers of other media.  
As soon as the superhero emerged in comics in 1938, publishers looked for ways to 
license out the characters they owned, following precedents established by publishers of pulp 
magazines and newspaper comic strips. Newspaper syndicates had been licensing their 
characters to remediate into cheap, give-away booklet form since 1917 (Bongco 95), but only in 
1934 did a publisher develop a so-called comic book for sale on newsstands (Jones 100). In 
1938, when National went looking for stories to fill their Action Comics, they bought 
“Superman,” by two Jewish boys from Cleveland. By 1941, National had parlayed this hit into a 
radio serial and a comic strip appearing in over two hundred newspapers. National’s entry into 
the movie business came when they licensed Superman to Paramount, who hired Fleischer 
Studios to produce animated shorts (158).6 In contrast to the high production values of the 
Fleischer Superman, the 1941 live-action Adventures of Captain Marvel, produced by Republic 
Pictures on license from Fawcett Publications, look shabby. Republic, the Poverty Row studio 
known for serials and singing cowboys, also produced Captain America (1944) for competitor 
Timely Comics (who would later become Marvel)7.  
Superman received the genre’s first feature-length movie treatment in 1951, with the 
inauspicious 58-minute Superman and the Mole Men. Sam Katzman, who had produced both the 
Superman (1948) and Atom Man vs. Superman (1950) serials for Columbia, turned out Mole Men 
                                                
6 In the early comics, Superman traveled by leaping up to “an eighth of a mile” at a time (Siegel, 
“Champion” 4). However, Max and Dave Fleischer thought that flying would look better on 
screen, so they added this power (“First Flight”). National then wrote this new power into the 
comics, an early example of two-way exchange between branches of a superhero franchise. 
7 In the 1930s and 1940s, the US comics market had not yet settled into its present duopoly of 
DC and Marvel. In 1951, National sued Fawcett, claiming that Captain Marvel infringed on 
Superman; see “National Comics Publications v. Fawcett.” National won, Fawcett folded, and 
National bought them out, then began making their own Captain Marvel comics. 
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on a tiny budget at Lippert Pictures to promote the upcoming Adventures of Superman (1952-
1958) television series, already in production (“Superman and the Mole Men”). By then, the 
superhero fad had ended in the comics, but Superman thrived on TV. The 1960s saw more 
superheroes licensed for television, but Batman (1966-1968), which aired at prime time on ABC, 
made DC a bonanza in licensing revenues and became all but metonymous for superheroes in 
public discourse.8 The ABC series’ camp tone and pop-art visuals only strengthened the genre’s 
association with low-budget filmmaking, four-color comics, and cheap plastic toys. Only with 
the release of Superman: The Movie (Richard Donner, 1978) did a major studio put its name on a 
high-budget superhero film. Produced independently by Alexander and Ilya Salkind but 
distributed by Warner Brothers, Superman boasted major stars (Marlon Brando, Gene Hackman) 
and a self-conscious seriousness that the genre had never received on screen.9 The 1970s had 
already witnessed the development of blockbuster filmmaking techniques that Superman would 
use. Jaws (Steven Spielberg, 1975) set the precedent of saturation marketing via television, to 
generate huge opening box-office figures and concomitant news coverage. Star Wars (George 
Lucas, 1977) treated the serial heroics of Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon and to a lavish special-
effects budget and, more importantly, extensive tie-in marketing, which ranged from a Star Wars 
radio play and soundtrack albums, to a Marvel Comics Star Wars series (which ran until 1987) 
and the ubiquitous Kenner toys. Textually, Star Wars paid homage to its serial roots with its 
disingenuous “Episode IV” text crawl, creating ersatz nostalgia for non-existent “episodes” in 
                                                
8 Even into the 2000s, journalists covering superhero blockbusters continued using 
onomatopoeia—pow, zap, and so on—in the titles of their articles, still riffing on the Adam West 
series. On the rush for Batman merchandise, see Avi Santo’s “Batman versus The Green Hornet: 
The Merchandisable TV Text and the Paradox of Licensing in the Classical Network Era.” 
9 A 1969 merger had brought both Warner Brothers and DC Comics into the portfolio of Kinney 
National Services; when the conglomerate divided in 1971, Warner Communications 
Incorporated took media holdings that included Warner Brothers and DC Comics. See Gustafson 
(578). 
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the series.10 Eighteen months after Star Wars opened, Superman: The Movie also began with a 
self-conscious, paratextual reference to earlier, low-prestige media, but with still more emphasis. 
A widescreen, black-and-white shot shows a curtain opening to frame an Academy-ratio 
screen within the screen, where “June 1983” appears on black. On this para-diegetic screen a 
black-and-white image of an issue of Action Comics fades into view; the cover shows a rocket 
hurtling from an exploding planet. The comic lies on a patterned rug, and a child’s hand begins 
to turn its pages, such that the camera’s point of view, and therefore ours, becomes that of the 
child reading on the floor. That the child reads on a floor signifies that this is not prestigious 
reading done at a desk in school or on a pew in church; this is play. A child’s voice-over tells us,   
In the decade of the Nineteen-Thirties, even the great city of Metropolis was not spared 
the ravages of the worldwide Depression. In a time of fear and confusion the job of 
informing the public was the responsibility of The Daily Planet, a great metropolitan 
newspaper, whose reputation for clarity and truth had become a symbol of hope for the 
city of Metropolis. 
The child turns the pages of the comic, which depict city scenes, but not Superman, and the 
camera pushes in on a panel depicting the upper part of the Daily Planet building, which 
resembles that from the Adventures of Superman television show; moreover, the phrase “great 
metropolitan newspaper” would have been familiar to viewers from show’s opening narration, 
strengthening the association with that earlier iteration of the hero. A dissolve replaces the 
cartoon Daily Planet building with a real one, and our view swoops over it and into the night 
sky. As blue credits begin to rush toward the viewer, the diegetic curtains open fully, such that 
the two-screen effect ends, and the film’s full-color credits begin.  
                                                
10 See, for example, the text-crawl recaps in Universal’s The Phantom Creeps (Ford Beebe, Saul 
A. Goodkind, 1939). 
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In two ways this sequence establishes narrative and affective paradigms for Hollywood’s 
blockbuster treatment of superheroes. First, it foregrounds the mass media from decades past: the 
Academy-ratio movie from Hollywood’s classical era, the comic book from the days when 
comics had not finished growing into a mass medium, and the 20-years-defunct TV show (still in 
syndication through the 1970s and 1980s). These allusions direct the viewer backwards into 
memory. Second, the sequence sutures the viewer into a nostalgic reading position. We see the 
world as it might have looked in the 1930s or 1940s, or as an adult viewer in 1978 might wish to 
recall the world looking. Moreover, we see that world from the optical point of view of a child. 
Matt Yockey argues that this sequence exemplifies the Superman franchise’s “constructed sense 
of childhood dependent upon nostalgia” (30). I would go further: this sequence, at the historical 
dawn of the superhero blockbuster, presents narrative and affective tropes that would thereafter 
characterize the genre. The absence of Superman’s likeness, his S-logo, or even his name from 
this sequence creates suspense, but we can also read his absence as proleptic loss: the scene 
invites us to remember enjoying Superman—whether in the comics, on the TV, or at the 
matinee—and to miss those absent pleasures. The narration offers not only the Daily Planet but 
also, by metonymy, Superman himself, as a nostalgic talisman of “hope” against the “fear” and 
“confusion” of the Great Depression. Zack Snyder’s 2013 Man of Steel explicitly incorporates 
this discourse into the diegesis: when Lois Lane asks the yet-unnamed super-man, “What’s the S 
stand for?” he replies, “It’s not an S. On my world, it means ‘hope.’”  
Hope, like nostalgia, has a temporal dimension. The superhero symbolizes not happiness, 
or security, or belonging, but a proleptic sense that things—economic downturns, media 
franchises—might get better. Lauren Berlant might describe our relation to the hope offered by 
the superhero genre as one of “cruel optimism,” in which the object of desire is actually “a 
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cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us” (93). 
Our desire for this cluster thus constitutes “a relation of attachment to compromised conditions 
of possibility whose realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too 
possible, and toxic” [Berlant’s emphasis] (94). Intradiegetically, Superman supposedly gives 
people hope, though what he gives them hope about the narratives seldom make clear; after all, 
Superman can’t prevent every automobile crash or metastatic tumor or mass shooting. 
Furthermore, as Umberto Eco and many commentators since have pointed out, the superhero 
functions to maintain the status quo: although Superman has enough power to “take over the 
government, defeat the army, or alter the equilibrium of planetary politics,” he mainly thwarts 
crime (122). Superman never has an ambitious scheme; he thwarts ambitious schemes.  So we in 
the audience have no reason to hope that he will arrange the prosecution of Wall Street bankers, 
return Guantanamo Bay to Cuba, or nationalize Time Warner. Instead, Superman gives us para-
diegetic hope maybe we will enjoy some Superman story in the future, the way we remember 
enjoying a Superman story in the past. This project seeks to parse such affective appeals, and 
their intelligibility within the conservative horizons of possibility that this genre offers. 
After 1978, Hollywood superhero films integrate their nostalgia more seamlessly into the 
narrative, rather than front-loading it in a pre-credits direct address to the viewer. If the opening 
sequence of Superman: The Movie models nostalgia and an affectively intense relationship with 
media objects, then the rest of the film elaborates it. Some forty minutes in, Clark Kent discovers 
a crystal that contains recordings from his lost home planet of Krypton, including a semi-
autonomous re-creation of his father’s personality; this media ghost tells Clark that by the time 
he finds the crystal, the father “will have been dead for many thousands of your years.” This 
constitutes the film superhero genre’s signature representation of media objects: they bring us 
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closer to a person or a time we desire, but that asymptotic movement can not deliver, cannot 
satisfy. Like the adult curating mementos of a vanished childhood or a dead parent, we find 
ourselves always too late. These affects also recall those of the comic-book collector or the 
media fan, whose desire may cathect in the fictional character or fictional world as a means of 
obtaining the feelings that those media objects promise, whether in their marketing or in their 
address to the audience. Walter Benjamin, writing about moving his library, noted that the book 
collector’s “passion borders on the chaos of memories” (60). He exclaims about the memories 
that “crowd in” upon him as he unpacks (66). Superhero blockbusters also activate audience 
memories, both through the superhero genre’s seriality in general, and also through memories of 
the particular character. They also activate hopes about future media. The open endings of these 
films often contain explicit promises from their heroes to continue fighting crime; Marvel 
Studios added end-credits teasers that introduce actors and characters yet to come in the 
franchise, and Fox has imitated them in their X-Men films. Such devices appear most salient in 
superhero movies that fail: Daredevil (Mark Steven Johnson, 2003) ends with both of its villains 
still alive and the vigilante saying, in voice-over, “Hell's Kitchen is my neighborhood. I prowl 
the rooftops and alleyways at night, watching from the darkness. Forever in darkness.” The 
heroine of the disastrous Catwoman (Pitof, 2004) ends with another rooftop voiceover: “And so, 
my journey begins.” These narrations use the present tense to make their subtext as clear as Eon 
Productions’ explicit end-credits promise, “James Bond will return.” Superhero movies thus 
rehearse for us the excitement that producers want us to feel about the hero’s return; the greatest 
power of these films may lie in their ability to depict a past that we cannot recover and a future 
no better than the present. Within the larger context of Hollywood’s exploitation of decades-old 
intellectual property, this project explicates ways that nostalgia and hope become obverses of one 
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another within these films, offering complementary temporal modes of relating to a fictional 
brand in an objectionable present.   
Although many of the narrative and commercial features of this genre coalesced in the 
1970s, it did not explode until the 2000s, when it proved ideally suited to the new home video 
format of DVD. At least since the success of Spider-Man (Sam Raimi, 2002), commentators 
working both inside and outside the industry have recited the qualities of superhero comics that 
made them attractive to studios in the 21st century: characters already familiar not only to the 
target demographic of young males but also to nostalgic parents; characters whose four-color 
likenesses reproduce well at low resolutions, on lunchboxes and smartphone cases; the absence 
of adult sexual relationships, which would exclude teenagers from cinemas and invite censorship 
overseas; emphasis on action, rather than dialogue, which exports well to non-Anglophone 
markets; open-ended, serial narratives, which lend themselves easily to sequels; and, most 
importantly, the status of superheroes as intellectual property owned not by individual creators, 
but by corporations. In the case of Time Warner, they already owned not only DC Comics, with 
its stable of Superman, Batman, Wonder Woman, and thousands more, but also Warner Brothers, 
a major studio and a leader in the home video market.  
In contrast to DC’s relatively stable position since 1971 as a subsidiary of a media 
conglomerate that also owned a major studio, Marvel had a more tortuous path. In 1968 
publisher Martin Goodman sold Marvel Comics to the Perfect Film and Chemical Corporation, 
which later changed its name to Cadence Industries; from there, Marvel would pass through 
other companies’ hands, including Roger Corman’s New World Pictures (“Marvel 
Entertainment”). In 1989, “corporate raider and junk-bond king” Ron Perelman bought Marvel 
for his McAndrews & Forbes Group, and thereafter, Marvel bought up toy and trading-card 
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companies, seeking to build itself into a media conglomerate (D. Johnson, “Will” 70). Perelman 
said that he wanted Marvel to become a “mini-Disney in terms of intellectual property” (qtd. in 
Lott). Disney provided the model and apotheosis of intellectual-property management. As Paul 
Grainge has argued, “The history of modern entertainment branding is inextricably linked with 
the Disney Company and its transition in the 1950s from a studio specializing in cartoon 
animation to a company whose activities would [integrate] leisure markets, connecting movie 
production to developments in television, tourism, theme parks and consumer merchandise” (44). 
Marvel aspired to such integration. After IMS Capital Value Fund bought a significant portion of 
Marvel in 2002, a manager at IMS remarked, “Marvel needs to be sold to a larger entertainment 
company, like Disney or AOL Time Warner, with the leverage to make better films and promote 
the library of characters […] but it could take four to five years of momentum-building before 
we see a deal of that kind” (qtd. in Oestricher). It took Marvel seven years of momentum-
building, but they got their first choice.  
Disney’s strategy of corporate “synergy” made them synonymous with characters that 
had become effectively autonomous from the films in which they originally appeared. Mike 
Budd has argued that this synergy makes “every Disney product […] both a commodity and an 
ad for every other Disney commodity” and enables every new text to strengthen “the Disney 
brand” (1). Marvel imitated that strategy and added a rhetoric of custodianship to legitimate their 
practices to established fans. In 2008, Marvel Studios chair David Maisel said of his company, 
“We are in the Iron Man business […] so whether it be a major motion picture or a video game, 
we have somewhat of an obligation to our fans and the consumer to stay involved with the 
creative process” (qtd. in Ward). Marvel’s licensing of their characters to movie studios—Blade 
to New Line, the X-Men to 20th Century Fox, Spider-Man to Columbia—not only gave Marvel 
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the capital to climb out of bankruptcy in the 1990s, but it also presented Marvel as a powerful 
brand to would-be franchisees and investors. As Johnson put it in 2007, Marvel “failed to 
duplicate the corporate structure of Disney or Time Warner,” but “settled for the creative 
structure” of such a conglomerate [his emphasis] (“Will” 71). This strategy worked, and by 
2009, Marvel had succeeded so well as managers of intellectual property that Disney bought 
them out. 
Now, the American comics duopoly operates within an armature of two much larger 
media conglomerates. Thomas Schatz, writing on conglomerate Hollywood in the 2000s, argues 
that “[t]he business of the major studios is making and selling franchise-sustaining blockbuster 
hits—i.e., calculated megafilms designed to sustain a product line of similar films and an ever-
expanding array of related entertainment products, all of which benefit the parent conglomerates’ 
various media-and-entertainment divisions” (30). American superhero comics, no longer a mass 
medium, serve as sources of content for these franchises. As business writer Rob Salkowitz puts 
it, “Comics are the hamster running in the wheel at the center of this gigantic media contraption” 
(4). Writers within the movie industry even use the superhero film genre as a metonym for the 
successful tentpole film: Edward Jay Epstein does so throughout The Hollywood Economist; 
producer Lynda Obst, in her 2013 memoir Sleepless in Hollywood, in defining the term tentpole 
for unfamiliar readers, gives twenty-three examples of successful tentpole films, of which nine 
adapt superhero comics (5). Within the media industry, comic books and superheroes now 
function as means toward other ends. 
This project argues that superhero films pursue those ends in part by interpellating 
viewers into brand loyalty. However, I sometimes assume the parameters of that interpellation 
without exhaustively interrogating them. One such parameter is gender. Paul Lopes argues that 
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during the comics industry’s long decline from the 1950s to the 1980s, DC and Marvel survived 
by appealing to a narrowing audience of “teen and young adult male readers” (73). The birth of 
the “direct market” of dedicated comic-book shops in the 1970s led to a further decline in 
readership “among all females and also among male child readers”; the duopoly bet heavily on 
one genre, the superhero, and that genre’s core audience (104). The conventional wisdom among 
Hollywood market researchers holds that teen and young adult males constitute the audience 
segment most easily induced to buy franchise commodities, which explains why Hollywood 
mined superhero comics during the so-called DVD boom of the 2000s. However, this project 
does not examine why marketers consider young males such an easy sell, or how the dominance 
of men in positions of power both in Hollywood and elsewhere in the media industries might 
shape demographic phenomena that commentators treat as given. While this project does analyze 
in some depth the ways that the genre handles race, specifically Blackness, it generally leaves 
gender for future study. By focusing on interpellation and nostalgia as the means that these films 
exploit older intellectual property, I aim to help other scholars better frame their own political 
and ideological analyses of the ways that conglomerates adapt old media for new purposes. 
 
Situating this Project 
 I conceive of this project as a work of interdisciplinary cultural studies in the tradition of 
the Frankfurt and Birmingham schools. Although I use formalist methods such as the close 
reading of visual techniques within films, I also use historicist methods to situate films in their 
industrial contexts of production and their social contexts of reception by academics, journalists, 
and ordinary movie viewers. Superhero blockbusters typically employ bricolage, drawing on 
visual, narrative, and character elements chosen from decades of comic books and other media, 
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in order to create multi-layered texts that will engage both casual popcorn-munchers and 
dedicated fans. Cultural studies uses a similar methodological strategy; as Cary Nelson, Paula 
Treichler, and Lawrence Grossberg put it, cultural studies “could best be seen as bricolage,” 
drawing “from whatever fields are necessary to produce the knowledge required for a particular 
project” (2). The culture industries borrow and copy from each other as far as the law allows 
(and sometimes beyond), so throughout this project, I will borrow methods and hermeneutic 
frameworks as necessary, not only from academic disciplines but also from the culture 
industries, to help me accomplish my goals. My methods, neither hermetic, nor autonomous, nor 
pure, thus match my object.  
 Recent scholarly work on the comics industry and its relationships to other media both 
inform this project and motivate its explorations of under-theorized topics. Superhero 
blockbusters have become an object of growing interest to scholars, especially since Marvel 
Studios initiated its interconnected “Marvel Cinematic Universe” cycle of films. Derek 
Johnson’s work on Marvel Studios and Adilifu Nama’s work on Black superheroes provide 
different starting points for my own analyses, as does Andrew Hoberek’s 2014 monograph on 
Watchmen. However, although these writers look at the relationships between superhero movies 
and comics, none takes movies as his primary object of study. 2015 did see the publication of 
Liam Burke’s monograph The Comic Book Film Adaptation: Exploring Modern Hollywood's 
Leading Genre, but as its title suggests, Burke uses a definition of genre far broader than the one 
that I use here; moreover, despite acknowledging the conglomerate structure of Hollywood, 
Burke does not offer a sustained ideological critique of these films. For example, although 
American Splendor (Shari Springer Berman and Robert Pulcini, 2003) and The Dark Knight 
(Christopher Nolan, 2008) both adapt material from comics, their resemblance ends there. One, a 
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self-reflexive, low-budget indie production, adapts comics produced outside the work-for-hire 
system of the Marvel-DC duopoly, while the other occupies the center of a conglomerate’s 
transmedia brand, based on corporate-owned intellectual property, and partly shot on IMAX. 
Jared Gardner’s Projections: Comics and the History of Twenty-First Century Storytelling 
bridges comics and film studies, but he devotes relatively little of his book to Hollywood, and 
still less to the ways that superhero movies model affective relationships to media that are 
commercially useful to the owners of intellectual property. In the 2009 Demanding Respect: The 
Evolution of the American Comic Book, Paul Lopes demystifies the relations between workers 
and owners in the US comics industry. The chronology of comic books used by fandom—
Golden Age, Silver Age, and so on—obscures the industrial relations of production between 
artists and writers and their publishers; Lopes instead distinguishes between an Industrial Age 
(1930s to 1980s) and a Heroic Age (1980s to present) on the basis of the principles of aesthetic 
autonomy and authorship that comics artists and writers claimed regarding their work. This 
project also draws on older work on comics and superheroes, with a particular debt to Richard 
Reynolds’s Superheroes: A Modern Mythology, which offers a lucid explication of the different 
levels of continuity at work in monthly comics, as well as an analysis of the essentially passive 
and antagonistic narrative function of the superhero.11 
Works of film and media theory that attend to the commercial logic of Hollywood since 
the 1980s inform my work throughout. Of central importance is the model of genre advanced by 
Rick Altman in Film/Genre, which depends on the tension between non-proprietary, generic 
elements and the proprietary, branded elements from which studios not only develop cycles of 
                                                
11 Mythological criticism of superheroes usually suffers from a lack of theoretical or historical 
rigor, if not the dilettantism of slumming literature scholars, but Reynolds’s book proves the 
exception. 
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linked films but also connect those cycles to larger transmedia entertainment brands. Linda 
Hutcheon’s Theory of Adaptation and Thomas Leitch’s Film Adaptation and its Discontents both 
situate older questions about authorship and process in detailed studies of the production and 
reception of individual films. Justin Wyatt’s High Concept presents a history of the development 
of filmmaking driven primarily by marketing and cross-promotion logics. Toby Miller et al.’s 
Global Hollywood and Allen Scott’s On Hollywood both present political economies of 
Hollywood as a labor market, offering necessary correctives to even leftist film scholars’ habit of 
forgetting that it takes a small army of workers to make a Hollywood movie. These books 
remind us that Hollywood workers belong to guilds and unions, forms of organization that 
workers in other industries, such as comics, do not enjoy. Derek Johnson’s Media Franchising 
and Jonathan Gray’s Show Sold Separately explicate the ways that companies manage brands 
across multiple media platforms, delving into media paratexts and trade literature to show how 
convergent media brands lay claims to innovation, quality, and authenticity. Both serve as 
models for my own work beyond the confines of individual superhero films, into their 
promotional paratexts as well as their reception. Scholarship on the relationship between 
blockbuster filmmaking and marketing also helps me orient these analyses. Jean-Marc Lehu 
writes Branded Entertainment for students of marketing, and he makes clear the goal of the 
trade: to create mystique that leads customers to repeated purchases. Scott Lash and Celia Lury’s 
Global Culture Industry approaches from a critical, Marxian position, seeking to de-mystify 
filmic reifications of intellectual property.  
 The resultant project offers a functionalist analysis of a body of films interpreted as texts 
that aim to recruit viewers into loyalty to privately-held media brands, despite the film 
characters’ avowal of altruistic, non-acquisitive values. In recruiting viewers into transmedia 
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fandom, these films serve as corporate pedagogy, training viewers not only to enjoy but also to 
remember and to anticipate enjoying certain kinds of media address and certain resolutions to 
real problems. Simultaneously these films obscure the actual economic relations behind their 
production, relations that do not benefit most viewers. Moreover, much as superheroes avow 
altruistic values, so do the real-life brand managers in charge of those superheroes, in a rhetoric 
that inverts the acquisitive and exploitative logic that actually governs media conglomerates and 
the banks that lend them money. Following Marx and Engels, I read this inversion of values as 
ideology, where “men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura” 
(47). What for fans seems an affective relationship with a fictional character, say Spider-Man, 
actually masks a set of economic relations between audience, media workers, media executives, 
and shareholders, as well as the economic relations between a licensor (here, Marvel) and a 
licensee (here, Columbia Pictures). Our apparently spontaneous affective responses to low-
prestige media like superhero narratives not only serve specific class interests, they also serve 
those interests independently of, and even against, our will. In Learning to Labor, Paul Willis 
studied how the culture of working-class English boys functioned to groom them for a particular 
class position. The boys’ embrace of the non-instrumental values of their “lad” culture—a 
contempt for intellectualism, a delight in breaking petty rules, and a reverence for brawling as 
proof of masculine integrity—all increased the likelihood that they would “fail” to grasp 
opportunities for upward mobility, thereby reproducing their class position. Yet the alternative 
“lad” culture offered them affective rewards for this exchange: they traded class mobility for 
camaraderie. Willis wrote, “there is an element of self-damnation in the taking on of subordinate 
roles in Western capitalism,” but for these lads, “this damnation is experienced, paradoxically, as 
true learning, affirmation, appropriation, and as a form of resistance” (3). Like Willis, my project 
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focuses on an area of culture gendered masculine and that encourages identification with figures 
who defy social norms in the name of non-acquisitive, seemingly altruistic values, yet which 
thereby reinforces the power of capital. To theorize the Hollywood superhero, one must therefore 
explicate the ways that these films serve the ends of conglomerates while inviting spectators to 
imagine a world not dominated by the instrumental rationality of neoliberalism, which treats 
everything, even the human, as capital. One of the goals of my project is to understand and 
explain the ways that corporate media use our virtues, even our potentially radical impulses, 
against us.  
 
Ownership, Allegory, and Deception 
This project assumes that the critic can infer the intentionality behind a text with greater 
or lesser degrees of accuracy, but that ultimately a text’s motivations matter less than its 
functions. This functionalist orientation offers one solution to the methodological difficulty 
posed by what Derek Johnson calls “the secrecy preferred by risk-averse media industries” 
(Media 18). In the Concise Handbook of Movie Industry Economics, Janet Wasko writes, “it is 
still a challenge to find reliable and relevant data about the film industry. For instance, where can 
one find accurate production figures beyond the public relations rumor mill reported in Variety 
or other trade publications? Where is it possible to find accurate or meaningful figures on stock 
ownership?” (25). Jerome Christensen remarks on the “strategic opacity” of Steve Ross, CEO of 
Warner Communications, would only move forward on a business deal with another company if 
the details of the deal were extremely difficult even for other executives to understand (“Time 
Warner” 607-08). In The Hollywood Economist, Edward Jay Epstein speaks more bluntly, 
referring not merely to Hollywood’s secrecy but also their “culture of deception” (94), the 
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“financial legerdemain” that they use to exploit tax loopholes (103), and the studios’ attempts to 
“collude” to shape the market (218). And this comes from a writer on friendly terms with media 
executives, who invite him to private retreats and insider parties; Epstein thanks Michael Eisner 
for answering his personal emails (26). How much more difficult, then, for the outsider?12  
Even determining seemingly elementary data like revenue proves difficult. Theatrical 
gross represents a small portion of a conglomerate’s revenue from a media property, but studios 
practice secrecy about other platforms. Epstein notes that in 2008, during the DVD boom, when 
the format became Hollywood’s most lucrative window for films, studios stopped giving home 
video revenue figures to the Motion Picture Association of America (90). Studios grew furtive 
about video profits, “fearful that A-list actors and filmmakers would get wind of how much 
money was pouring in and want a bigger piece of the action” (Goldstein). Figuring out the 
compensation of highly paid media workers proves difficult for related reasons. For example, 
according to The Hollywood Reporter, Robert Downey, Jr., had negotiated “box office bonuses 
and back-end compensation” for his turn in The Avengers, with sources speculating a payday as 
high as fifty million dollars for Downey. As precedent, the Reporter cites the actor’s past: 
When Marvel’s Iron Man grossed a surprising $585 million worldwide in 2008, 
Downey’s reps at CAA and the Hansen Jacobson law firm renegotiated a deal to include 
what multiple sources say is a slice of Marvel’s revenue from future movies in which he 
plays Iron Man (one source puts it in the 5 percent to 7 percent range; another source 
disputes the percentage. Marvel and Downey’s reps declined comment). (Belloni) 
                                                
12 As both Jones and Lopes argue, the comics industry also uses secrecy about revenue to reduce 
the negotiating power of artists and the accountability of managers to their employees. Jack 
Liebowitz, president of National Allied Publications, mastered creative accounting methods 
doing the books for “unions, racketeers, and pornographers” (Jones 186), methods that helped 
National hide revenues from their most successful artists. 
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Most film industry workers in the Los Angeles get paid on an hourly or daily basis, according to 
union pay scales (for those fortunate enough to belong to work in unionized trades). In contrast, 
only the most powerful A-list stars can negotiate so-called “contingent compensation,” which 
can include percentages of box-office revenues, or the more lucrative “back-end” of home video, 
pay TV, and ancillary merchandise (Epstein 75).13 We can therefore read the studios’ secrecy 
about their revenues as a means to limit the ability of well-paid workers to negotiate for 
compensation based on non-theatrical revenues. However, studio secrecy also extends to 
concealing the conglomerate’s strategies to exploit intellectual property across multiple 
platforms, insofar as profit motives, rather than curatorial reverence for popular culture, drive 
business plans. The studio that comes out and says, “We don’t really care about long-underwear 
heroes, as long as they bring in good figures from Chinese distributors and domestic pay TV,” 
risks losing the business of people whose affective attachments to a character or a franchise have 
nothing to do with economics.  
 Some may object that because I do not seek to explicate the inner workings of specific 
media companies, I doom myself to only discover what I already believe to be true about 
Hollywood or corporate media. By making an ideological critique of a film genre’s mode of 
production, instead of exploring the history of, say, Marvel Studios, I fail to see the complex 
negotiations of power within that company, or the ways that Marvel employees or executives 
resist or even undermine their superiors at Disney. In America’s Corporate Art: The Studio 
                                                
13 Members of Hollywood labor unions that have collective bargaining agreements with the 
studios do receive residuals from a movie’s profits in the form of payments into the Motion 
Picture Industry Pension and Health Plans (MPIPHP) rather than direct compensation. The 
Screen Actor’s Guild (SAG) secured the first of these in 1960, ironically under Ronald Reagan’s  
leadership of the Guild (Hulett). See “5 Things You Need to Know about Residuals,” “The 
Plans: History and Governance,” and “Questions of the Day.” 
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Authorship of Hollywood Motion Picture, Jerome Christensen critiques the kind of functionalist, 
ideological approach I have taken: 
For the functionalist any supposed motive, whether individual or corporate, is a 
secondary effect of the dynamism of an industrial system that is fundamentally a 
technology for efficient self-reproduction by means of profit-maximization. The 
symmetries of functionalist systems propagate most neatly if individual Hollywood 
corporations are amalgamated into the general category of the “film industry.” (16) 
I aim for such an amalgamation: I want to explicate the way that an industry has taken up and 
elaborated a genre to advance the common interests of the shareholding class. I would not deny 
the differences in management structure or corporate “culture” that might distinguish Marvel 
Entertainment from DC Entertainment synchronically, or that might distinguish different 
versions of either company from itself diachronically, or that might distinguish films made by 
studios within the conglomerate from films made by licensees outside. Christensen seeks to 
understand the strategic differences between studios; I seek to understand the shared, class-based 
strategies that these media conglomerates have in common, and which they reveal through their 
use of superhero movies to exploit intellectual property. From those studios’ attempts to 
distinguish superhero franchises not only from each other but from earlier iterations of the same 
character, patterns emerge, and these patterns show what media corporations have in common, 
even corporations that squabble over the rights to make the next Spider-Man or Fantastic Four 
movie. 
 My allegorical reading of the genre assumes that even escapist, fantastical films 
constitute socially communicative acts, collective in both origin and in address. Following 
William G. Roy, I see corporations as “organizations that administer a major social task” (14), 
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the management and expansion of capital. The close study of Hollywood superhero films reveals 
the essential congruence between the tasks of administering proprietary characters at both 
Marvel and DC; the smart investor, aiming for a diverse portfolio, buys shares in both Time 
Warner and the Walt Disney Company. To borrow a phrase from Michael Baxandall, a 21st-
century Hollywood superhero movie “is the deposit of a social relationship” (1). That 
relationship joins shareholders, executives, and workers in the media industries in a relationship 
that involves risk, reward, creativity, and exploitation. Yet if superhero films constitute 
communicative acts, the executives who shape these communications work not in the interest of 
the audience but in the interest of shareholders, even when a given film or media property fails to 
advance that interest. This is not to say that these films represent a coherent or conscious 
“message” from the shareholding classes or from capital. As David Bordwell has remarked about 
superhero blockbusters, “It’s in filmmakers’ interests to push a lot of our buttons without 
worrying whether what comes out is a coherent intellectual position.” Indeed, both heroes and 
villains in these films espouse and act on non-instrumental values, despite the characters’ 
appearance in the most instrumental and profit-driven of media forms. In Fredric Jameson’s 
allegorical method of studying the novel, “what we formerly regarded as individual texts are 
grasped as ‘utterances’ in an essentially collective or class discourse” (80). In movie production, 
the “essentially collective” origin becomes, in one sense, literal: unlike novels, Hollywood 
blockbusters emerge from the coordinated labor of thousands of workers, often in multiple 
countries. Jameson seeks to identify the ideologeme, “smallest intelligible unit of the essentially 
antagonistic collective discourses of social classes” (75). While I will not use Jameson’s 
neologism, a similar purpose animates this project, which seeks to parse superhero blockbusters 
as strategically ambiguous utterances of the shareholding class, articulated through the labor of 
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above- and below-the-line workers in Hollywood. These films “speak,” but not on behalf of the 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) or non-union craft personnel 
contracted in North Carolina, Vancouver, or overseas. In Marx’s terms, the superhero and its 
media franchise become not just commodities, but new “machinery” of production, alienated via 
work-for-hire agreements from the workers who produce them. This virtual “fixed capital” 
(Grundrisse 132) consists not of a factory floor but of a continuity of comic books, movies, and 
computer games.  
 Although tactics have changed since the 1930s, one strategy has remained central to the 
superhero business: corporate ownership and exploitation of characters. Lopes dubs the period 
from the 1930s to the 1980s the Industrial Age, which he characterizes as lacking “principles of 
autonomy” among comics writers and illustrators (xiv). Under this regime, “publishers paid 
simple page rates and retained all ownership of an artist’s work” (2) and therefore the legal right 
to exploit that work in other media. Comics publishers borrowed these practices from the pulp 
magazine business, where prolific writers wrote under multiple pen names, and multiple hands 
might write the serial of a popular character (6-8). Moreover, during the boom years of the late 
1930s and early 1940s, comics publishers could not keep up with demand, driving many to 
outsource production to independent comics “shops” (10). Subcontracting meant that actual 
authorship of a series might vary issue to issue. These practices continued into the 1980s. As 
Lopes tells it,  
While many artists were in-house “staff” in the bullpens of publishers, virtually all 
writers and artists were treated like “work-for-hire” freelancers, paid per page with no 
company benefits. And publishers continued to claim all rights to the work of writers and 
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artists. While National had contractual agreements, Marvel continued the old practice of 
stamping the back of paychecks with a waiver of all rights to one’s work. (101) 
Although screen adaptations often credit the creators of comic book characters, this does not 
indicate that those creators participate either creatively or financially in the adaptation. When the 
Copyright Act of 1976 took effect at the beginning of 1978, it solidified the legal basis for artists 
to claim sole copyright to their work. However, as Lopes notes, “a loophole in the act exempted 
‘work-for-hire’ artists from these rights,” such that “DC and Marvel immediately made up new 
contracts and release forms that designated artists as work-for-hire artists” (102). By the 1980s, a 
combination of diminishing monthly sales and rising prestige for artists like Frank Miller and 
Alan Moore led the comics duopoly to negotiate more deals whereby star artists retained rights 
to their work.  
Collective bargaining through unions might have empowered comics artists to force 
publishers to adopt the practice of treating them as owners of their creations, or even to pressure 
lawmakers to close the work-for-hire loophole in the Copyright Act. Unlike cartoon animators, 
comics artists failed to organize into guilds and unions that would bargain collectively with 
management and ownership (Lent 180-81).14 In Hollywood after the 1948 Paramount decision, 
studios favored smaller permanent staffs of employees, relying on contracted and temporary 
labor, diminishing “long-term employment security in Hollywood” (Scott 5). Yet even in a post-
Fordist movie industry tending toward precarity, unions like the Screen Actors Guild and various 
locals of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) still bargained 
                                                
14 Both Disney and Warner Brothers opposed screen animators’ mid-1930s drive to unionize as 
the Animated Motion Pictures Union, prompting their animators to strike. New York City’s 
Fleischer Studios recognized the union in 1937, then moved production to “work-for-hire” 
Florida to break them (Lent 181-82).  
 41 
collectively.15 John Lent notes that “attempts in the 1960s to unionize New York City comic 
book artists failed” (183). The 1969 establishment of the Academy of Comic Book Artists 
(ACBA) led only to “a promotional organization instead of a union,” and in 1975 the group 
folded (Lopes 101). In May of 1978, a group of comics artists including such acclaimed figures 
as Neal Adams, Frank Miller, and Chris Claremont attempted to unionize as the Comic Book 
Creators Guild, presenting a pay scale to publishers; in 2015, Janelle Asselin of Comic Alliance 
remarked, “It’s not an overstatement to say that these rates, adjusted for inflation, dwarf most 
creators’ rates today.” Workers in the comics industry never enjoyed the Fordist rapprochement 
between labor and capital that made the middle decades of the 20th century so prosperous and 
stable for so many (white) workers in the United States.16 All of the characters that have 
headlined Hollywood films adapted from Marvel and DC superhero comics were created under 
contractual relationships that shut those creators out of ownership of their work.  
Defenses of media corporations, even devil’s advocacies by critical scholars, sometimes 
treat those corporations commercial aims as an alibi for their most ruthless, cynical, and 
dishonest behavior. Following David Hesmondhalgh, I want to bring a normative, ethical 
valence to the discussion of capitalist exploitation throughout this project, an understanding of 
exploitation “that incorporates systemic unjust advantage with questions of flourishing and 
suffering” (31). Specifically, I want to challenge the habit of treating the exploitative practices of 
                                                
15 As Toby Miller argues, post-1948 Hollywood actually “became a pioneer of the type of 
employment beloved of contemporary management (post-Fordism). With jobs constantly 
starting, ending, and moving, it exemplified ‘flexible specialization’—a shift from life-long 
employment to casualized labor. The pharmaceutical sector, for instance, has looked to this 
model for its own pernicious development” (“Workers” 98). 
16 As Neilson and Rossiter point out, “Precarity appears as an irregular phenomenon only when 
set against a Fordist or Keynesian norm” (54). That is, “If we look at capitalism in a wider 
historical and geographical scope, it is precarity that is the norm and not Fordist economic 
organization” (54).  
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the 20th-century comics industry as prehistory, because those practices helped build the 
conglomerated media environment we now inhabit. Scholars writing on the Marvel and DC 
duopoly acknowledge the exploitative logic of the two companies, but sometimes this shades 
toward a tendency to accept the business practices of these companies as natural or given, the 
whole horizon of possibility. True, National cut Siegel and Shuster out of ownership of 
Superman, but other creators fared better. Bob Kane leveraged a better deal, attaching his name 
(and his alone) to Batman and securing compensation he would never publicly discuss (Jones 
150). William Moulton Marston, already a media entrepreneur from his work promoting lie-
detection equipment, arranged ownership of his creation, Wonder Woman, as well as “royalties 
on sales in perpetuity” (208). Outside National, Will Eisner ran an independent comics 
production ship with partner Jerry Iger, until Eisner sold his share to Iger in exchange for full 
ownership of his character the Spirit (194). Even during the exploitative Industrial Age of 
comics, these creative workers negotiated fairer treatment. This does not excuse companies like 
National and Timely; instead, it reminds us not to treat these economic relationships as 
inevitable, but as negotiated, contingent, and embedded in history.  
The comics industry has long cultivated fandom, and many writers and artists working in 
comics for the past forty years began as fans. The industry therefore exhibits features of what 
Henry Jenkins called “participatory culture” in his influential 1992 book Textual Poachers. 
However, Jenkins used Michel de Certeau’s metaphor of poaching to indicate the illicit and 
unlawful nature of fans’ play with copyrighted characters. Scholars of fandom sometimes forget 
this, in their desire to find the silver lining of a media environment dominated by large 
corporations, where the very platforms that fans use—Facebook, Tumblr, YouTube—treat user 
traffic both as a commodity to sell to advertisers and as a source of data to fine-tune ads. But 
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scholars of the culture industry also forget. For example, Molly Hatcher argues that within DC 
Comics, artists have access to “a miniature public domain that exists solely for the inhabitants of 
this universe” (259). Hatcher proposes we read the “world of open resources” within DC as 
“microcosm of the larger world in order to investigate the benefits of a more broadly defined 
public domain” (258). I agree, insofar as the intertextual sophistication of artists working for 
such a company merits study from multiple angles, but within DC, artists’ work using the 
company’s intellectual property remains subject to the directives and approval of brand 
managers. Managerial limits on the creativity of writers and artists makes Hatcher’s heuristic of 
a DC “commons” seem of little value.  
For example, when Alan Moore worked for DC, he daringly revised Superman in the 
two-part story “Whatever Happened to the Man of Tomorrow?” but only because editors at DC 
gave him permission. The company had already planned to let John Byrne re-write Superman’s 
origin and early career, rebooting the title; therefore they gave Moore free reign to do whatever 
he wanted in the final issues (Kupperberg). This included retiring Superman, marrying him and 
Lois Lane, and killing many of the franchise’s oldest supporting characters (7-8). But when 
Moore asked to use characters that DC had purchased from defunct publisher Charlton for his 
Watchmen series, DC refused. Andrew Hoberek writes, “It is small wonder that DC turned down 
Moore’s request to use the Charlton characters, since he was essentially asking the company to 
eschew these characters’ potential as renewable sources of profit for the sake of his story” (93). 
Moore responded to DC’s refusal by creating original, generic, off-brand versions of the 
Charlton characters, demonstrating his willingness to let DC keep their “renewable sources of 
profit”: Moore could thereby kill or retire his off-brand characters at the end of the story. Moore 
even negotiated a contract characteristic of the new autonomy that star artists enjoyed in the 
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1980s: when Watchmen went out of print, the rights to the characters would revert from DC to 
writer Moore and penciller Dave Gibbons. However, DC then kept Watchmen continuously in 
print, denying Moore and Gibbons the promised reversion of ownership (Johnston). So DC thus 
converted Moore’s off-brand characters—made to satisfy the company’s desire to keep the 
Charlton characters for later use—back into their intellectual property, a new range brand. DC 
immediately licensed this brand to 20th Century Fox (Cieply). Hoberek, surprisingly, does not 
remark on DC’s move to co-opt Moore’s original, off-brand characters into a new DC brand. The 
exploitative logic of the company looms so large that sometimes its most cynical expropriations 
become invisible.17 
Although I point to these seeming blind spots in the analyses of Hatcher and Hoberek, I 
do so primarily to show lacunae in such otherwise astute, historically and economically informed 
scholarship on superhero narratives. Hoberek fails to remark on the brand-building (not simply 
brand-protecting) logic of one of DC’s most egregious dealings with its artists; however, he does 
so in an otherwise thoroughgoing and demystifying account of the genesis of Watchmen, one that 
offers an allegorical reading of its villain that has influenced my own readings of superhero 
blockbusters. Hatcher, despite her unconvincing heuristic, offers a rare analysis of the 
proprietary characters of the comics duopoly in Marxian terms, as the  “means of cultural 
                                                
17 Moore’s League of Extraordinary Gentlemen series (1999- ) adapted public-domain literary 
characters like Allan Quatermain, Doctor Jekyll, Mina Harker, and the Invisible Man into a 
Victorian homage to superhero team-up series like The Avengers. When 20th Century Fox 
adapted League of Extraordinary Gentlemen (Stephen Norrington, 2003) for the screen, they 
added a narrative about the theft and duplication of the heroes’ powers not present in the comics.  
Late in the film, the Invisible Man seems on the verge of betraying the team, but he 
rejoins them after discovering that the villain plans to make “new versions of us—invisible spies, 
an army of Hydes.” Quatermain jokes that the Invisible Man has heroic qualities after all, but the 
Invisible Man maintains his cynicism: “Any more like me,” he says, “and I’ll lose the franchise.” 
The anti-hero voices the logic animating the conglomerates that turn comic books into media 
franchises, a logic evident even in flops like League. 
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production” (258). Lapses like this remind us of the ease with which critics can fall into 
uncritical habits of reifying and fetishizing even the most commercial arts. Professional 
marketers strive to cultivate these old, bad habits in audiences: they want us to see the 
transmedia brand as a space where artists play, riff, and re-mix, and not a corporation’s 
management of creative labor for private economic ends. In 2010, the symposium “Transmedia, 
Hollywood: S/Telling the Story” coincided with the Society for Cinema and Media Studies 
annual conference, held that year in Los Angeles. UCLA and USC faculty moderated panels of 
“top creators, producers, and executives from the entertainment industry,” putting “their critical 
perspectives in dialogue with scholars pursuing the most current academic research on 
transmedia studies” (Jenkins, “Announcing”). Clare Parody, writing about the symposium, 
reports that screenwriter, producer, and DC comics writer Danny Bilson stressed the importance 
of world-building to media franchises by using the mantra, “What’s the playground?” (214). In 
American English, playground denotes a public space, a common that children can use without 
paying a fee, yet Parody does not remark on the duplicity of Bilson’s catchphrase, or the way 
that this substitution of private commerce for a public good reflects the central mission of 
neoliberalism. As Miller et al. note, “Mass media products have the characteristics of a public 
good in that their value does not diminish as the number of users rise” [their emphasis] (113). 
However, we should not mistake characteristics for identity. Corporate brand managers do not 
create public goods, so their rhetoric tries to evoke the feelings that audiences get from public 
goods.  
For Marvel, superheroes literally became financial instruments. On 28 April 2005, 
Variety reported the company’s unprecedented deal with Merrill Lynch Wealth Management: the 
financial services firm would bankroll Marvel’s independent production of films, and in 
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exchange, Marvel would put up ten of their characters as collateral. Merrill Lynch opened a 
credit line of $525 million in exchange for Marvel’s promise to produce as many as ten 
blockbuster films: 
Merrill Lynch said the unusual financing structure probably couldn’t be replicated, 
considering the firepower of Marvel’s characters. The characters themselves are the 
assets that Merrill Lynch will use to go to capital markets and raise money. Among those 
being put up for collateral, [Marvel Studios CEO Avi] Arad would only reveal the 
identities of Captain America, the Avengers and Nick Fury […] To maximize possible 
audience, none of the films will be rated R. (McClintock) 
Here, characters created under work-for-hire agreements decades ago become a narrative version 
of “human capital” often cited in neoliberal discourse. That those financial instruments move 
when embodied by actors on the screen should not blind us to the past and present economic 
relationships that intersect beneath their trademarked masks. The last line of the Variety piece 
informs us, “Marvel shares were up 33¢ to close at $19.52 in trading Thursday.” This compared 
well to the stock price of Time Warner, parent company of competitor DC, which closed that 
same day at $18.11 (“Time Warner Inc.”). However, by 31 August 2009, when Disney 
announced their purchase of Marvel, Marvel’s stock closed at $38.65 per share; Disney then paid 
$30 cash “plus 0.745 Disney shares for every Marvel share” which amounted to $50 per share 
(Nakashima). That same day, Time Warner’s stock price closed at a mere $23.21 (“Time Warner 
Inc.”). Marvel had leveraged their characters to increase the exchange value of their intellectual 
property while also completing their assimilation into a conglomerate with unsurpassed power to 
exploit that intellectual property. Departing Chairman of Marvel Entertainment’s Board of 
Directors, Mort Handel, described the Walt Disney Company as “a perfect home for our great 
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collection of characters” (qtd. in Nakashima), obscuring the financial motives for the transaction 
behind warm and non-instrumental metaphor.  
 
The Virtual Character 
 Other scholars have looked at Hollywood films as commodities shaped by the needs of 
conglomerate capital, but I propose to refine this aspect of my analysis by focusing on the ways 
that superheroes crystallize the labor of past media workers to become a new means of 
production owned by corporations. Since the 1980s, conglomeration of production studios has 
both driven and been driven by high-concept blockbuster filmmaking, with its emphasis on 
marketing across multiple media platforms; conglomerates both encourage and exploit what 
Allen Scott calls the era’s tendency toward “proliferation of new markets based on the packaging 
and repackaging of intellectual properties” (35). As Eileen Meehan argued about Tim Burton’s 
Batman, to understand the texts produced in such an industry, “we must be able to understand 
them as always and simultaneously text and commodity, intertext and product line” (62). I 
propose refining our understanding not only of the different levels of commercial address 
contained within these films, but also to theorize the ways that these films’ affectively enlist the 
spectator in the defense and reproduction of intellectual property, and thereby of capital. I do this 
by taking up the marketing discourse of the brand but using it for purposes opposed to those of 
marketers and corporate executives, who see branding as a means to profitably mystify the 
commodity and to manipulate of the audience into repeated purchases. 
In the literature of marketing as a practice, the term brand equity conveys the brand’s 
double role as the signifier of a seller’s commercial identity and the capital represented by the 
seller’s intellectual property. The brand marks the commodity, as a hot iron marks a barrel or a 
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living skin; the brand also contains equity, value invested in cultivating its commercial image. In 
Building Strong Brands, David Aaker argues that brand equity comprises four kinds of assets 
(another term from finance): brand name awareness, brand loyalty, perceived quality, and brand 
associations (8). These resources for the marketer all consist of cognitive or affective states in the 
object of the marketing pitch; the good quality of the commodities sold under the brand need 
only be perceived, not actual. Aaker develops this point without apology: “Research in 
psychology has shown that recognition alone can result in more positive feelings toward nearly 
anything” (10). In Aaker’s example, subjects of a blind taste test report that a peanut butter tastes 
better if the experimenter identifies it as a well-known brand, even if the peanut butter in 
question actually does worse in blind taste tests with no brands identified (11). The trademarked 
name alone has the power to shape our perceptions. Aaker also identifies as a useful strategy that 
of “brand-as-person,” which  
suggests a brand identity that is richer and more interesting than one based on product 
attributes. Like a person, a brand can be perceived as being upscale, competent, 
impressive, trustworthy, fun, active, humorous, casual, formal, youthful, or intellectual. 
[…] it can help create a self-expressive benefit that becomes a vehicle for the customer to 
express his or her own personality. For example, an Apple user might identify himself or 
herself as casual, anti-corporate, and creative. (83-84) 
For marketers, virtues of the self-sacrificing, altruistic, or even anti-corporate superhero can thus 
become elements of corporate brand equity, and when films induce audiences to identify with 
those superheroes, then the brand has the potential to engage audience desires for self-definition. 
As with the peanut butter, good qualities need only be “perceived”; virtual qualities can drive 
actual sales. Henry Jenkins calls the loyalty that arises from such perceptions “the holy grail of 
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affective economics” (Convergence 72). In Sir Thomas Malory’s Morte d’Arthur, the grail gives 
each knight “such meats and drinks as he best loved in the world” (6), but the commercial brand 
has a different power: it can trick us into thinking that that we love the peanut butter given to us 
by the experimenter. 
 Throughout Branded Entertainment: Product Placement & Brand Strategy in the  
Entertainment Business, Jean-Marc Lehu stresses the importance of concealing the marketed 
brand in a credible narrative, such that the viewer does not consciously notice a sales pitch. The 
conglomerated Hollywood of the 21st century offers means whereby “a brand is able to get closer 
to its target audience via a film, a television programme or series, a play, a novel, song, or show 
[…] Hence the broader concept of ‘entertainment marketing,’ sometimes used to describe the 
experiential consumption stemming from these many and varied brand and product placements” 
(1). What makes this consumption “experiential” is the audience’s focus on the “experience” of 
what seems to be an autonomous media text, but which serves also or even primarily as a vehicle 
for advertising. The commercial insertion of a brand into texts that do not conform to traditional 
modes of advertising, such as the television commercial, Lehu calls “staging the brand” (242). 
This metaphor recalls not only the theater, but also the practice of staging houses in real-estate, 
another kind of mise en scène: the decoration of houses with props so that they look inhabited. 
And although corporations own brands, Lehu argues that effective marketing makes consumers 
feel that they somehow own them, too: “a living brand may not be the exclusive property of its 
legal owners alone […] it is necessarily, in part, the property of its consumers” (238). For the 
brand “to live, it must share emotions with these same consumers: create wishes and desires, and, 
more simply, identify needs and expectations” (238). One could hardly imagine a more lucid call 
for the cultivation of false consciousness, the creation of the bogus sense that people hold 
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intellectual property in common simply because many people recognize it—as if my feelings 
toward the brand make me the subject, rather than the object, of its marketing.18  
 Scott Lash and Celia Lury’s Global Culture Industry offers a critical understanding of the 
role of brands in mass culture indispensible to my analysis, one informed not only by the cultural 
studies of the Frankfurt and Birmingham schools, but also by the literature of marketing. They 
argue that the logic of the culture industry has changed in the past three decades, shifting toward 
brand management, with two results most relevant to this project. The first result the authors call 
the “temporal reframing of the market” (120) away from singulative commodity purchases and 
toward continuative brand loyalty. The second result appears the centrality of the brand to what 
Lash and Lury call a “virtual capitalism” (183), where trademarks and proprietary characters 
become the most valuable kind of property. 
 Lash and Lury take Swatch and Nike as their key examples of the temporal reframing of 
the market in the 1980s. Swatch responded to Japanese competition in the watch market not by 
making a better watch with the virtues that had made Swiss watchmakers famous—precision, 
durability, and prestige—but by making a cheap, plastic watch that would form the centerpiece 
of a club organized around repeated watch-buying (116-18). Consumption became an event to 
pleasurably anticipate again and again, rather than one to commemorate using a durable 
                                                
18 In 1954, NYU professor Peter F. Drucker argued in The Practice of Management that 
marketing, and not manufacturing, trade, or the development of new commodities, constituted 
the unique feature of the commercial enterprise: “A business is set apart from all other human 
organizations by the fact that it markets a product or a service” (38). The creation of 
commodities takes second place to the act of creating demand: “Markets are not created by God, 
nature or economic forces but by businessmen. The want they satisfy may have been felt by the 
customer before he was offered the means of satisfying it. […] In every case it is business action 
that creates the customer” (37). Although NYU’s Drucker obtained his degree at the University 
of Frankfurt am Main (Feder), his work reads in important ways as the antithesis of the 
“Frankfurt School.” 
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commodity. Also in the 1980s, Reebok unseated Nike as the leading manufacturer of athletic 
shoes, and Nike responded by reconfiguring itself from an athletic-shoe manufacturer into a 
fashion brand. CEO Phil Knight explained: “For years, we thought of ourselves as a production-
oriented company, meaning we put all our emphasis on designing and manufacturing the 
product. But now we understand that the most important thing we do is market the product. 
We’ve come around to saying that Nike is a marketing-oriented company, and the product is our 
most important marketing tool.” Means and ends trade places: shoes become a means to sell 
loyalty to Nike. Rather than selling running shoes to people when their old shoes wear out, Nike 
would sell the urge to keep up (120-21).  
The US comics duopoly did something similar during the same period: they made 
disruptive novelty into the driver of purchases by brand-loyal consumers. Until 1986, the serial 
continuities in monthly superhero comics had remained generally stable, notwithstanding the 
occasional death of a supporting character. However, sales of comic books had shrunk steadily 
since the 1950s, and by the 1980s, the industry faced “dire problems” with monthly sales (Lopes 
72). The industry responded by experimenting long-form publications (the so-called graphic 
novel) and by re-launching of established titles. In 1986, DC rebooted Superman with the Man of 
Steel miniseries by John Byrne, which jettisoned the byzantine continuity and secondary 
characters that Superman comics had generated since 1938, to start over with Clark Kent 
beginning work at the Daily Planet in the 1980s. Ma and Pa Kent still live, enjoying their 
twilight years back in Smallville; more importantly, nobody in Metropolis has heard of 
Superman yet. With Superman alone, DC launched reboots in 2003 (Superman: Birthright), 
2008 (Superman: Secret Origin), 2011 (The New 52, DC’s re-launch of all fifty-two of its 
superhero titles), and 2015 (the Convergence limited series, which superseded the New 52 
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continuity).19 These reboots improved sales by capturing the attention of old readers who had 
lost interest in the title while offering new readers a point of entry. DC reported that the New 52 
brought their best monthly sales figures “in 20 years” (English). DC’s release of their reboots in 
trade paperback ensures that they remain commercially available.20  
Hollywood did not use the superhero reboot until 2005, with Batman Begins, the first 
film of the character since 1997. However, the success of this film provided the new model, and 
by bringing DC characters back into cinemas that had just seen two Spider-Man and two X-Men 
blockbusters licensed by competitor Marvel, Batman Begins positioned DC to compete once 
again. A mere five years separate Hulk (Ang Lee, 2003) and The Incredible Hulk (John Leterrier, 
2008); but five years gives teenage fans long enough to “grow up,” for their tastes to change as 
high school comes and goes. Add the two or three-year intervals between sequels in the previous 
cycle, then by the time the character cinematically reboots, the first film of the previous cycle 
already lies a decade in the past, a childhood memory. The temporal framing away from loose, 
open-ended serial continuity toward the periodic radical disruption of the reboot worked in the 
comics, and it has worked in the movies. The character or company becomes the brand to which 
                                                
19 This does not include the Death of Superman arc in 1992 or the 1993 launch of four parallel 
Superman titles (collected in Reign of the Supermen) before bringing the familiar character back 
in 1993. It also does not include the many “crossover” events that followed Crisis on Infinite 
Earths (1985-85), which made great and small changes to the continuities of multiple DC titles. 
20 Marvel eventually adopted a similar practice of rebooting their monthly titles, but only after 
disastrously proliferating their number in the 1990s (D. Johnson, Media, 88-92).  
Marvel has distinguished their comics from DC’s by using fewer reboots but a greater 
number of fictional continuities, published simultaneous to one another, featuring alternate 
versions of the same character. For example, Marvel’s main Spider-Man continuity rebooted in 
2007, but parallel to this ran the Ultimate Spider-Man continuity (2000-2009); Spider-Man: 
India (2004), set in Mumbai, and starring an Indian teen protagonist, Pavitr Prabhakar; Marvel 
Zombies (2005-2006), featuring an undead Spider-Man; and Spider-Man: Noir (2009), set in 
1933. 
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the customer remains loyal; minor differences within a familiar context (say, the Superman 
universe) become an occasion for new affective investments and new purchases.  
Marketing literature distinguishes between brand and commodity, but Lash and Lury 
develop the distinction in terms informed by Marxian analyses of value. As they point out,  
you cannot go to a market and buy a brand. Brands do not typically exchange at all. They 
are only for sale on capital markets […] The commodity is produced. The brand is a 
source of production. The commodity is a single, discrete, fixed product. The brand 
instantiates itself in a range of products, is generated across a range of products. (6) 
Lash and Lury suggest, but stop short of, explicitly framing the brand as I will in this project: as 
a non-material element of the means of production, owned by the corporation that holds the 
intellectual property. Lash and Lury, borrowing from Gilles Deleuze, stress that brands exist not 
in the marketplace or even within our perception, not as “actuals” (183), but as things imagined 
and rhetorically invoked, as “virtuals” (183). These virtuals “may be actualized in any number of 
products” (14). In this sense, conglomerate Hollywood’s emphasis on branding constitutes part 
of the turn toward what Lash and Lury call virtual capitalism.  
However, I take this notion of the virtual a step further. I argue that the most productive 
critical approach to Hollywood superhero blockbuster treats the superhero as actually a brand 
and only virtually a character. By this I mean virtual in three senses. First, this superhero brand 
reads as virtual in Lash and Lury’s sense of a seeming, notional, or merely hypothetical existence 
(as opposed to a real existence). Second the superhero itself reads virtual in possessing certain of 
a thing’s virtues without actually being that thing: it resembles a character, and audiences 
mistake it for a character. We get the English word from the Latin root vir, meaning man, and in 
this third sense the superhero also reads as virtual: nearly always male, and often having the 
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word man embedded in his code name, the superhero gives a gendered appearance to a 
trademark dressed as a man. Derek Johnson has shown that Marvel executives deliberately 
gender their address to male fans, cultivating “a sense of boyish solidarity with the comics fans 
interested in Hollywood’s adaptations. Notably, few, if any, of these trade narratives featured 
Marvel’s female executives, branding Marvel’s managerial acumen as a particularly masculine 
expertise” (“Cinematic” 19). Whatever the origin of a given iteration of a superhero, whether in 
the imaginings of writers in a New York bullpen or in the re-imaginings of conglomerate 
executives looking for intellectual property to exploit, in 21st-century Hollywood the virtual 
character that we call the superhero functions as means of organizing relations between narrative, 
labor, capital, and audience.  
As such, the heuristic of treating the superhero as actually a brand and only virtually a 
character helps us avoid the temptation, which marketers encourage, to fetishize and reify brands 
as somehow “belonging” to all of their potential customers, such that they ignore the economic 
and social relationships that underlie those brands. In 2015, the Journal of Popular Culture 
published an otherwise lucid analysis of Warner Brothers’ “de-queering” of Batman in the 
Christopher Nolan films; author Nick Winstead, following Will Brooker, argued that knowledge 
of the basics of the Batman universe constitutes “shared cultural history” (572), forming the 
basis of “the general public’s ownership and familiarity with the character” (573). Yet conflating 
knowledge with ownership mystifies the actual social, economic, and affective relations 
operating within and around these movies. This is not to say that reading the superhero as 
primarily as brand erases the multiplicity that a brand might contain. Superheroes and 
supervillains still model values radically opposed to the neoliberal reason that would apply 
market principles to every sphere of life, and these films offer multiple and shifting points of 
 55 
audience identification. Instead, my heuristic asks viewers to perform a Marxian inversion, 
assigning priority to the economic relations that underlie this art form and then using those 
relations to explain the art’s aesthetic, narrative, and rhetorical practices.  
We need stronger materialist analyses of these films; we have always needed them. In her 
widely cited 1991 essay, “‘Holy Commodity Fetish, Batman!’: The Political Economy of a 
Commercial Intertext,” Eileen Meehan uses Batman (Tim Burton, 1989) to study brand 
management across multiple platforms, “orchestrated by the conglomerate in its search for more 
profitable and cost-efficient ways to manufacture culture” (56). Only in the conclusion of her 
essay does she use the term “commodity fetishism” to put a name to our failure to perceive the 
branded character as a “complex structure of interpenetrating cultural industries and the 
corporate interests of media conglomerates,” a structure that remains “generally invisible to us” 
(56). Meehan puts this invisibility last, but I put it first, as the major shortcoming of the scholarly 
reception of these films. Furthermore, Meehan does not explicate Batman’s “complex structure” 
of “corporate interests” in class terms, of the shareholding class exploiting the labor of media 
workers. Meehan’s essay has a good claim to founding the materialist analysis of Hollywood 
superhero films, but it performs only a three-quarters analysis, leaving that last step to us. This 
stopping short implicitly treats the corporation, a social and class relationship, as natural and 
given. Meehan acknowledges that in conglomerated Hollywood, “doing business means 
constructing shows according to business needs” (62), but she treats those needs as a black box 
rather than as a contingent and contested class-based relationship between workers, executives, 
and owners that a more thoroughly Marxian ideological analysis reveals.  
Too many scholars of mass culture allow corporate profit motives to function as an alibi 
for our failures to explain the ways that the media industries exploit workers and manipulate 
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audiences. I borrow the metaphor of the alibi Maura Wickstrom’s analysis of Disney’s Lion King 
musical. According to Wickstrom, director Julie Taymor (who would direct Marvel’s Spider-
Man: Turn off the Dark in 2011) used art as an “alibi” for her decision to direct a play that 
promotes a corporate brand in the context of the New York theater district that Disney has re-
shaped (111-12). Too often, scholars confronting the exploitation and duplicity of media 
corporations simply shrug, unable or unwilling to trace the paths between popcorn-muncher and 
shareholder. Like the Hollywood executive’s proverbial impatience with scholars looking for 
meaning in mere “entertainment,” scholars perform their own version of this mystification when 
they take for granted the structurally insatiable greed of corporations while failing to examine the 
aesthetic and narrative results of that greed. 
Studying a media form that rewards fandom also poses affective risks that too few 
scholars of popular media take seriously, risks that take the form of the same hermeneutic 
pleasures that brought many of us to study movies and books. Superhero movies aim to entertain 
newcomers, but they also aim to surprise and reward fans who have varying levels of familiarity 
with the brand. Comics publishers have printed letters from readers since the 1940s; in the 
1960s, letters sections became place for fans to interpret and discuss their beloved objects. Those 
publishers have, for just as long, used fan forums as tools for marketing and for research and 
development, means of gauging and engaging the audience’s affective investments in and 
responses to the property. Marvel and DC have decades of experience pressing the buttons of 
people who pay close attention to texts, who construct complex interpretations of those texts, and 
who purse knowledge of those texts for non-instrumental ends. Henry Jenkins calls his personal 
blog Confessions of an Aca-Fan; there, he writes about participatory fandoms and the ways that 
media industries attempt to contain and exploit those fandoms. However, some find Jenkins too 
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sanguine about the inequities of participatory culture, as well as inequities of the wider society 
that the corporate culture industries reproduce. Ian Bogost has written against aca-fandom: 
“Those of us who make an enviable living being champions of media, particularly popular 
media, must also remain dissatisfied with them. We ought to challenge not only ourselves, our 
colleagues, and our students—but also the public and the creators of our chosen media. We 
ought not to be satisfied.” Like Bogost, I see dissatisfaction as the most strategically productive 
attitude for media scholars to cultivate; if we take critique as our vocation, then we must remind 
ourselves to find our dissatisfaction, especially our political dissatisfaction, with media texts. 
Marketers and brand managers work long hours to mystify commerce and to manipulate us into 
warm feelings toward corporate properties; they don’t need our help. Intellectuals have a 
responsibility to de-mystify the world and to empower citizens to see how powerful economic 
interests seek to manipulate us. Academics need no longer “confess” that we love comic books 
or romance novels or Dungeons and Dragons. We need to get to work explicating how 
corporations turn guilty pleasures into billion-dollar media brands. 
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CHAPTER ONE: ALLEGORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Introduction  
This chapter offers a reading of the Hollywood superhero blockbuster as an allegory of 
intellectual property in the age of conglomerate filmmaking. The proprietary superhero’s brand 
identity signifies stability and quality even as the character’s corporate managers continually 
revise him (rarely her) for shifting media platforms and audiences. Economic capital takes 
human shape in superheroes, their supporting characters, and indicia, trademarks that outlive 
both their creators in the comics and the filmmakers and actors who depict them on screen. I read 
the Hollywood superhero not simply as an utterance on behalf of capital, but also as a mask worn 
by capital.  
 This approach treats allegory as a deliberate mode of reading, a category hermeneutic 
rather than ontological. I borrow this orientation from Fredric Jameson’s Political Unconscious: 
Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, which seeks a “more ‘fundamental’ narrative […] which is 
the allegorical key or figural content of the first sequence of empirical materials” (28). Jameson’s 
arguments about novels apply with even more force to the supposedly apolitical and escapist 
genre that forms the object of my study: 
the convenient working distinction between cultural texts that are social and political and 
those that are not becomes something worse than error: namely, a symptom of a 
reinforcement of the reification and privatization of contemporary life. […] The assertion 
of a political unconscious proposes that we undertake just such a final analysis and 
explore the multiple paths that lead to the unmasking of cultural artifacts as socially 
symbolic acts. (10)  
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This mode of allegorical reading does not assume conscious intent on the part of individual 
filmmakers to curate the proprietary character beyond a given cycle of films. Gary Johnson 
defines allegory as “that class of works that fulfills its rhetorical purpose by means of the 
transformation of some phenomenon into a figural narrative” (9); Johnson treats “authorial 
intention” as “a crucial component of allegory” (10). However, I see individual authorial 
intention as, at best, secondary to the “rhetorical purpose” of a work collectively and industrially 
authored in the manner of a Hollywood blockbuster. These works have as their primary 
rhetorical purpose the strengthening of the brand at various levels. Jerome Christensen has 
proposed a convincing allegorical reading of the 1989 Batman film as “an instrumental allegory 
contrived to accomplish corporate objectives” (591). But where Christensen reads the film’s 
allegorical content as a deliberate, intra-conglomerate utterance from Warner Brothers 
executives to Time executives, I pursue instead signs of the shared class interests that all those 
executives represent, notwithstanding their tactical or corporate-cultural differences, and whether 
or not they conceive of themselves as acting in class terms.  
Although some media scholars have done fine work understanding how workers within 
media corporations make and defend claims to individual agency within a larger organization, 
such an approach risks reifying the notion of the talented individual who can transcend his or her 
structural, institutional setting. Many forms of mass culture, including the superhero film, 
valorize the individual while actually strengthening the collective, social, and class-based 
relationship we call the corporation; in Hollywood’s hands, the cult of the exceptional individual 
becomes ideological in the Marxian sense, in that it advances the interests of a particular class 
while obscuring the means that class uses to maintain its advantages. Corporations lobby 
politicians to pass laws that benefit corporations, attempting to extend copyright, lower barriers 
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to trade, enable oligopolistic collusion, and weaken organized labor (when not sidestepping labor 
by moving production elsewhere). The different histories of DC and Marvel matter, but their 
evolutions have converged, such that the two parties of America’s comics duopoly now occupy 
structurally analogous positions as intellectual-property divisions of publicly traded media 
conglomerates. My approach risks eliding some of the differences within and between DC and 
Marvel, as well their changing relationships with the studios that produced movies based on their 
characters; it also risks eliding conflicts among persons working within these organizations. 
However, by looking instead at what superhero films can tell us about the interchangeable goals 
and methods of these two companies, we can reveal the true relationships between shareholder 
capital, intellectual property, workers, and audiences that media conglomerates work to conceal. 
  
Conventions of the Blockbuster Superhero 
Branding and franchising logics have always driven superheroes in a more thoroughgoing 
and explicit way than in other popular American narrative genres. The superhero emerged as a 
generic model in 1938, and publishers quickly moved to codify and copyright their characters; 
the genre’s birth in a medium that mixed visual iconography with text distinguishes the 
superhero genre from its pulp predecessors. Between 1938 and 1941 the superhero coalesced into 
a set of public conventions, easily (and legally) copied by competitors, as well as proprietary 
content, protected under copyright law, that owners could license to other companies.21 Although 
                                                
21 Like most retroactive descriptions of movements in the arts, the period of the so-called Golden 
Age of comics varies depending on who does the reckoning. Most agree that it began with the 
June 1938 publication of the first Superman story, and that it lasted until 1954. In that year, the 
US Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency held hearings on comic books, and Fredric 
Wertham’s Seduction of the Innocent appeared in print; in the following year, American comics 
sales “dropped from eighty million to forty million” units (Lopes 56). See Lopes’s Demanding 
Respect, Jones’s Men of Tomorrow, or David Hajdu’s Ten-Cent Plague.  
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some commentators blame 21st-century Hollywood for treating comics as a mere testing ground 
for brands to license into other media, but the American comics duopoly of Marvel and DC have 
subjected superheroes to this logic since the Industrial Age of mass-market comics. And since 
the 1970s, branding logic has become more central in the USA’s increasingly post-industrial 
“information” economy, and since then, the executives at duopoly have conceived of their 
mission not as selling comic books, but as creating and curating portfolios of intellectual 
property. This chapter examines the way that this practice emerges in the narratives of the most 
costly use of those intellectual properties: the Hollywood blockbuster. 
Superhero blockbusters have much in common with superhero narratives in comics and 
other media, but nevertheless the genre takes a specific form on the screen, shaped by the 
demands of transmedia franchising. Three tropes constitute and distinguish the blockbuster 
version of the superhero narrative. First, these films foreground and emphasize coming-of-age 
narratives in ways that the comics do not, in an attempt to appeal to the commercially important 
demographic quadrant (to use the industry term) of young males. Second, these films perform 
nostalgia within the diegesis even as they invite the viewer to feel nostalgia without, and the 
films cathect these feelings onto intradiegetic media that stand in for the real-world media that 
the film studios’ parent conglomerates sell. Third, these films demonstrate a conservatism toward 
the future, reflected in the trope of the abortive apocalypse, the villain’s scheme to create a 
dystopia, which the hero thwarts. The three combine in an unintentional but lucid allegory of 
intellectual property in the age of conglomerate media, a genre that bends its narrative energies 
toward ensuring that ancillary-hungry young males feel nostalgic about past media and 
cautiously optimistic about future media within the brand. 
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The origin stories of many superheroes in the comics contain elements of Bildungsroman, 
but Hollywood elaborates them into an Oedipal melodrama of troubled relationships with one or 
more father figures.22 As Lopes’s history of the American comics industry has shown, the comics 
duopoly had bet, since the 1960s, on the loyalty of a niche audience of white male readers 
ranging from their teens to their twenties (104, 169-70). Movie studios, developing blockbuster 
films according to the principles of marketing experts, courted this core audience, following the 
so-called “80-20 rule.” As Robert Kozinets put it, “In many product and service categories, 
approximately eighty per cent of most products and services are consumed by approximately 
twenty percent of their customer base” (255). Studios therefore strove to appeal to comics 
fanboys young and old, who had kept the industry (barely) afloat through the ups and downs of 
the 1970s through the 1990s, and who readily bought DVDs in the 2000s. The film’s emphasis 
on nostalgic boys’ comic-of-age stories therefore represent the survival of niche-marketing 
marketing habits from the comics business, now adapted for mass-market the movie business.  
The superhero’s Oedipal drama has two manifestations. The first links the protagonist’s 
status as superhero with the traumatic loss of the father: the protagonist gains super-powers in 
some way connected with the loss of a parent, and the movie never lets him forget. In the DC 
universe, Superman’s powers remind us that his biological parents died with their planet 
Krypton; Batman becomes a roof-prowling vigilante because he witnessed his parents’ murder in 
a street mugging. Marvel goes one better with Spider-Man: the teen-age Peter Parker, an orphan, 
lives with his aunt and uncle, but his selfishness about his new superpowers leads to his uncle’s 
murder. In the second manifestation of the Oedipal drama, the hero defies a father figure, usually 
                                                
22 Even in films with female protagonists, like Supergirl (Jeannot Szwarc, 1984) and Catwoman 
(Pitof, 2004), follow this pattern, substituting an evil mother into the same structure. 
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in a physical confrontation with an evil, surrogate father, an elder male who incites the hero to 
transgress norms.  
Marvel’s Hulk (Ang Lee, 2003) represents the extremes to which Hollywood takes this 
Oedipal melodrama. In the comics, Bruce Banner gains his ability to transform into the Hulk in 
an unplanned nuclear accident, but the 2003 film presents Bruce as the survivor of his father’s 
mad science. The senior Dr. Banner injects himself with an experimental serum that passes a 
strange regenerative power to his son; later, the father tries to murder his offspring but kills 
Bruce’s mother in the attempt. Bruce represses the memory of this scene and grows up in an 
adoptive family. Only after the adult Banner receives an accidental dose of radiation does his 
latent genetic power manifest in the ability to transform into the Hulk, essentially a furious 
toddler with a superhuman body. Every transformation, therefore, performs a return of Bruce’s 
repressed, primordial fury at his father, a return premised on that father’s illicit experimentation 
with his own son’s DNA.23 Even after the senior Dr. Banner leaves prison, he heeds neither 
scientific nor social codes of ethics, but resumes his mad science, and thereby converts himself 
into a protean being able to imitate the properties of any material he touches. Comics readers will 
recognize this villain as a perennial Hulk antagonist, the Absorbing Man, in all but name; the 
filmmakers have taken a villain not related to the hero by blood or marriage and written him into 
the Banner family. This super-powered father then seeks to absorb the Hulk’s powers, 
demanding an incestuous-cannibalistic union with his son to achieve semi-godhood. But Bruce, 
who has internalized ethical prohibitions, only wants to rid himself of the Hulk; the film 
                                                
23 The elder Banner thus represents the figure that Žižek calls “the obscene father” (Enjoy 180), 
the inverse of the Lacanian father as a figure of prohibition and the symbolic; he “epitomizes the 
obscene-licentious display of power” (181). Moreover, this “primordial father” “is not a 
primitive figure of pure, presymbolic, brute force, but a father who knows” [Žižek’s emphasis] 
(181), that is, who knows how to enjoy the forbidden, both horrifying and enviable. 
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culminates in his principled refusal to be party to his father’s ambitions, followed by their battle. 
Hollywood’s trope of the villain claiming at least fictive kinship with the hero has endured for 
three decades; in 1997, an Onion headline parodied it: “Villain Contends He, Hero ‘Very Much 
Alike.’” Hollywood’s re-workings of comic-book superheroes add this element, then push it into 
the foreground, often by making the kinship literal. 
Hollywood’s version of the superhero also diverges from the comics’ in a second 
constitutive trope, the insistent modeling of nostalgia through diegetic media. This becomes 
especially salient after the mid-2000s. Before that, Bruce Wayne looked at newspaper clippings 
from the Gotham Globe about his parents’ murder in Batman (Tim Burton, 1989), sparking a 
flashback to the scene, and in the early 2000s, May Parker disappointed Peter Parker by throwing 
out his comic-book collection (never shown on screen) in Spider-Man II (Sam Raimi, 2004). But 
these did not offer opportunities for licensing, marketing, or cross-promotion of other real-life 
properties within the conglomerate. Marvel led the way in Iron Man (Jon Favreau, 2008), where 
protagonist Tony Stark listens 1980s AC/DC and Suicidal Tendencies, but the studio further 
refined the technique over their next few films. 
 Captain America: The First Avenger (Joe Johnston, 2011) represents a triumph of 
nostalgic branding. Set during World War II, the film tells how scrawny volunteer Steve Rogers 
becomes a “super soldier” through (helpfully) mad science. Before he goes to fight the Nazis, 
Rogers goes on tour to advertise US war bonds, and the film depicts this in a montage sequence. 
It begins with Rogers awkwardly performing, in costume, in the war-bonds stage show; sepia 
tones predominate, except for the vivid reds, whites, and blues. As the sequence continues, we 
see 1940s film technologies: Captain America marches in place before a rear-projection screen in 
a studio; later we see him react with shy amusement to black-and-white footage of the 
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recruitment film he has just made. The montage uses cuts at its beginning, but as the hero’s self-
confidence grows, the sequence employs irises and complex wipes, and its cinematography 
begins to resemble a Freed Unit musical number, a dance between chorines and boom-mounted 
cameras. In the intradiegetic show, Captain America “punches” an actor dressed as Hitler, 
provoking rapt applause from children in the audience; seconds later, the montage cuts to a 
newsstand selling stacks of Timely Comics’ Captain America #1, with its iconic cover 
illustration of Captain America punching Hitler.24 Clean young boys (three white, one Black) 
wearing overdetermined 1940s attire (cardigans, an oversized newsboy hat, suspenders) read the 
comic on the streets of a bustling city. The city has that idealized, Disneyland look: the people 
smile, wearing clean clothes, while late-model cars gleam on the street. Moreover, unlike actual 
newsstands from 1941, this one displays not hundreds of different comics, pulps, slicks, and 
newspapers, but only Captain America. A later shot reveals a white American serviceman in a 
military camp reading a copy, while the song from the war bonds stage show continues on the 
soundtrack.  
The sequence plays as an homage to the media forms and styles of seventy years past, but 
it also plays as an advertisement for Captain America as a long-lived and beloved media 
property, one that represents the idea of an America worth fighting for. Not the America 
hobbling after the Great Depression, not the America with an armed forces still formally 
segregated until 1948, and not the America where Martin Goodman, publisher of Timely 
Comics, in the words of Gerard Jones, “screwed” artist Jack Kirby and writer Joe Simon (202), 
creators of the Captain America series. The montage sequence in Captain America: the First 
Avenger invites us instead to share the pleasure of the intradiegetic spectators and comic-book 
                                                
24 The film presents the comic book a tie-in to Cap’s war bond campaign. 
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readers, to feel good not just about America’s past, but about the Marvel corporate brand, the 
1940s Captain America range brand, and even the 1960s Avengers range brand (also named in 
the title).  
Yet the genre’s foregrounding of media nostalgia also reminds us that nostalgia hurts. In 
Marvel’s Iron Man II (Jon Favreau, 2010), Tony Stark unpacks a case containing technical 
schematics, notes, and 16mm promotional films created by his long-dead father, the inventor and 
industrialist Howard Stark. We see Tony sitting beside a 16mm film projector, screening the 
footage while he tries to make sense of the notes, and as we watch the film over his shoulder, we 
notice that it includes outtakes: a child Tony Stark suddenly intrudes into the scene, prompting 
his father’s dismissive anger. The raw footage reminds us that Howard Stark made a cold and 
distant father, drinking between takes, clearly the model for the emotionally distant and alcoholic 
Tony. After a cut within the reel, Howard Stark appears before the camera in a closer framing, 
now sober, calm, and directly addressing his son: “You’re too young to understand this, so I 
thought I’d put it on film for you. […] I’m limited by the technology of my time, but one day, 
you’ll figure this out, and when you do, you will change the world. What is, and always will be, 
my greatest creation—is you.” This unexpected, direct address from the past motivates Tony to 
revisit one of his father’s abandoned models, and in the process, Tony discovers a lost design 
that helps him solve a technical problem with his prosthetic heart. “Dead for almost twenty 
years,” muses Tony, “but still taking me to school.”  
Where Captain America modeled childlike pleasure in media from the past, Iron Man II 
models grief, loss, and physical pain (which Tony suffers as his artificial heart slowly poisons 
him), mixed with a wished-for address from the lost father and a solution to a deadly technical 
problem. The sentimental heart metaphor might cause us to miss the industrial subtext of the 
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word “creation,” the talk of putting things on film, and the monologue’s embedded teleological 
claim. Inside the diegesis, Tony Stark inherited his father’s economic property; we can therefore 
call both Tony and Stark Industries the elder Stark’s “creations,” albeit in different senses. 
However, outside the diegesis, we can call Tony and Stark Industries the “creations” of  
Stan Lee, Larry Lieber, Don Heck, and Jack Kirby created Tony Stark and Iron Man (DeFalco et 
al.), yet these men worked under contracts that allowed Marvel to call those characters Marvel’s 
“creations.” The 16mm ghost of Howard Stark calls Tony his “creation” in a double metaphor, 
linking the biological heritage to the industrial, unintentionally reminding of the real work of 
creation that Marvel’s legal arrangements reconfigure and override.  
Furthermore, the senior Stark’s reference to the technological limitations of his “time,” 
evoked through emphatic 1960s mise en scène, recalls a commonplace of journalism on 
superhero movies: that they have proliferated in the 21st century because technology has finally 
caught up with the visually-fanciful source material. This account of the genre invites us to feel 
pleased that Hollywood can “finally” bring comic-book superheroics to the screen. Yet the 
special-effects-intensive Star Wars (1977) and the post-1977 Superman and Batman film cycles 
belie this claim. Moreover, films like RoboCop II (Irwin Kirshner, 1990) and Robot Jox (Stuart 
Gordon, 1990) put action movies about cyborgs, robots, and powered armor with the reach of 
modest Hollywood budgets. I propose an alternate explanation for Hollywood’s proliferation of 
superhero films in the 2000s: the media industries had developed new platforms (such as the 
immensely lucrative DVD), and conglomeration had altered their branding practices, such that 
these refined means of production required appropriate raw material for exploitation—material 
not actually raw, but pre-sold, thoroughly tested, and having a decades-long history in serial 
media. DC already belonged to a conglomerate that owned a studio; Marvel had to license their 
 68 
characters, then self-produce movies, before they found a conglomerate buyer. Iron Man II 
models for us a sentimental nostalgia, a hope that by watching outtakes on our home media 
players, we will get closer to some intense and authentic experience; simultaneously, it also 
suggests an alternative to the teleology of special effects finally catching up to superheroes. 
The third and final constitutive trope in the Hollywood version of the superhero, its 
conservatism toward the future, places both the hero and the villain outside the law, but with 
opposing roles there. Both the hero and the villain operate outside the law; even when the 
villaindirectly works for the state, as in X2: X-Men United (Bryan Singer, 2003) or Captain 
America: The Winter Soldier (Joe Russo and Anthony Russo, 2014), his schemes always go 
beyond the lawful. However, the hero violates law in order to maintain the social order, while the 
villain violates law in order to change that order. Richard Reynolds points out that in the comics, 
the superhero is, in an important sense, “passive: he is not called upon to act unless the status quo 
s threatened by the villain’s plans” (51). We mistake the superhero for the protagonist, the active 
core of a given story, because of his salience, but as Reynolds puts it, superheroes “function 
essentially as antagonists, foils for the true star of each story, the villain” (51). The scale of the 
villains’ threats against the demos distinguishes the Hollywood versions of these narratives from 
those in the comics. They promise great and catastrophic change, apocalyptic in the original 
Greek sense of the word apokálupsis: an uncovering, a revelation. They reveal an alternate vision 
of how to constitute society. 
Screen supervillains do not merely rob banks or pursue personal vengeance. Instead, they 
place in jeopardy the very possibility of normal life as the audience knows it. The villain 
threatens not individuals, but anonymous groups, entailing consequences at an impersonal, 
collective scale, from marketing dangerous cosmetics (Catwoman) to conducting unsupervised 
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and unsafe nuclear fusion experiments that could destroy New York City (Spider-Man II), to 
destroying our universe to remake it according to the designs of Dark Elves (Thor: The Dark 
World, Alan Taylor, 2013). More often, the villain’s plan explicitly aims to remake human 
societies. In Spider-Man, the Green Goblin proposes an Ayn-Randian idyll in which both he and 
Spider-Man rule New York: “There are 8 million people in this city, and those teeming masses 
exist for the sole purpose of lifting the few exceptional people onto their shoulders.” In Batman 
Begins and The Dark Knight Rises (Christopher Nolan, 2012), the League of Shadows’ planned 
vigilante justice for Gotham City amounts to democide (by chemical or by nuclear weapons, 
respectively). The X-Men films think biopolitics on a grand scale: in X2: X-Men United, the 
heroes join forces with Magneto’s Brotherhood of Mutants to thwart Colonel William Stryker’s 
plan to exterminate all mutant humans, worldwide; then, after defeating Stryker, the X-Men must 
stop Magneto from using Stryker’s apparatus to pre-emptively exterminate all non-mutant 
humans. The prequel-reboot X-Men: First Class (Matthew Vaughan, 2011) re-imagines the 
Cuban Missile Crisis as a villain’s scheme to provoke nuclear war between the human 
superpowers, thereby creating Lebensraum for mutants. In all these films, the heroes thwart the 
villains’ plans by the narrowest of margins. 
In 1962, Eco parsed Superman comics, analyzing the political and social implications of 
their repetitiveness, “the circular, static conveyance of a pedagogic message which is 
substantially immobilistic” (122). What do we make of the intensification of this resistance to 
change, in an era that has seen so much, from September 11 and two US-led overseas wars to the 
2008 financial collapse? Many would argue that the era’s superhero blockbusters reflect the 
zeitgeist or some emerging national taste for flashy special effects coupled with social stasis, but 
as Lester Asheim argued in 1947, “analysis of film content provides an insight only into the 
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producers’ idea of the national taste, and not the national taste itself” [his emphasis] (416). 
These films do get something “right” about the way it feels to live in a precarious, neoliberal 
capitalist order, in their capture of what Berlant calls “aspirational normalcy, the desire to feel 
normal and to feel normalcy as a ground of dependable life, a life that does not have to keep 
being reinvented” (281). This goes some distance toward explaining their emphasis on nostalgia, 
even when that nostalgia lacks explicit connection to an appeal to buy commodities. In Spider-
Man, Uncle Ben Parker loses his factory job, “laid off after thirty-five years,” but the old man 
lacks the computer skills to compete in the labor market he has unexpectedly fallen into. Berlant 
describes such life as “the slow train wreck that is always coming in the catastrophic time of 
capitalism, where if you’re lucky you get to be exploited, in a scene that hails and ejects you 
when it is your time to again become worthless” [Berlant’s emphasis] (281). But not everyone in 
these films or in the real world see capitalism as catastrophic. Later in Spider-Man, Norman 
Osborn, the founder and CEO of aerospace firm Oscorp Industries, happily tells his board, 
“Costs are down, revenues are up, and our stock has never been higher.” The film stops short of 
making explicit the class antagonism implicit in Ben Parker’s and Norman Osborn’s fortunes. 
That is, that Uncle Ben Parker either worked for Oscorp or he worked for a company that 
reduces “costs” as Oscorp did, by eliminating costly workers. Osborn’s secret identity as the 
Green Goblin, the film’s villain, suggests a different structural analogy: the worker who just 
wants to get by within the existing order, just wants a chance to get exploited, resembles to the 
passive superhero, as the enterprising, disruptively-innovating executive resembles the 
supervillain, who would remake the existing order. Unlike heroes, villains do not grit their teeth 
and hope that things get better. 
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However, we would err if we proposed that supervillains simply stand in for this specific 
class position. Entrepreneurs and executives do often become supervillains in these films, but 
only when they value something beyond the lawful order of corporate mergers, takeovers, and so 
on; that is, when they believe in something beyond the instrumental logic of capitalism. In this 
regard, villains constitute one of the few areas where superhero films show radical potential. 
Often, villains propose explicitly altruistic, Utopian aims, like the mad scientist in Amazing 
Spider-Man (Marc Webb, 2012), who plans to release a biological agent in New York City that 
will heal the sick and infirm (by turning them into half-lizard freaks). “I can save them,” he 
raves, “I can cure them!” The seeming paradox of the superhero film, therefore, lies here: for all 
the hero’s aspirations to peace, justice, or a better world, he does not initiate action to achieve 
those aspirations. The superhero’s orientation recalls what Žižek dubs “the basic paradox of 
liberalism”:  
The anti-ideological stance is inscribed into the very core of the liberal vision: liberalism 
conceives itself as a “politics of lesser evil,” its ambition is to bring about the “least evil 
society possible,” thus preventing greater evil, since it considers any attempt to directly 
impose a positive Good the ultimate source of all evil. (16) 
In Žižek’s terms, the superhero always represents not the Good, but the lesser evil. This is not to 
say that screen superheroes take necessarily reactionary or uncritical stances toward the societies 
they defend; some, like Captain America, explicitly critique the shortcomings of the societies 
they inhabit. However, as Peter Paik argues, political criticism remains more compatible “with 
the established values of liberal bourgeois society—and its crushing dread at the prospect of 
sweeping, coercive change—than with any genuinely revolutionary political stance” (9). The 
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radical or emancipatory potential in these films usually lies in the dreams and values of their 
villains—mad scientists, mutants, and former Nazis.  
Businessmen can become villains when they start to value something other than the 
company’s stock price. The Green Goblin may talk like an Ayn Rand fan, but unlike many on 
America’s libertarian right, he takes his radical individualism beyond the pale of corporate 
management or neoliberal policy. He doesn’t expel the troublesome executives from Oscorp’s 
board: he kills them. His violence offers a vision beyond what Max Weber calls the 
“instrumentally rational,” a social orientation toward “rationally pursued and calculated ends” 
(24). Instead, the Goblin, like the other supervillains and superheroes in these films, exhibits 
what Weber calls a “value-rational” orientation, “determined by a conscious belief in the value 
for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of 
its prospects of success” (24-25). This makes both heroes and villains attractive: they do not 
compromise but instead rebel against the tyranny of everyday calculations of costs and benefits. 
However, where superheroes merely react, pursuing socially normative values, supervillains take 
the initiative, pursuing values at odds with reigning norms, even the norms that govern the 
functioning of corporations.  
 
Corporate Folklore and Intellectual Property 
 Writers on superheroes and supervillains often highlight this defiance of instrumental 
rationality by comparing the characters to figures from literature and folklore. The heroes and 
villains of the four-color comics and their screen adaptations, this comparison goes, resemble the 
Titans of Greek myth, or Milton’s Satan, or Robin Hood in ways X, Y, and Z. However, mythic 
and folkloric interpretations of the superhero genre not only obscure the political economy of the 
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production of superhero texts, but they also indirectly contribute to a marketing strategy long 
used by American corporate media, that of assimilating characters from public narrative spheres 
into the proprietary sphere of copyrights and trademarks. DC and Marvel have shifted toward 
operating primarily as generators of intellectual property, and only secondarily as publishing 
houses; while many commentators have remarked on this trend since 2000, the companies made 
the shift back in the 1970s. The continued practice among critics and journalists of focusing on 
characters and narrative to the exclusion of ownership and production dovetails with this element 
of the promotional rhetoric that the duopoly has long used. This section will briefly trace the 
history of that rhetoric from the 1940s, when comics met their first backlash, to the 2000s, an era 
of neoliberal advances not just in the protection of intellectual property, but in securing new 
privileges for the corporations that own it. 
 Comics companies have long presented themselves as purveyors of fun, but sometimes 
they have styled themselves as custodians of a shared cultural tradition. After the comic book’s 
popularity exploded in the late 1930s, some commentators—teachers, librarians, physicians—
worried about the possible danger that the new medium, especially its stories of violent 
adventure, might pose to the children who read them (Lopes 31-34). Defenders of comic books 
argued that the most fanciful of the comic-book characters, the superheroes, resembled 
characters from folklore and myth. In March of 1941, the New York Times reported on the 
research of New York psychiatrists Lauretta Bender and Reginald S. Lourie, who had made “a 
thorough study of children’s reactions to contemporary folklore as represented in the comics” 
(MacKenzie). In the July 1941 issue of American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Bender and Lourie 
refuted the claim that comics harmed children, and instead argued that comics held therapeutic 
potential for children struggling with serious emotional and behavior-control problems. Comics, 
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the doctors wrote, “can probably be best understood if they are looked upon as an expression of 
the folklore of this age. They may be compared with the mythology, fairy tales and puppet 
shows, for example, of past ages” (546). Bender and Lourie recount stories troubled children 
interpreting and using comics to cope with difficult feelings; while the Frankfurt School decried 
mass culture as monolithic and stupefying, Bender and Lourie showed ways that audiences do 
things with texts that neither industry, nor marketers, nor defenders of traditional high culture 
can predict or control. However, Bender and Lourie ignored the industrial context of production 
from which comic books emerged as well as the ways that proprietary comic-strip and comic-
book characters served the commercial ends of publishers and licensees. They ignore these 
relations of ownership and circulation, optimistically but ahistorically calling comics “the 
folklore of the times, spontaneously given to and received by children, serving at the same time 
as a means of helping them solve the individual and sociological problems appropriate to their 
own lives” (550). The August 1941 Science News Letter reported on Bender and Lourie’s 
findings, that “Comics provide the folklore of this modern age” (“Let the Children” 124).25  
The anonymity of most early comic-book stories gave commentators another ground for 
comparing them to folklore. As Jones notes, “The garment industry was still the source of much 
of the investment capital that launched Jewish publishing enterprises in the 1930s, and the 
piecework and sweatshop models of the trade were employed by many small publishers” (136). 
Although Jones’s sympathies lie with exploited artists, he raises an analogy worth discussing: 
“Who created that superhero?” asks Jones. “Ask who created that jacket, who finished the 
                                                
25 In 1948, Fredric Wertham would aim a barb at his psychiatric foes Bender and Lourie, as well 
as others who used folklore discourse to defend American comics. The “manifestations of 
brutality, cruelty, and violence” in the crime and horror comics that Wertham abhorred, “[a]ll 
these and the manner in which they are committed—that is the folklore of the comic books” (27).  
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sleeves, who attached the lining?” (190) True, we cannot easily determine percentages of credit 
for any complex work produced multiple persons, but such negotiations constitute part of every 
economic endeavor outside the Robinsonade. The difficulty of the question “Who made that 
character?” does not absolve us of trying to answer it, for comics companies always had an 
answer ready: the company made it. Corporate managers show little compunction about claiming 
ownership and authorship of the creations of their workers when the law allows; to corporations, 
authorship presents a problem of not of ontology, or sociology, or historiography, but of legal 
precedent and contract negotiation. As Jones own research shows, some workers in the comics 
industry negotiated rights of ownership and authorship. Batman co-creator Bob Kane arranged to 
take sole credit for the character despite using ghostwriters and ghost artists to supply him with 
pages (Jones 153-54); he even kept his ghosts’ identities secret from one another to limit their 
ability to negotiate (154). Such negotiations made Kane less an independent owner-artist than a 
middleman exploiter and small-time intellectual-property manager. In contrast to Kane’s secrecy,  
“Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster formed a studio to do their work under their byline, but they talked 
openly about it and let everyone work in the same room and socialize with each other” (153-54). 
Still, most writers and artists in the industry did not expect to get individual credit, let alone a 
share in ownership, and this made it easy for outsiders to accept the comparison to traditionally 
anonymous forms of culture like the ballad and the tall tale.  
National Allied Publications saw academic experts and the discourse of folklore as means 
to assuage parental and political fears about the new medium. National quickly adopted the 
discourse as Bender and Lourie had used it, erasing their own commercial interest and 
proprietary stake in this new body of stories, as well as erasing the labor of individual artists. In 
October 1941 Nation announced the creation of an “Editorial Advisory Board” of experts in 
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education and child development, publishing their names and credentials inside the front cover of 
their comics (“A Message…”). This board included “Dr. C. Bowie Millican, Department of 
English Literature, New York University,” who “has noted the similarity of today’s fictional 
heroes to the legendary heroes of another day—Hercules, Paul Bunyan, Samson, and mighty 
Thor.” National later added to their Advisory Board psychologist William Moulton Marston, 
who had helped develop polygraph test technology before a polyamorous relationship with two 
women (one of them his research assistant) cost him his job at Tufts University (Jones 205-06). 
After his expulsion, Marston had parlayed his role as a developer of the polygraph into work as a 
paid consultant for companies like Gillette. In the late 1930s, he had appeared in “ads that ran in 
Time, Life, and The Saturday Evening Post” in which he used the lie detector to confirm the 
testimony of men who said Gillette blades shaved closer than competitors (Alder 189).26 At the 
end of 1941, National published Wonder Woman, a title that Marston had written; Marston, 
experienced in the world of corporate media, negotiated full ownership of the character, as well 
as royalties (Jones 208). In the winter 1943-44 issue of The American Scholar, Marston held 
forth on the value of comics as a medium  
The ancients, as numerous historical monuments attest, recorded their military triumphs 
as well as their domestic comedies in picture stories. These visual histories were done in 
shells, lapis lazuli, and pink limestone. […] What have we today? The same thing 
precisely, done with artist’s ink, zinc plates, and four color-printing process. The new 
development, accomplishing the ancient purpose, lies merely in the fact that modern 
mechanical facilities permit comic strip producers to distribute their picture tales to a 
                                                
26 “I cannot too strongly emphasize the importance of using the best blades obtainable,” says 
Marston in the ads. “My study enables me to state flatly that Gillette Blades are far superior in 
ever respect to competitive blades tested” (Gillette). 
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hundred million people instead of carving them on a stationary stone monument […] The 
recreational appeal of picture dramas has always existed; the means of contacting vast 
populations with these pictorial creations constitutes the real achievement of our present 
age. (37-38) [Marston’s emphasis] 
This resembles Scott McCloud’s arguments in Understanding Comics that comics as we know 
them today had many antecedents in visual media that juxtapose words and text, but Marston 
erases the historical differences in purpose and audience between such works, subsuming those 
differences under a larger category of “comics avant la lettre,” as a middle-school textbook 
might subsume a Renaissance pietà, a Shang Dynasty bronze, and a Roy Lichtenstein painting 
under the single, ahistorical category of “art.” In addition to ignoring his own conflict of interest 
as a paid consultant, Marston’s essay does not consider the circumstances from which these “art” 
objects emerged or the political economy of their celebration or interpretation. 
 Where Marston evoked classicism, National’s 1944 Superman novelization linked 
Superman to a specifically American tradition. A member of National’s Advisory Board, Josette 
Frank, wrote the book’s foreword. Frank’s 1941 biography from National identifies her as 
belonging to “the Child Study Association of America,” “author of What Books for Children,” 
and “an acknowledged authority in the field of juvenile reading” (“A Message…”). She begins 
her foreword, “America has had many fabulous heroes.” She continues: 
In the great lumber country men told of Paul Bunyan, mighty logger, who moved 
mountains and changed the course of rivers to suit the lumbermen. The opening of the 
West created Pecos Bill, who could lasso a tornado and mount a demon stallion. […] And 
now—Superman—wrestling with the mechanized might to today’s world of airplanes 
and submarines and super-villainy. […] Perhaps you have followed his adventures in the 
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comics where first he was introduced to an astonished world. You may have heard his 
challenging voice on the airwaves of the radio or watched his flaming red cape as he 
streaked across the screen at the movies. (ix-x) 
By listing three of the media in which Superman has appeared, Frank detaches the character from 
any one medium; she also mentions neither Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, nor of National or any 
other commercial publishing interests. Instead, she likens Superman to heroes from American 
folklore. Like her fellow advisor, NYU’s Millican, she mentions Paul Bunyan by name, thereby 
grounding the Last Son of Krypton in a specifically American context. But Paul Bunyan 
represents the classic case of what folklore scholars would soon thereafter call fakelore: sunny, 
mass-market-ready stories having little or no basis in authentic oral culture, sold to a public that 
didn’t know better.  
 The March 1950 issue of The American Mercury published historian Richard M. 
Dorson’s “Folk Lore and Fake Lore,” in which Dorson dismissed Paul Bunyan as the 
construction by commercial writers from a thin base of Michigan loggers’ tales from the 1910s. 
In contrast to John Henry, widely attributed in anonymous folk ballads, Bunyan emerged largely 
from the work of commercial writers like James Stevens, who cited no sources (Dorson 337) and 
who had done “little systematic field work” (338). Pecos Bill had no basis in folklore: as later 
folklorists would demonstrate, Edward O’Reilly fabricated Pecos Bill in 1923 for the magazine 
American Century (Doyle 183; Taft 315). In his monograph American Folklore, Dorson traced 
Bunyan tales to a 1910 print attribution of an oral story (216-17); from there, however, Bunyan’s 
own story strangely parallels the story of newspaper comics’ remediation into the comic book. In 
1914, W. B. Laughead, a Minnesota lumber company’s advertising executive, prepared “thirty-
page booklet of postcard size, Introducing Mr. Paul Bunyan of Westwood Cal.” that 
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“interspersed little Bunyan anecdotes and cartoons among the eulogies of his company’s 
product” (Dorson American Folklore 217). In Dorson’s account, 
A second booklet followed in 1916, but the third issue in 1922, larger and handsomer, 
with a colored cover and the title The Marvelous Exploits of Paul Bunyan, put Paul on the 
map. Instead of circularizing only his customers, Laughead now offered the brochure 
freely to the public and disposed of a printing of ten thousand copies so quickly that the 
had to order five thousand more. The company issued ten subsequent editions at intervals 
of two or three years, and shortly before its dissolution brought out a thirtieth anniversary 
edition in 1944, Paul Bunyan and his Big Blue Ox. […] Laughead’s drawing of Paul 
Bunyan, as a moon-faced axman with a stovepipe cap and flaring whiskers, became the 
trademark of the company [….] (217-18) 
Meanwhile, other writers, taking Bunyan for authentic and in the public domain, invented their 
own Bunyan yarns, and in 1924 Bunyan made his first appearance in a commercial book (214). 
Recall that 1917 saw the first appearance of a booklet reprint of newspaper comics dubbed a 
“comic book” (Bongco 95), and that the first wave of comic books in the early 1930s appeared as 
giveaways to promote other products (Jones 99, 100). A key point distinguished the Bunyan 
stories from newspaper funnies: nobody mistook the Katzenjammer Kids or Little Nemo for 
expressions of some anonymous American “folk” culture.  
 Dorson critiqued fakelore on aesthetic, methodological, and political grounds. For the 
children’s book market, commercial writers bowdlerized the “coarse and obscene” logger’s tales, 
(American 4), dense with the “technical language of white pine logging” (222). Commercial 
fakelore writers did not conduct careful research or interviews with local informants, revealing 
what Dorson saw as their dilettantism. His political critiques, however, hold greatest interest for 
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me and for the critical folklorists he inspired. Under the rubric of fakelore Dorson included Nazi 
and Stalinist uses of supposedly “folk” narratives that either re-purpose or falsely present 
themselves as autochthonous culture in order to empower already hegemonic social groups (3). 
Following Dorson, Archie Green notes that unlike the totalitarians of Europe, Americans 
“relegated our legend making away from the government […] to popular-culture hucksters” 
(354). José Limón’s definition of folklore requires its “relatively autonomous origins within 
communities in contrast to mass media culture” (39) [his emphasis]. Jennifer Gilley and Stephen 
Burnett, studying the US Steel company’s appropriation of the Joe Magrac legend (of a 
superhuman steel-worker), warn of the “the invisible power of the storyteller” who by claiming 
folk authenticity can hide an array of motives or relations of exploitation (392); the “historian, 
sociologist, folklorist, or news columnist exerts a hidden yet crucial influence in our conception 
of the past” (400).27 The historicist critique of fakelore thus informs my own critique of the 
reception of superheroes: when writers either within the superhero industries or without them 
invoke folklore, those invocations obscure the cultural and economic relations—the work-for-
hire or freelance agreements, the copyright and trademark laws, the residuals and licensing—that 
any critical account of this genre must consider. 
 Mystifying the origins of proprietary characters through the folklore discourse serves the 
interests of media corporations, but those same corporations also work to enclose the cultural 
commons for their own use. When NYU’s C. Bowie Millican likened National’s superheroes to 
tales of “mighty Thor,” he could not have known that in the 1960s, National competitor Marvel 
Comics would develop a superhero version of the Norse god. Since 1962 Marvel has filed many 
trademarks for Thor and other Norse deities with United States Patent and Trademark Office 
                                                
27 Joe Magrac also has no attributions prior to a 1931 appearance in Scribner’s Magazine (393), 
qualifying him as fakelore, too.  
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(Lee). Moreover, in 1967 Marvel specifically filed a version with the epithet “Mighty,” receiving 
that trademark registration in 1970, and renewing it in 2007 (“The Mighty Thor”). In 2014, 
Marvel tried to block a slot-machine maker from using Thor and Loki’s names on a new game, 
arguing “that these marks have become so associated with Marvel” that users of the machines 
“are likely to believe that the product is associated with Marvel and its trademarks” (Lee). 
Arguably, the slot-machine makers do want something like that: not that people will actually 
misrecognize their slot machines as licensed Marvel tie-ins, but that people will look favorably 
on their machines because of the association. Borrowing the fame of Marvel’s Thor brand lets 
them differentiate their slot machines in a crowded marketplace. For a small company, using 
public-domain characters to associate their product with a more successful brand represents good 
strategy, and it costs less than paying licensing fees to that brand’s owner—until it lands them in 
court with Disney’s attorneys. 
 Commentators who remark on the duopoly’s shift toward cultivating intellectual property 
rather than publishing comic books often assume the novelty of practices that these companies 
have merely intensified. As Paul Lopes points out, in the late 1970s licensing overtook sales as 
the duopoly’s primary source of revenue (Lopes 74). By the so-called “DC Implosion” of 1978, 
when both DC and Marvel cut their number of titles, “[t]he age of the comic book as a mass 
medium was inarguably over” (74). In October 1979, the New York Times reported that Marvel 
staff had written to “Cadence Industries, Marvel’s [then] parent, venting distress that the comics 
were losing priority within the company” (Kleinfield 25). By this time, Stan Lee spent “most of 
his time on the West Coast, striking Deals with Hollywood. ‘I have the sense that he wants to be 
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like Walt Disney,’ one Marvel writer says” (25).28 DC took a similar path, and by 1985, the 
Times reported that DC president Jenette Kahn had “turned DC into what she calls a ‘creative 
rights company,’ whose products are providing licensing and movie revenues for other Warner 
divisions as well,” though “Warner will not say how much of [its] profits are accountable to DC” 
(Gutis). When Marvel began to rise from its bankruptcy at the beginning of the new century, 
Forbes noted that new CEO F. Peter Cuneo had steered Marvel “away from comics and toys 
toward its vastly underutilized licensing opportunities” (Powers 120). Since Marvel did not then 
belong to a large media conglomerate, Forbes observed that “Most of the money generated from 
Marvel’s catalog of 4,700 characters has gone into the pockets of others” (120). That is, into the 
pockets of persons other than Marvel shareholders: Forbes has no objection to exploitation per 
se.  
In 2003, Marvel named Eli Bard their Senior Litigation Counsel, and his name appears on 
hundreds of trademark filings and renewals for Marvel during his decade-long tenure. These 
filing stake claims not only for characters that originated at Marvel, but also for characters like 
Thor, born in older narrative traditions and now generally regarded as public domain. Bard’s 
filings include “Ares,” “Atlas,” “Excalibur,” and “Frost Giants.” He also filed the 13 February 
2010 ten-year renewal on Marvel’s practice of putting small, stylized versions of their characters 
in a rectangle in the upper left of the front covers of comics; the original language of this 
unnamed filing claims Marvel’s exclusive right to depict in this distinctive manner a variety of 
characters, ranging from “Men, stylized” and “men wearing space suits” to “fictional or 
legendary characters; Paul Bunyan; Pied Piper; Robin Hood” (Serial number 72277676). At the 
time of Bard’s hiring, Marvel’s former CEO, Allen S. Lipson, declared, “As an owner and 
                                                
28 By 1979 Disney’s name had already become metonymous with transmedia branding. See 
Grainge, Brand Hollywood, and Wasko, Understanding Disney.  
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licensor of intellectual property, Marvel must focus a tremendous amount of resources on legal 
talent to structure, negotiate, complete and enforce license agreements as well as to aggressively 
defend against unauthorized use of our character assets” (qtd. in “Marvel Expands”). In Lipson’s 
rhetoric and in the world of intellectual property, aggression and defense merge. Eli Bard helped 
Marvel “structure, negotiate, complete and enforce” Marvel’s claims, claims on not just the 
works of 20th-century freelancers but also the works of huckstering Minnesota lumber executives 
and anonymous European skalds. This Bard tells a different kind of story: legal fictions to 
consolidate the economic power not of a noble patron but of a corporation. 
 In the 2001 Forbes piece on Marvel, Powers wrote, “Some action hero should come to 
the rescue. Sony, for instance” (121). In 2009, Disney would do just that, but only after Marvel 
Studios had parlayed the company’s intellectual property into astronomical licensing revenues. 
In April 2005, License! magazine reported that Marvel’s licensing revenues had exploded from 
$189 million to $4 billion in a single year, taking the company from number sixty-nine to 
number four on their list of biggest licensors (Wilensky 16). “Disney Consumer Products and 
Warner Bros. Consumer Products continue to stake their claims to the Nos. 1 and 2 spots, 
respectively,” reported License!, with Nickelodeon & Viacom Consumer Products taking third 
place (16). Disney’s acquisition of Marvel brought the company from fourth place to first.  
 
A Pedagogical Genre 
Superheroes became ubiquitous at the movies during the 2000s, a decade that saw growth 
in DVD sales that has been called the DVD boom, a period during which the Motion Picture 
Association of America pursued related a campaign to reduce the unauthorized copying of 
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video.29 The most public facet of that campaign began with a partnership between the MPAA 
and the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS), the authoritarian, capitalist city-state 
long ruled by the People’s Action Party of Lee Kwan Yew. The IPOS launched a campaign 
called “Honour I.P.,” shortened to “HIP” (“Be HIP” 6). From this partnership resulted a trailer, 
“Piracy: It’s a Crime,” which then screened in Singapore before House of Flying Daggers 
(Zhang Yimou, 2004). Over a pounding techno score, the trailer shows an MTV-style montage 
of thefts, shot with speed-ramping and breakneck zooms. Intertitles, in a distressed font 
(approximating someone’s idea of “punk” graphic design), directly hail the viewer: “You 
wouldn’t steal a car. You wouldn’t steal a handbag. You wouldn’t steal a television. You 
wouldn’t steal a movie. [Here, we see a shoplifter steal a DVD.] Downloading pirated films is 
stealing.” MPAA then made this trailer available for American DVD manufacturers, who put it 
on discs before movies. The manufacturers added a feature that angered many DVD buyers: the 
viewer could not skip this propaganda film. “Someone really wants you to watch this,” wrote 
Finlo Rohrer of the BBC, who covered the backlash from angry DVD buyers. Parodies of the 
short became an online meme, thereby subverting the IPOS’s goal of making their anti-copying 
position hip.30 
The trailer’s address collapses copying and stealing into a single category, when the two 
do not equate. Unlike a true pirate who steals a commodity from me, an unlawful copier does not 
deprive me of my use of the thing copied; copying only deprives me of a possible, future “use” if 
                                                
29 For more on the DVD boom, see chapter three. 
30 In a bit of unintended farce, the makers of the trailer used music by Dutch artist Melchior 
Rietveldt, but they told his agents that the trailer would run only “at a local film festival” (Mick). 
Rietveldt later found his music used in the “Piracy: It’s a Crime” trailer playing on a Harry 
Potter DVD, sued his former agents, and won a substantial settlement. A judge also fined the 
company 20,000 Euros (Mick). According to court documents, the trailer ran on “at least 71” 
different DVD titles (Enigmax). 
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that use depends on my limited monopoly on the reproduction of the object. Moreover, this 
monopoly does not depend on my having made the thing in question. Singapore’s Senior 
Minister for State Ho Peng Kee said of the “Honour IP” campaign, “Whether it is a fancy gadget, 
a household brand or music and movies, someone invested time and effort to create it and owns 
the IP in it. We need to realise that it takes numerous parties working endless 18-hour days to 
bring to us a unique piece of movie magic” (4). Kee’s statement pays lip service to the labor that 
goes into media production while obscuring and mystifying the legal relations that actually 
exclude the majority of media workers from a meaningful share in the profits that their media 
generate. Intellectual property law indirectly benefits workers insofar as media franchises 
constitute open-ended, long-term projects which require future labor to keep running. Below-the-
line Hollywood workers directly benefit from intellectual property laws only if they have 
organized to bargain for a share. 
Supplementing the pedagogical project of pro-corporate texts like “Piracy: It’s a Crime” 
we find the narratives of movies that explicitly position IP-copycats as villains. In the Hollywood 
superhero genre, no scheme appears more often than the villain who tries to copy the superhero’s 
powers in order to reproduce them. The trope has a long history in the comics, but it has never 
figured centrally there; on the screen, Superman IV: The Quest for Peace (Sidney J. Furie, 1987) 
Lex Luthor tried to clone Superman, but we would not see the trope’s return to the screen until 
the DVD era. It takes two forms, biological and technological, and in both versions, villains style 
their mission as at least rhetorically pro-social, bringing the benefits of the hero’s powers to more 
people (though they may define the people in unconventional or self-serving ways). In a parody 
of Copyleft or Creative Commons activism, these films present illicit copiers as dupes or 
bunglers at best, democidal sociopaths at worst.  
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In the Hulk films of the 2000s, competing factions of villains attempt to copy the hero’s 
powers. In Hulk (2003), rogue military contractor and biotechnology entrepreneur Talbot attacks 
a captive Bruce Banner with a stun-gun; he wants Banner to transform into the Hulk so that he 
can “carve off a piece,” “analyze it, patent it, and make a fortune”; meanwhile the senior Dr. 
Banner wants to absorb his son’s powers for his own use. In the 2008 reboot, The Incredible 
Hulk, Banner spends most of the film protecting his proprietary DNA from General 
“Thunderbolt” Ross, who wants, as Banner puts it, to “replicate” the Hulk: “He wants to make it 
a weapon.” The 2008 film offers version of the Hulk’s origin that differs from the 2003 film: 
here, Banner’s alter ego results not from his father’s mad science but from government 
experiments to create a super-soldier. While the 2008 Banner hides from the government, he 
begins an encrypted, online correspondence with an underground geneticist, in the hope of 
finding a way to cure himself of the Hulk. However, this geneticist later betrays Banner’s trust: 
he has secretly cultured Banner’s blood cells and spliced Banner’s DNA into animal subjects. 
“This is potentially Olympian,” says the geneticist as he leads banner through a gallery of 
catalogued blood-cultures. “This gamma technology has limitless applications. We’ll unlock 
hundreds of cures. We’ll make humans impervious to disease! […] This is Promethean fire!” 
Banner not only refuses to entertain medical applications of this research, but he insists they 
destroy all the samples; however, before he can persuade the geneticist, the military captures 
him. The geneticist subsequently injects a Special Forces operative, Blonsky, with his half-baked 
version of the serum, warning that the result could be “an abomination.” Readers of Hulk comics 
will recognize the Abomination as a perennial villain, but anyone can recognize the 
abominability of the resultant steroid-freak: it rampages through Manhattan, wantonly killing 
soldiers and civilians, demanding, “Give me a real fight!” Unlike Banner, who wants to cure 
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himself of the Hulk, Blonsky seeks out such power; unlike the Hulk, who only wants to be left 
alone, the Abomination craves violence. The Abomination’s very name implies a judgment on 
the morality of trying to copy the Hulk against Banner’s wishes. The film presents Banner’s 
refusal as evidence of moral probity and social responsibility, yet we can also read it as a 
requirement of the franchise: the Hulk must remain extraordinary. For Bruce Banner’s trials to 
seem poignant, he must remain a lonely freak, rather than the revered source of medical 
treatments that radically transform the human species. The pleasures of the Hulk brand arise 
because of Banner’s suffering, so his suffering must continue; the franchise requires that peace 
for Banner, and biomedical Utopia for the rest of us, must never arrive. 
Unlike the Incredible Hulk, Prometheus lies in the public domain, so villains in both 
Marvel and DC franchises can invoke him as a metaphor. In both the 1978 Superman and in the 
2006 Superman Returns, Lex Luthor threatens Metropolis, but with a key difference: the DVD-
era Luthor specifically covets Superman’s self-replicating Kryptonian technology. Both Luthors 
travel to Superman’s arctic Fortress of Solitude to use his crystal library without his permission, 
and both Luthors plan to create empires by destroying swaths of North America, killing millions. 
However, only the latter-day, DVD-era Luthor steals self-replicating crystal technology from 
Superman’s Fortress. He compares himself to Prometheus, explaining the allusion for his moll, 
Kitty, and for the audience: “Prometheus was a god who stole the power of fire from the other 
gods and gave control of it to mortals. In essence, he gave us technology.” When Kitty replies 
that Luthor is not a god, he rejoins, “Gods are selfish beings that fly around in little red capes and 
don’t share their power with mankind. […] No, I don’t want to be a god. I just want to bring fire 
to the people. And I want my cut.” Luthor draws on Olympian metaphor, giving a classical 
veneer to his entrepreneurialism, which he merrily acknowledges will kill “billions.” He seeds 
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the ocean floor to begin growing a new continent of crystal towers, but where the crystals of 
Superman’s Fortress gleam white, these resemble coal, and their growth causes earthquakes that 
wreak havoc in Metropolis.  
Luthor’s forbidding crags render visually the moral contrast between him and Superman 
and the contrast between their uses of Kryptonian technology: Superman only uses it to create 
his Fortress of Solitude, far from population and the envying eyes of humans, a private Olympus, 
where he can safeguard technology from a species not (yet) worthy of its use. The film does not 
entertain the possibility that Superman should share his technology with humanity, or that its 
presence on Earth even warrants Superman’s consultation with humans on the matter; instead, it 
implies that Superman does right by keeping it from us. Outside the diegesis, we find other 
compelling reasons for this narrative of concentrated ownership. First, the historical precedent of 
the norms of Superman franchise requires him to inhabit our recognizable world, not a science-
fiction wonderland of humans using Kryptonian technology. In Watchmen, Alan Moore violates 
this convention of the genre: the godlike super-scientist Dr. Manhattan creates technologies that 
change everyday life, such as rechargeable electric cars used by the Promethean Cab Company. 
Their slogan, “Bringing Light to the World” (ch. 3, p. 22), makes clear Moore’s revisionist 
impulse. Second, and more fundamentally, Superman replicates the way corporations manage 
intellectual property. Not even shareholders get to vote on how executives use intellectual 
property; they may only buy in or cash out. 
Luthor’s plan therefore mirrors Superman’s custodial relationship to Kryptonian 
technology, which functions as a limited monopoly. Although Luthor invokes Prometheus’ 
radical act of sharing of fire with mortals, Luthor actually plans to “share” Kryptonian 
technology only as a means to control its scarcity: “the rest of the world will be begging me for a 
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piece of high-tech beachfront property. In fact, they’ll pay through the nose for it.” Land, for 
both versions of Luthor, constitutes an absolute limit of wealth. The 2006 version recites 
something his father used to tell him: “You can print money, manufacture diamonds, and people 
are a dime a dozen, but they’ll always need land. It’s the one thing they’re not making any more 
of.” This sounds familiar because the 2006 script re-treads much of this speech from a scene in 
the 1978 film, where the earlier Luthor explains his plan. Brando and Reeve both died in 2004, 
so in this context, Luthor’s speech and the film’s overdetermined nostalgia for the earlier film 
cycle suggest another kind of scarcity: that of Warner Brothers Superman movies themselves. In 
the context of the film’s mise en scène of towering crystals and John Williams score, both re-
used from the first Superman film cycle, and most of all, its re-use of footage of Marlon Brando 
(literally duplicating his role from the earlier Superman cycle), we can formulate Luthor’s 
maxim another way: “Time Warner can print more comic books, manufacture DVDs, and 
screenwriters are a dime a dozen, but they’ll always need Superman movies. The Christopher 
Reeve and Marlon Superman films are the one thing they’re not making more of.” Time Warner 
owns the character, and they maintain a limited monopoly not only on (nostalgic) new Superman 
texts but also on re-uses of older texts.  
Still, some challenge Time Warner’s limited monopoly on the rights to Superman. The 
Siegel and Shuster estates have continued their legal wrangling with DC and Warner Brothers 
into the 21st century, long after the creators’ deaths. In 2009 a judge ruled that Warners had to 
begin production of another Superman film by 2011 or face a suit from the Siegel estate for 
additional royalties (McNary). The resultant film, Man of Steel (Zack Snyder, 2013), takes the 
superhero as intellectual property to a grotesque extreme. Superman faces off against Kryptonian 
General Zod, who arrives on Earth with a band of fellow exiles. Zod, sworn to protect Krypton, 
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seeks to recover a Codex holding the genetic codes of the people of that lost planet, which Zod 
believes came to Earth with the baby Kal-El (i.e. Superman). With this science-fictional “library” 
of characters, Zod plans to re-constitute the Kryptonian people on Earth, incidentally 
exterminating humans. To make sure we understand Zod’s evil, the script also makes his plans 
eugenic toward Kryptonians, too: he plans not just to “save our race” but to “sever the 
degenerate bloodlines that led us to this state.” His forces search for but cannot find the Codex, 
until the icy Kryptonian scientist Jax-Ur solves the mystery: before launching baby Kal-El to 
earth, the boy’s father “took the Codex, the DNA of a billion people, and he bonded it within his 
son’s individual cells—all Krypton’s heirs, living, hidden in one refugee’s body.”  
Jax-Ur’s German accent obscures the Canadian nationality of the actor who plays him, 
Mackenzie Gray. On the Vancouver television show The Rush, Gray explained that when he 
auditioned for the part, director Snyder surprised him by asking him to do the audition “in a 
German accent”; Snyder “loved it” and gave Gray the role “on the spot” (“Actor”). Moreover, 
the filmmakers flew Gray to Chicago to rehearse with German actress Antje Traue, who would 
play another evil Kryptonian. According to Gray, “they wanted us to be from the same place, and 
Antje’s got a German accent, and they wanted me to adopt that” (“Actor”). Although Traue, to 
my ear, does not sound recognizably German in the film, Gray does. General Zod, played by 
Michael Shannon (from Chicago), speaks a Midwestern American accent, as does Superman, 
played by Henry Cavill (from England). What to make of Jax-Ur’s accent? He alone performs 
painful, invasive medical tests on the captive Superman, a refugee dangerous to the Kryptonian 
race. Jax-Ur, in his high-collared black-and-gray uniform, therefore sounds to me not merely 
German but Nazi German, Schutzstaffel from central casting. Some viewers expressed 
puzzlement over this. Film-student blogger Joey Katz remarks on the “out of place” “evil 
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Kryptonian Nazi scientist.” A forum regular at the EyesSkyward Superman fan site begins his 
complaint about the film, “what was up with crazy Nazi Kryptonian guy? OK, it’s supposed to 
be Jax-Ur (which I was disappointed by because Jax-Ur isn’t a biologist but whatever) but he has 
a weird Nazi scientist vibe. He even has what sounds like a German accent” (Vadakin). 
However, they do not look into Gray’s nationality or Snyder’s request for the accent, and they do 
not consider the rhetorical function of Nazis as Hollywood shorthand for Evil. While the real-
world heirs of Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster—Nazi-hating Jews from Cleveland—fought Time 
Warner in court for shares of the media franchise’s profits, Man of Steel quietly offered a 
comparison: those who would violate the superhero’s intellectual property resemble the would-
be enslavers of modern Europe. 
  
“A Fair, Efficient, and Predictable Environment”  
In contrast to the space fantasies of Man of Steel, Marvel’s Iron Man series deals with 
intellectual property in an area closest to the real-life fears of corporations: industrial design. The 
inventor of the Iron Man armor, industrialist Tony Stark, has no powers except his inherited 
wealth and his genius as an inventor. Because he manufactures his armor using earthly materials 
and does not keep his identity secret, many attempt to copy his work. In Iron Man (Jon Favreau, 
2008), another executive within Stark Industries envies Stark genius. This rival tries but fails to 
equal Stark’s designs, and eventually he decides to steal Stark’s miniature reactor, to power his 
clumsy, smoke-belching, knock-off suit of powered armor. As Stark lies paralyzed, his enemy 
gloats: 
When I ordered the hit on you, I worried that I was killing the golden goose. But, you see, 
it was just fate that you survived—you had one last golden egg to give. Do you really 
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think that just because you have an idea, it belongs to you? Your father, he helped give us 
the atomic bomb. Now what kind of world would it be today if he were as selfish as you? 
[He holds up the luminous reactor, admiring it.] Oh, Tony, this is your Ninth Symphony. 
The film suggests that the first-rate invent, while the wicked and second-rate steal intellectual 
property. Despite his comparison to symphony, the villain does not intend to put the fusion 
reactor in the public domain, where we can find Beethoven’s compositions. Moreover, his pro-
social rhetoric about the atomic bomb actually undercuts the argument about sharing intellectual 
property. After all, even hawkish viewers see atomic weapons as the limit case of the power of 
intellectual property and the copying of technology; the Bush Administration premised the 2003 
invasion of Iraq on the need to control the proliferation of weapons that the US has had the 
power to make for generations.  
Herein we find the paradox of the Iron Man series and the Marvel Cinematic Universe: 
Tony Stark invents devices that should radically change human civilization, but each film begins 
in our familiar world, not radically changed by flying armor, free energy, or any other mass-
producible innovation the previous film introduced. This becomes most apparent after Iron Man 
II (Jon Favreau, 2010). Early in that film, the US Senate Armed Services Committee subpoenas 
Stark; when he appears at the hearing, a senator Stern tells him, “My priority is to get the Iron 
Man weapon turned over to the people of the United States of America.” Yet the casting of Gary 
Shandling as the senator signals to viewers that we should not take this pompous man too 
seriously. So does the casting of Sam Rockwell as the bumbling defense contractor Justin 
Hammer, the CEO of Hammer Industries, overdressed here and throughout the film in a three-
piece suit (blockbuster shorthand for rich and square, whether a buffoon or a villain). Stark 
shows contempt for Hammer but shows respect for Lieutenant Colonel James Rhodes, played by 
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the suave and handsome Don Cheadle. Rhodes presents to the hearing images from Iran and 
North Korea, testifying: “Intelligence suggests that the devices seen in these photos are attempts 
at making manned copies of Mister Stark’s suit.” However, during this testimony, Stark uses his 
super-smartphone to hack the room’s computer system, so that he can show classified footage: a 
North Korean robot suit malfunctioning, then an Iranian suit exploding, and finally, in a video 
bearing the Hammer Industries logo, Justin Hammer beside another malfunctioning robot suit. 
Stark demonstrates technical mastery over both the Iron Man armor and the room’s computer 
equipment, then offers the senators his assessment of his competitors’ progress toward matching 
his inventions: “I’d say most countries—five, ten years away. Hammer Industries—twenty.” 
Stark ends his testimony defiant: “You want my property? You can’t have it. […] I have 
successfully privatized world peace.”  
While this sounds like a neoliberal dream, Iron Man II’s narrative presents the “private” 
element of privatization (and private property) as a fragile ideal, in need of vigorous defense. 
The film pits Stark against a secret alliance between copycat Hammer and a brilliant Russian 
inventor, Ivan Danko (Mickey Rourke). Danko’s father, we learn, helped Stark’s father develop 
the tiny reactor that powers the Iron Man armor, but the elder Stark took sole credit for the 
invention. The younger Danko now develops not only his own suit of powered armor, but also a 
fleet of semi-autonomous drone suits. In the film’s climactic set-piece, Stark confronts 
something like a capitalist’s nightmare: the proprietor finds designs that he thought belonged to 
him now turned against him, the alienator of labor power now the victim of alienation. The film 
gives Capital a happy ending, as Stark defeats the knock-offs, but labor doesn’t get one; even in 
the interior shots of Justin Hammer’s factories, actual workers appear seldom, and always far in 
the background of the shot. Iron Man II frames both Stark’s corporate rivals and the elected 
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representatives of the American people as neither ethical enough to be trusted with the armor nor 
competent enough to duplicate it well. Only the Russian inventor, motivated by a personal (and 
therefore non-commercial) grudge, has the necessary talent, but his defeat in the film’s climax 
ends his “competition” with Stark. The Avengers (Joss Whedon, 2012) and Iron Man III (Shane 
Black, 2013) show a world free from the specter of ubiquitous powered armor, where Stark 
protects the world by protecting his brand, thereby maintaining his monopoly on the Iron Man 
business.31 
Of all superhero films, the Iron Man franchise shows the most sustained interest in the 
USA’s military interventions overseas. The first film in the series re-writes he hero’s place of 
origin from Vietnam to Afghanistan, in the context of Stark Industries’ sales of military 
hardware to warlords; the third film pits the hero against a terrorist organization that at first 
appears to be based in Muslim countries where the US intervenes militarily, including Pakistan. 
Neither this superhero movie franchise nor any other sends its hero to Iraq, America’s most 
bloody and least popular intervention since Vietnam; studio executives showed instrumental 
rationality in avoiding taking a side that might alienate potential viewers. Yet if American 
attempts at nation-building in Iraq constitute the unacknowledged subtext of Iron Man’s 
adventures overseas, then American attempts to rebuild Iraq specifically along lines favorable to 
corporations constitutes part of the unacknowledged background of economic and juridical 
relations behind this movie genre’s obsession with intellectual property.  
As superheroes battled would-be copycats on the screen and MPAA trailers equated 
copying with theft, the Coalition Provisional Authority, installed in Iraq by US military force, 
                                                
31 Avengers: Age of Ultron (Joss Whedon, 2015) brings back the fear of alienated intellectual 
property, as the artificial intelligence Ultron commandeers not only Stark’s armor, but also 
Stark’s automated production machinery. Ultron, as software that Stark developed, represents 
rogue intellectual property at its purest, without the mediation of human commercial rivals. 
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proclaimed a variety of legal and economic reforms known as the 100 Orders. Order 80 aimed to 
secure intellectual property, declaring that “companies, lenders and entrepreneurs require a fair, 
efficient, and predictable environment for protection of their intellectual property” (1). The 
language suggests neutrality and legalism, but the Orders set the stage for the privatization of 
Iraqi industry and resources by foreign companies. Like Justice Kennedy’s 2010 opinion in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, Order 80 says nothing about structural 
imbalances of power or wealth. For Kennedy, corporations represent “associations of citizens” 
(4, 38, 40), and laws that restrict corporate spending (here equated with speech) unfairly 
“disfavored” (40) a certain category of citizen associations. Similarly, Order 80 frames the need 
to protect intellectual property in populist, even vaguely democratic terms, “as necessary to 
improve the economic condition of the people of Iraq” (1). In May of 2003, Paul Bremer 
announced, “Iraq is open for business again” (qtd. in Tyler), but as many critics of the 
occupation pointed out, Bremer meant a particular kind of business. As Wendy Brown points 
out, Iraqi farmers had long obtained seed “from a national seed bank, located, alas, in Abu 
Ghraib, where the entire bank vanished after the bombings and occupation” (144). Into this void 
stepped foreign agribusiness, selling genetically modified seeds, who could now apply for “plant 
variety protection” under Order 81 (16). As Nancy Scola writes, Bremer’s announcement 
amounted to “telling Monsanto that the same conditions had been created in Iraq that had led to 
the company’s stunning successes in India,” where hundreds of farmers bankrupted by their 
dependence on Monsanto committed suicide by drinking the company’s Round-Up herbicide. As 
Scola points out, genetically modified seeds contaminate the larger gene pools of their crops, 
such that “eventually much of the world’s seeds could labor under patents controlled by one 
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agribusiness or another.”32 Genetically modified plants propagate independent of farmers’ 
volition, colonizing non-proprietary seed stocks, much as corporate media brands propagate 
spontaneously through social networks of fans whose unpaid labor strengthens the portfolios of 
conglomerates. 
Although Iron Man III departs from its precursors’ fixation on the copying of the Iron 
Man armor, its narrative still hinges on intellectual property, and in a way even closer to the 
realities of the geopolitics of the 2000s. The film’s first hint about the true nature of the villain’s 
threat appears in the form of a genetically modified plant that explodes when damaged; the 
second appears in the spontaneous combustion of returning US military veterans. The latter 
prove to be the test subjects of a mad scientist-entrepreneur’s experiments, who volunteer in the 
hope of recovering limbs lost in war. “I’ll own the War on Terror,” the villain tells Stark. “I’ll 
create supply and demand.” He plans to monetize the whole apparatus of US military 
intervention: he will sell technology to the armed forces that will let maimed American soldiers 
regenerate, while simultaneously using the same technology to run a worldwide terrorist 
organization. The villain of Iron Man III thus comes closest to actually duplicating the methods 
of what Naomi Klein has called “disaster capitalism,” using or engineering large-scale 
destruction to create commercial opportunities. Like the neoliberals in the Bush administration 
who wrecked Iraq and then rebuilt it as a playground for foreign corporations, the villain in Iron 
Man III does not disdain state power; unlike an Objectivist or an “anarcho-capitalist,” he requires 
the state, even as he subverts its purposes for his own. While Iraq represents an extreme example 
                                                
32 The Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association sued Monsanto to prevent the company 
from suing farmers whose seeds become contaminated by natural cross-pollination, but the suit 
failed in both district and federal court. As Reuters reported, “The group asked Monsanto for a 
pledge not to sue, but the company refused, saying: ‘A blanket covenant not to sue any present or 
future member of petitioners’ organizations would enable virtually anyone to commit intentional 
infringement’” (“Monsanto Critics”). 
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of the neoliberal re-structuring of the state and its legal order for the benefit of corporations, it 
differs in degree but not in kind from, say, Disney’s intervention to re-write the 1998 Copyright 
Extension Act so that corporations would enjoy an additional twenty years of exclusive rights to 
their intellectual property. As Janet Wasko points out, “Disney provided campaign contributions 
to ten of the 13 initial sponsors of the House bill and eight of the 12 sponsors of the Senate bill” 
(86). Disney, too, wants to create “a fair, efficient, and predictable environment,” with fairness, 
efficiency, and predictability defined as serving the ends of Disney. 
  
Interpellation, Anamorphosis, and the Phenomenology of the Branded Hero 
 Superhero blockbusters thus merge marketing, narrative, and pedagogy, offering a 
normative model of how citizens should comport themselves toward intellectual property. In 
these films, only bunglers and megalomaniacs attempt to use the hero’s intellectual property 
without his permission. Yet if we dismiss these appeals as rankly commercial, we miss the 
sophistication that the studios demonstrate in curating intellectual property and in grooming their 
audiences for long-term engagement with the brand. That this engagement includes modes of 
ironic, even oppositional spectatorship makes it all the stronger. Take, for example, a scene from 
Spider-Man (Sam Raimi, 2002). Crass, penny-pinching J. Jonah Jameson, editor of the tabloid 
Daily Bugle, has named the costumed villain that battled with Spider-Man in Times Square. “The 
Green Goblin,” he says to Peter Parker. “You like that? Made it up myself. These weirdos all 
gotta have a name now.” He tells his assistant, “Call the patent office! Copyright the name 
‘Green Goblin’—I want a quarter every time somebody says it.” Irony works here on three 
levels. First, on the dramatic level: the audience, but not Jameson, knows that Peter’s secret 
identity as Spider-Man, the “weirdo” whom Jameson sensationally presents as a “menace” to 
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New York in order to boost sales. Second, on the intertextual level, viewers familiar with Spider-
Man stories recognize the film’s revision, which credits Jameson with the Goblin’s codename. 
On a third level, however, the scene illustrates the commercial logic of intellectual property, but 
exaggerated for comic effect. However, the Goblin’s first public appearance, in Times Square, 
took place under the logos of dozens of real-world companies that engaged with Sony Pictures 
Classics for product-placement deals (including Disney, in a billboard for the Broadway Lion 
King). Actor J. K. Simmons, who plays Jameson, steals this scene with his rapid-fire delivery 
around his cigar stub; the film thus reveals the branding logic by which Marvel operates, but 
only through the mouth of a character that the filmmakers expect us not merely to dislike, but to 
enjoy disliking. In the film, Peter Parker learns that he must never use his powers for financial 
gain, but the film he inhabits, and the company that licensed Sony to produce it, have no such 
compunctions. 
The sequel further elaborates this ironic treatment of intellectual property. The moment in 
Spider-Man II (Sam Raimi, 2004) functions simultaneously as self-reflexive, intertextual play 
and as an acknowledgement of the actual economic relations behind the film: 
JAMESON: Guy named Otto Octavius winds up with eight limbs. What are the odds? 
Hoffman, what are we going to call this guy? 
HOFFMAN: Er… Doctor Octopus? 
JAMESON: Nah, it’s crap. 
HOFFMAN: Science Squid? 
JAMESON: Crap. 
HOFFMAN: Doctor Strange? 
 99 
JAMESON: That’s pretty good. But it’s taken. Wait, wait—I got it. [gesturing as if 
toward a marquee] Doctor Octopus!  
HOFFMAN: But— [hesitating] I like it. 
JAMESON: Of course you do. Doctor Octopus! New villain in town. [making air quotes] 
Doc Ock! 
HOFFMAN: [looking defeated] Genius. 
JAMESON: What are you looking for, a raise? Get out. 
 This scene plays on the often allusive, often alliterative names once common in superhero comic 
books (one of which J. Jonah Jameson himself has), but the reference to Doctor Strange 
increases the self-reflexivity of the scene. Viewers familiar with Marvel Comics know Doctor 
Strange as a long-running title; viewers familiar with 1960s Marvel know that Spider-Man co-
creator and penciller Steve Ditko created Doctor Strange. Jameson’s dialogue thus also 
interpellates these viewers into the pleasurable viewing position of expert fan, an elite audience 
within the audience, by rewarding their knowledge of the character and the company’s history.  
Jameson’s decision to take credit for Hoffman’s name for the new villain reinforces our 
sense of Jameson as quick-witted and unscrupulous operator in the media business. After all, 
based on the first film, we can infer that Jameson also intends to legally register “Doctor 
Octopus,” which Hoffman coined (within the diegesis), as an intellectual property for his own 
commercial use. However, the scene thereby recalls Steve Ditko’s own creative and commercial 
struggles with Marvel Comics. Between 1963 and 1966, The Amazing-Spider Man had become 
extremely successful, and Marvel’s licensing of the character brought in money that the artists 
and writers, with their work-for-hire contracts, never saw; company head Martin Goodman 
continually deferred re-negotiations with the talent (Bell 95). On Ditko’s final day at Marvel, 
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Goodman tried to induce him to stay, not by agreeing to give him a percentage of ownership or 
revenues from franchising but by offering to raise his pay by five dollars per page (95). Since 
that departure, Ditko has received royalties on Spider-Man comics, but no money from the films 
or other media (Tucker). In this context, Jameson’s expropriation of Hoffman’s work and his 
rhetorical question about the raise sound like allusions to Marvel’s real-world exploitation of a 
founding artist within the Spider-Man franchise itself—but presented as penny-pinching Jameson 
being Jameson. While the screenwriters may have originally written the scene as a reflexive 
critique of Marvel’s business practices, such intentions become difficult to parse when four 
screenwriters get involved: an original “screen story” written by Alfred Gough and Miles Millar 
passed into the hands of Michael Chabon, before Alvin Sargent rewrote it in the form that Raimi 
used.33 Although in Chabon’s version, Jameson does name Doctor Octopus (203), Jameson does 
not steal the credit from one of his underlings, and he does not refer to Doctor Strange.34 
However, I would argue that the scene as filmed functions independently of the intentions of 
specific writers, insofar as its self-reflexive irony still rewards audience knowledge of Marvel 
history independent of our approval of that history. Even fans who know the circumstances of 
Ditko’s departure from Marvel can enjoy the scene, as it interpellates them into a position of 
expertise in the brand even as it reveals the methods of that brand’s managers.35 
                                                
33 The Writers’ Guild of America Screen Credits Manual lays out the guidelines for using and 
interpreting the word and versus the ampersand to clarify who worked on a script with whom 
relative to others in time. 
34 Chabon’s script does allude, bluntly, to Steve Ditko through the name of Peter Parker’s 
landlord, Mr. Ditkovich. Chabon’s script identifies the character as a Ukrainian immigrant (127-
28), and Sargent’s script keeps the name. 
35 On the DVD of Spider-Man II, the special feature “Spidey-Sense 2” plays trivia factoids at the 
bottom of the screen along with the film. The factoids for this scene mention Ditko’s role as co-
creator of Spider-Man but make no mention of Ditko’s dissatisfaction or his exit from Marvel. 
Instead, they build the corporate brand (Marvel) by emphasizing connections among its range 
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 Unlike other forms of commercial media, and even other kinds of film franchise, in 
superhero films, the brand hides in the open, in the guise of the star character. In “The Purloined 
Letter,” Poe’s detective C. Auguste Dupin makes an extended comparison between the methods 
of advertisers and the methods of a canny blackmailer, who has hidden in plain sight the stolen 
letter of title. Dupin asks the narrator, 
have you ever noticed which of the street signs, over the shop doors, are the most 
attractive of attention? […] the over-largely lettered signs and placards of the street, 
escape observation by dint of being excessively obvious; and here the physical oversight 
is precisely analogous with the moral inapprehension by which the intellect suffers to 
pass unnoticed those considerations which are too obtrusively and too palpably self-
evident. (345) 
The superhero resembles these advertising slogans that we fail to recognize as such; we see the 
chevron on Superman’s chest, or the spider on Spider-Man’s back, but we see it as part of a 
costume, and not as a trademark. When Spider-Man lands atop a Carlsberg truck in Spider-Man 
(Sam Raimi, 2002), or when Superman rolls from the burning ruins of a 7-11 in Man of Steel 
(Zack Snyder, 2013), even then, we might not actively notice that that advertisers address us. In 
each scene, the narrative strives to keep us more interested in a mixture of violent action and 
Oedipal melodrama: Spider-Man lands on that beer truck when he first uses his webs to swing 
through Manhattan, racing to catch his uncle’s murderer, and Superman rises from the wrecked 
gas station during a battle to save his adoptive mother from General Zod.  
 Of course we can also understand the spectator’s flows of attention and inattention in 
other terms, narrative or generic. For example, a spectator in suspense about the outcome of 
                                                                                                                                                       
brands, telling us, “In the comics, Doctor Strange and Spider-Man have teamed up several times 
to battle foes such as Xandu and Nightmare.” 
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Superman’s fight with General Zod might simply pay attention to other things beside corporate 
logos; the fan of the DC Comics Superman might instead compare this version of the fight to 
others, scanning for clues that suggest specific textual borrowings. In contrast, a thirteen-year-
old spectator who did not drive to the multiplex, and who does not choose where to fill the 
family car’s gas tank, may ignore the logo of the gas station out of habit. More critical viewers 
do attend to the product placement; I remember friends in 2002 joking about the Carlsberg truck 
in Spider-Man that I had been too enthralled to notice. In 2013, after watching Man of Steel, I 
pointed out to the friends who saw the film with me the 7-11, and the U-Haul van, and the IHOP, 
and the Sears. However, in neither case do I remember anyone pointing out the superheroes 
themselves. David Bordwell, in homage to Poe, called the classical Hollywood of the studio era 
“an excessively obvious cinema” (11), but the superhero blockbuster exceeds those norms. The 
superhero’s status as the commercial enunciation of capital hides before our eyes, such that we 
recognize one layer of commercial address while misrecognizing the other. 
 The superhero’s status as brand disappears through what Žižek has called anamorphosis. 
We see the other trademarks and brand names in the mise en scène; and we might even groan at 
Hollywood’s crass handling of a character we remember fondly from comics or from other 
movies, texts far enough in our pasts that we have forgotten their encrusting commercial 
apparatus of ads and product-placements. However, we still fail to recognize the superhero as the 
anamorphic object, the mis-seen blot that has the power to inflect the meaning of everything else 
in the composition. In his analysis of I Am Legend (Francis Lawrence, 2007), Kirk Boyle 
describes the advertisements that still clutter post-apocalyptic Manhattan as “anamorphic 
advertising,” part of a mise en scène packed with corporate signifiers meant to register only in 
the corner of the eye (2). But the superhero operates according to a bolder logic, one more like 
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that of The Ambassadors by Holbein the Younger. In Žižek’s analysis the anamorphic element 
remains unintelligible “when viewed straightforwardly” (Looking 90). In superhero blockbusters, 
the film interpellates us into the straightforward viewing position from which we cannot see the 
hero as brand: somewhere between the wide-eyed popcorn-muncher and the jaded, long-time fan 
of the franchise (in whatever medium). When viewed straightforwardly, the superhero remains 
intelligible as brand managers wish it understood. However, if “we look at the picture from a 
precisely determined perspective,” the anamorphic element “suddenly acquires well-known 
contours” (Žižek 90). Like the skull in Holbein the Younger’s Ambassadors, our recognition of 
those well-known contours shifts our interpretation of the whole text: the superhero becomes 
intelligible as the avatar of conglomerate capital, an advertisement among advertisements, 
teaching us self-sacrifice and loyalty to the brand. 
 
Conclusion 
 The superhero genre’s long preoccupation with dual identities leads to moments of self-
reflexivity, as characters sometimes wonder which of their own identities, superhero or civilian, 
expresses their true nature. The films work this into their narratives, as in Batman Begins 
(Christopher Nolan, 2005), when Rachel Dawes wistfully touches Bruce Wayne’s face and says, 
“This is your mask. Your real face is the one that criminals now fear.” In his historically rich 
Batman Unmasked: Understanding a Cultural Icon, Will Brooker traces the changes to the 
character over the years, and finds that Batman comprises a shifting constellation of traits and 
texts rather than a stable unity. Influenced by Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish, he reads Batman 
as the construction of writers and readers: “There is,” he writes, “potentially no limit to the many 
lives of the Batman” (25). I read the generative power of Batman first in economic terms, as that 
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of the brand, always and ultimately limited by the gnawing drive to profit from commercial 
enunciations of this intellectual property. In a discussion of the metaphor of the mask in Marx’s 
writing, Eduard Urbánek writes, “The masks that the executors of certain social functions and 
roles bear, obscure, it is true, their authentic faces, and mislead the world and the public. But this 
does not mean their roles and masks, their power, and functions are ineffective and illusory only” 
(536-37). I read both Batman and Bruce Wayne as masks worn by the capital of shareholders in 
Time Warner, traded as TWX on the New York Stock Exchange. These masks hide decades of 
the accreted labor of media workers in different companies, labor supported and directed by 
those companies’ logistical, administrative, and managerial workers. Behind these corporate 
workers, whether temporary or permanent, paid by the hour or paid a salary plus stock options, 
looms shareholder wealth—capital, and its gnawing imperative to grow. This is not to deny the 
real and tremendously varied forms of enjoyment that superhero narratives bring, both to 
audiences and also to media workers, from those officially employed in the industries to those 
who labor outside official circuits: from the cosplayers who sew their own costumes, to the 
gamers who write and trade hacks for computer games, to the children who draw superheroes in 
their school notebooks. However, managers of capital will enlist our pleasures in work or play if 
they can profit from them. When we reify a proprietary character, and forget that historically and 
legally specific relations of exploitation and ownership produced it, we enable our own affective 
exploitation by media conglomerates. 
 In the introduction to this project, I called for more critical, more oppositional fan studies 
within the academy. Here I call instead for scholars and teachers to train our students in resistant 
reading not just of texts of conglomerated media industries, but also of their own responses to 
those texts. Marketing, both as a commercial practice and as a discipline within the academy, 
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exists primarily to manipulate our feelings, and thereby our behavior, for the sake of capital, not 
for the sake of human flourishing, and certainly not for the sake of the non-commercial values 
that superheroes (and many supervillains) pursue. Intellectuals serious about investigating the 
power of narrative and mass media have a responsibility to train students and other scholars to 
interpret superhero stories both from within the position into which the films interpellate us, and 
also from outside that position. Reading against the grain denies us many of the traditional 
pleasures of commercial media, but it opens up not only new interpretative horizons but also new 
possibilities for interpretative pleasure. The oppositional spectator, like the superhero with 
disinterested values, refuses to be bought off, and like the supervillain who plots apocalyptic 
changes, the oppositional spectator refuses to be satisfied with the injustice and shortsightedness 
of the status quo. Hollywood’s superheroes and supervillains both contain radical potential 
simply in their refusal of the instrumental, the anything-for-a-price project of 21st-century 
neoliberalisms. But to see this radical, emancipatory potential in the genre, we first must 
recognize beneath its mask the contours of shareholder capital and the rhetorics that help it grow.  
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CHAPTER TWO: NOLAN’S BATMAN: CRIMINOGENIC CAPITALISM AND THE  
(RE)BIRTH OF A BRAND  
Introduction 
 This chapter reads the Batman films directed by Christopher Nolan—Batman Begins 
(2005), The Dark Knight (2008), and The Dark Knight Rises (2012)—as narrating the rebirth of a 
media brand in an era of criminogenic capitalism. These films instantiate the formal paradigm of 
the 21st-century superhero movie genre through their bricolage of materials from comics, earlier 
Batman films, and other media. They tell the story of Bruce Wayne’s creation of the Batman 
persona and the defense of this intellectual property against would-be usurpers. Many journalists 
and critics read these films as fictional responses to the so-called “War on Terror,” but I read 
them primarily as an allegory of intellectual property management during a decade when the 
“War on Terror” became another field for corporate activity. Time Warner crafted these 
politically ambiguous melodramas not to reflect some zeitgeist or to work through questions of 
foreign policy and domestic justice, but to promote Batman. The films therefore reveal the 
daydreams and nightmares of the culture industry’s executive class, here concerned with 
terrorism, the Iraq War, and “homeland security” only insofar as those topics serve as foils for 
one of their most successful brands. 
Nolan’s Batman films make visible, without naming, the social costs of neoliberal 
capitalism, where the corporate search for profit helps generate social catastrophe in both 
familiar and new forms. Unlike earlier versions of Batman, which present Bruce Wayne as a 
genius inventor, the Nolan films have Wayne first scavenge, then bespeak made-to-order 
hardware from the Applied Sciences division of Wayne Enterprises, his father’s company. 
Wayne takes the disparate works of other hands and minds, then fashions them into a brand, 
 107 
complete with a logo. As Wayne stresses throughout the trilogy, he crafts the persona as “a 
symbol,” one that exceeds both Wayne himself and the high-tech gadgets he uses. His creation of 
the Batman persona within the diegesis thus parallels the work of DC Comics and Warner 
Brothers outside the diegesis, as they craft the work of earlier comics artists and filmmakers into 
seemingly “original” utterances within a familiar media brand. Nolan and his screenwriters 
erased intertextual signs that would connect Batman to the texts that inspired the character’s real-
life creators; furthermore, Nolan’s decisions about what kinds of work to show in the movie 
conceals the labor that produces Batman’s gadgets. Inside the diegesis, Batman creates his brand 
by re-purposing the methods of other vigilantes and the weapons of an arms manufacturer, while 
he conceals the social origins of his “loner” vigilante behind careful and secretive brand 
management. Both processes, within and without the fiction, cloak the character in an aura of 
spurious originality, inevitability, and wholeness that his chapter seeks to dispel. 
Within these films Batman inspires what Commissioner Gordon calls “escalation”: not 
only do criminals like the Joker adopt theatrical personas, but other vigilantes imitate Batman. 
Criminals also steal from Wayne Enterprises tools of war that the company manufactures 
overseas, using them to attack a Gotham City already suffering from de-industrialization. 
Nolan’s Gotham therefore constitutes what criminologists call a criminogenic environment, “one 
in which criminal activities—or, at the very least, processes that are of marginal legality—are 
effectively ‘folded’ into accepted institutional praxis, effecting a virtual disappearance of the 
‘criminal’ into the ‘lawful’” (Wilson “Criminogenic” 265-66). My reading of the Nolan Batman 
films takes neoliberal capitalism as generative not only of new opportunities for extralegal actors 
to steal and injure, but also new opportunities for those actors, including not only the vigilante 
Bruce Wayne but also supervillains that he fights, to hide their crimes. Wayne Enterprises, which 
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outsources its production overseas, creates both Bruce Wayne’s wealth and Gotham’s poverty, 
both the doomsday weapons of the villains who threaten Gotham and the tools that Batman uses 
to fight them. Branding becomes just another tactic available to conceal such crimes under the 
sign of social virtue. 
 
Nolan Begins: The Marks of Zorro 
In terms of style, I read Nolan’s Batman films as the confluence of a British director’s 
preoccupation with neo-noir with a media conglomerate’s need to reinvigorate this most noir of 
superhero franchises, one originally inspired by German Expressionism and low-budget gangster 
films. Nolan’s earlier features focused on ethically compromised protagonists; moreover, his 
films between Batman projects, The Prestige (2006) and Inception (2010), continue this pattern 
while adding narratives of industrial espionage, seemingly inspired by his work for the Batman 
franchise. Nolan’s Batman films offer a silent response to earlier screen iterations of the 
character, setting up the vigilante in contrast to two earlier versions: the Adam West Batman of 
the 1960s television show and the more recent Batman of Joel Schumacher’s Batman Forever 
(1995) and Batman and Robin (1997). The latter did poor business; critics and comics fans 
panned it for its camp tone, homoerotic humor, and focus on toy-like gadgets. This represented a 
costly misstep for the studio that some critics had seen as paradigmatic of the transmedia logic of 
conglomerate Hollywood. Thomas Schatz calls Batman (Tim Burton, 1989) “a true industry 
watershed—a tipping point that sent both conglomeration and blockbuster filmmaking into 
another register” (40). But “Hollywood’s premier franchise factory,” erred when they replaced 
Tim Burton with Joel Schumacher (40). Warners found success with the increasingly dark tones 
of their Harry Potter, Matrix, and Lord of the Rings franchises, Schatz argues, so they opted to 
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revive a darker Batman (41). Nolan thus presents a more chaste, less funny, and less queer 
vigilante in Batman Begins. As Nick Winstead puts it, the Nolan films thoroughly “de-queered” 
Batman (572). Unlike the sexually active Bruce Wayne of the 1989 film, Nolan’s Batman 
remains celibate—at least until the third film, The Dark Knight Rises (2012), which the 
advertising explicitly announced as the conclusion of the series. For comics writers at DC, the 
“Bat Bible” of editorial policies governing the character has long stipulated that he does not have 
romantic relationships (Brooker, Unmasked, 277). After Bruce Wayne’s sexual encounter with 
Miranda Tate in Rises, the film punishes him: in his next appearance in costume, a fanatical 
vigilante breaks Batman’s spine. Nolan’s Batman also has no orphan sidekick until Rises, which 
forecloses the possibility of a homoerotic relationship. So does the film’s ending, which leaves 
us with two possibilities: either (A) Bruce Wayne fakes his death in the nuclear explosion that 
nearly destroys Gotham City, and then goes on to live in a heterosexual relationship with Selina 
Kyle (the Catwoman of the comics); or (B) he dies in the nuclear explosion. However we read 
the ending of Rises, Nolan’s films labor to distance themselves from the Schumacher films.36  
When Warner Brothers named Christopher Nolan in 2003 to direct Begins, the studio had 
three live-action Batman-related projects in development (Fleming). One led to Catwoman 
(Pitof, 2004), while another led to Begins; a third would lead to Batman vs. Superman: Dawn of 
Justice (Zack Snyder, 2016) (after a long sojourn in development hell). Nolan had directed three 
features: Following (1998), Memento (2000), and Insomnia (2002). These serious, small-budget, 
R-rated, neo-noir crime thrillers focused on ethically compromised protagonists, and they 
featured non-linear narrative and subjective inserts that assumed an audience comfortable with 
                                                
36 I adopt here the convention of using the director as a metonym for the thousands of people 
whose work makes possible a Hollywood blockbuster. Other artists besides Nolan—for example, 
cinematographer Wally Pfister—worked with him across the Batman trilogy, shaping their form. 
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the ambiguities and subjective realism of art cinema. Begins marks the beginning of Nolan’s 
preoccupation with industrial espionage and intellectual property theft, topics not present in his 
pre-Batman work. His films between Batman projects, The Prestige (2006) and Inception (2010), 
continue this pattern, suggesting a periodization of Nolan’s work into neo-noir (2000 to 2003) 
and corporate noir (2005 to 2012) periods, with Interstellar (2014) breaking Nolan’s run of 
stories about stealers of trade secrets. The conglomerate’s preoccupation with intellectual 
property left its mark even on that director’s non-franchise work. 
The style of Nolan’s Batman films makes clear the logic of Warner Brothers’ choice of 
this director: his movies brought to the franchise the qualities that fans had accused the 
Schumacher Batman films of lacking. Begins opens with a dream-flashback to Bruce Wayne’s 
childhood, a traumatic memory. Bruce and Rachel, the daughter of one of the servants, play in 
the garden; Rachel has found an arrowhead, which she does not want to show to Bruce. 
BRUCE: Let me see! 
RACHEL: Finders, keepers. And I found it. 
BRUCE: In my garden.  
At this invocation of his family’s property rights, Rachel opens her hand, but Bruce snatches the 
arrowhead and runs, exclaiming, “Finders, keepers!” This defines Bruce Wayne’s attitude to 
property throughout the trilogy: he treats possession as the whole of the law. Moments after this 
theft, he falls through the lid of an abandoned well, into a cave home to a swarm of bats, which 
terrify him. The film makes heavy use of such flashbacks during its first half, presenting a 
temporal structure complex for a summer blockbuster, though simple compared to the puzzle-
like dual structure of Memento. Martin Fradley calls Nolan’s style in the Batman trilogy the 
“chin-stroking populism” of “a multiplex-friendly ‘Cinema of Ideas’” (15). Nolan’s earlier films 
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had featured no well-developed child characters; the two teens in Insomnia play minor and 
antagonistic roles in a film that invites us to identify with Al Pacino’s middle-aged crooked 
detective. Begins, however, sutures us into the point of view of a nostalgic man-child from the 
start, and sets the Bruce against what Kyle Killian describes as a “caravan of father figures” (81). 
Begins thus synthesizes Nolan’s thematic interests with elements from the Batman narrative 
universe and the Bildungsroman normative in superhero blockbusters. Later flashbacks connect 
the recurring traumatic memory of Bruce’s fall into the cave with pleasant memories of his 
parents and with the traumatic memory of their murder. Moreover, Bruce Wayne’s path later 
crosses that of an apocalyptic vigilante cult that uses a fear-inducing hallucinogen, which causes 
these memories to recur, often in shots so brief that the viewer cannot immediately identify them, 
forcing us to share Bruce’s disorientation. The film thus combines the superhero blockbuster’s 
nostalgia with Nolan’s uncomfortable subjective realism. 
 As adaptations of prior texts, Nolan’s films instantiate the paradigm of bricolage 
normative among Hollywood superhero films, recombining and re-purposing elements from 
Batman texts created over decades of the character’s history. Gerard Genette’s taxonomy of 
transtextual relations helps us parse some of these relationships. Hypertextual relations govern 
the traditional novel-to-film adaptation, especially one that announces its status as “a text derived 
from another preexistent text” (5). Batman Begins, however, does not announce such a 
relationship, although it borrows its foundational narrative elements (such as the hero’s objection 
to killing) from decades of Batman comics, and it borrows particular images and conflicts from 
more specific sources: Frank Miller’s Batman: The Dark Knight Returns and Batman: Year One 
and Dennis O’Neil’s “Man who Falls.” Under the rubric of intertextual relations, the “presence 
of one text within another,” Genette groups quotation, allusion, and the “less explicit and 
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canonical” practice of plagiarism from earlier texts (2), the presentation of copied work as one’s 
own. Artists working for Detective Comics cobbled Batman together from elements of other 
characters, synthesizing them into a character distinctive enough for DC to trademark; Bob Kane 
often claimed credit for inventing the character, despite working with Bill Finger and other 
collaborators (Jones 149), and despite using “ghost” artists for much of the drawing that 
appeared under his byline (Boxer). Kane’s copying and re-use (or self-plagiarism) of his own 
drawings from one story to the next further complicate issues of originality and derivation in 
foundational Batman texts.37 (So too does the Nolan Batman’s bricolage of copied and pilfered 
intellectual property.) Finally, a metatextual relation obtains between an earlier text and a later 
text that offers “commentary” upon it, “sometimes without even naming it” (4). Such a relation 
obtains between the Nolan and the Schumacher Batman films; as Sutton notes, “the critical 
response to Batman Begins defines it in opposition to this earlier cycle of films” (140). The 
Begins of the title signals a new serial continuity, implying a temporal break even as the 
character’s name implies continuity of the extradiegetic brand.  
 Despite its various debts to earlier texts, Nolan’s Batman films instantiate the 
conglomerate Hollywood tendency to suppress recognizable signs of connection to texts from 
outside the franchise. In Begins, the Wayne family’s last outing takes them to a performance of 
Arrigo Boito’s opera Mefistofele, a revision of the event as portrayed in Miller’s Dark Knight 
Returns (22) and Year One (21), which otherwise lend much to the Nolan films. Miller’s telling 
of the scene The Dark Knight Returns puts the Waynes at a screening of The Mark of Zorro, and 
                                                
37 Kane re-uses drawings of the vigilante in three of the first four Batman stories in Detective 
Comics: “Frenchy Blake’s Jewel Gang” (12), “The Batman Meets Doctor Death” (23), and “The 
Return of Doctor Death” (36). In 2005 DC released these stories in a trade paperback, The 
Batman Chronicles, Volume One, to coincide with the release of Begins, billing the book as “an 
exciting new way to experience the rich history of the Dark Knight” (“Batman Chronicles”). DC 
demonstrates no shame about Kane’s methods. 
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even specifies it as the version starring Tyrone Power (directed by Rouben Mamoulian, 1940) 
(Miller 22), and thus not the Douglas Fairbanks version (directed by Fred Niblo, 1920).38 In the 
comics’ first telling of the murders from November 1939, a caption tells us that the mugger 
catches the Waynes “walking home from a movie” (Fox 62) that the narration does not name. In 
Miller’s re-telling, he took the liberty of filling this gap, embellishing within the parameters of an 
established narrative. The decision by Nolan and co-screenwriter David Goyer to vary from 
Miller’s version might seem like the adapter’s prerogative, the same liberty Miller took. 
However, Nolan’s avowed rationale for the change reveals a different logic:  
We didn’t have young Bruce going to see Zorro because a character in a movie watching 
a movie is very different than a character in a comic book watching a movie. A comic-
book character reading a comic book is more analogous to a character in a movie 
watching a movie. It creates a deconstructionist thing that we were trying to avoid. 
(Nolan n.p.) 
By placing the Waynes at the opera, Nolan and Goyer avoid the mise en abyme of reminding the 
audience of their own spectatorship of a film. Where Miller directs the reader’s attention toward 
the transtextual relations between his Batman, the 1939 Batman, and Zorro, Nolan does the 
opposite, obscuring these relations. Unless we know 19th-century French opera we will not 
recognize Mefistofele or know that it adapts Goethe’s Faust; we will, however, recognize the 
cowled, black costumes of the devils, swinging on ropes above the stage, as reminiscent of bats 
in a cave, and if we do not, the flashback that they prompt in young Bruce will clarify the 
relationship. By raising the bar for viewers to parse the intertextual relationship, Nolan and 
                                                
38 The first Batman story appeared in 1939, making Miller’s version of the Wayne murders (i.e. 
following the screening of a 1940 film) anachronistic outside the plastic temporality of monthly 
comics.  
 114 
Goyer make their own debt to other texts harder to see. That debt, Nolan admits, includes “a lot 
of literary influences,” among them “bits of The Count of Monte Cristo and Hamlet” (qtd. in 
Jordan and Gross 23). Despite this admission, the film contains no clear citations of either.39  
Yet Nolan had another reason for eliminating the reference to The Mark of Zorro: that 
film belongs to rival studio Twentieth Century Fox. Batman co-creator Bob Kane eventually 
acknowledged the 1920 Mark of Zorro (itself an adaptation of Johnston McCulley’s 1919 pulp 
serial “The Curse of Capistrano”) as a major inspiration for the vigilante he and Bill Finger 
designed for Detective Comics (Boichel 6). Kane and Finger borrow much from Zorro (Spanish 
for fox): an aristocrat hero who pretends to be weak and dissipated by day, but who sneaks by 
night through secret passages in his manor house, dons a mask, and emerges as a vigilante under 
an animal-themed pseudonym. In this light, Frank Miller’s citation of The Mark of Zorro 
acknowledges the debt that the Batman universe owes to a precursor.40 In contrast, Nolan states 
that he and Goyer deliberately excised Miller’s Zorro references to “remove Zorro as a role 
model” (Nolan n.p.). He and Goyer “wanted nothing that would undermine the idea that Bruce 
                                                
39 Nolan claims that he and Goyer kept the Batman characters isolated from the wider “DC 
Universe” of Superman, Wonder Woman, and the like for similar reasons. Nolan excluded other 
DC character brands to make Bruce Wayne seem more original: “we did take the position 
philosophically—that superheroes simply don’t exist. If they did, if Bruce knew of Superman or 
even of comic books, then that’s a completely different decision that he’s making when he puts 
on a costume in an attempt to become a symbol” (Nolan). 
 This explanation comes from an interview with Nolan in the 29 October 2008 Los 
Angeles Times, which appeared in the autumn following Marvel Studios’ introduction of their 
interconnected “Marvel Cinematic Universe” with Iron Man (Jon Favreau, 2008) and The 
Incredible Hulk (Louis Leterrier, 2008). It seems possible that Nolan offered this explanation as 
a doubly auteurist rationale for a strategy handed down to him by Warner Brothers: taking 
auteurist credit for giving Bruce Wayne auteurist credit for the Batman persona within the 
diegesis. 
40 The Bat Whispers (Ronald West, 1930) mixed crime melodrama and haunted-house 
Gothicism, and it provided another major inspiration to Kane and Finger. The protagonists 
pursue the Bat, a criminal who wears a mask and cape modeled on bat wings, through secret 
passages in a mansion. The Bat taunts police via pirate radio and even leaves a calling card, 
suggesting that the character also inspired Batman’s perennial foe, the Joker. 
 115 
came up with this crazy plan of putting on a mask all by himself. That allowed us to treat it on 
our own terms. So we replaced the Zorro idea with the bats to cement that idea of fear and 
symbolism associated with bats.” Writers of superhero comics conventionally vary minor details 
when re-telling a character’s origin story; here, Nolan and Goyer exploit that flexibility to invest 
their Batman in an aura of originality, at least within the diegesis.  
However, this explanation elides Time Warner’s commercial interest in avoiding legal 
entanglements with claimants to the ownership of Zorro’s likeness. 20th Century Fox owns the 
1940 Mark of Zorro, but TriStar Pictures had produced the more recent Mask of Zorro (Martin 
Campbell, 1998). In 1999 TriStar had sued Del Taco for using Zorro’s likeness in advertisements 
(TriStar v. Del Taco). Parent conglomerate Sony also sued a fireworks manufacturer for using 
Zorro’s likeness in 2001 (Sony Pictures Entertainment v. Fireworks Enter. Group). Moreover, 
during Warner Brothers’ production of Batman Begins, Columbia Pictures had The Legend of 
Zorro (Martin Campbell, 2005) in production, with distribution arranged by parent Sony 
(“Legend”). Movie studio executives probably don’t concern themselves with references to their 
studios’ intellectual property appearing in comic books, even bestsellers like The Dark Knight 
Returns, but when those properties appear in blockbuster films by rival studios, we can assume 
that they take notice. Warner Brothers therefore had good reason to eliminate the reference to 
Zorro, not simply to avoid demands for licensing fees from Sony, but also to avoid providing 
free advertising for a competitor; Mefistofele, with its author long dead and no conglomerate’s 
franchise built around it, made commercial sense.  
Furthermore, eliminating Zorro helped Warner Brothers to avoid a potentially more 
radical challenge: some might try to argue that because Batman’s creators had copied so many 
elements from Zorro, therefore people with legal rights to Zorro also had rights to Batman. Zorro 
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Productions, Incorporated, claims “the worldwide trademarks and copyrights in the name, visual 
likeness and the character of Zorro” (“About Zorro”), despite having no affiliation with Zorro 
author Johnston McCulley or his estate. The company’s founder claims that “he has been 
responsible” for both Sony films, “ten Zorro TV series” “as well as some fifteen different Zorro 
stage productions” (“John Gertz”). In the ruling on Sony’s case against the fireworks 
manufacturer, the judge mentioned the claims of Zorro, Incorporated. 
that they have a common law trademark in the character Zorro because their licensees 
have used Zorro extensively for decades. Plaintiffs argue that these licensed uses inure to 
their benefit and cause consumers to think of Zorro when they see a daring black-masked 
and costumed character with a sword, superior fighting and riding skills, and a dual 
identity [….] Plaintiffs’ argument that they have a trademark in Zorro because they 
licensed others to use Zorro, however, is specious. It assumes that ZPI had the right to 
demand licenses to use Zorro at all. (Sony, sec. 3) 
Only the legal fiction that the work produced under freelance and work for hire contracts belongs 
to the employer entitles Detective Comics to claim ownership of Batman and demand licenses 
for use of the character. A Batman film that highlighted the franchise’s debts to another, earlier 
brand would open Time Warner to troublesome lawsuits, not just from semi-cranks but from 
other major studios. Even if judges decided in the favor of Time Warner, such cases make 
terrible public relations: they demystify the brand, highlighting its historical contingency. 
But artists can create legal fictions, too: through savvy negotiations, Bob Kane 
successfully negotiated that DC recognize him as sole author of Batman. In 1965, when the 
comics fanzine CAPA-Alpha publicly accused Kane of covering up Bill Finger’s role in co-
creating the character, Kane remained defiant; however, in his 1989 autobiography, Kane finally 
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acknowledged Finger’s contributions (Andrae 391). The timing of Kane’s autobiography with 
the Tim Burton Batman, for which he worked as a high-profile consultant, suggests that pressure 
from Time Warner prompted admission. Before that, writes Gerard Jones, Bob Kane  
would even go so far as to forge sketches that he supposedly drew in January 1934 […] 
inspired by Leonardo da Vinci’s sketches of a winglike flying machine; so he tried to 
prove not only that Finger hadn’t helped him but that he couldn’t even have been inspired 
by [the Hawkmen] in Flash Gordon, which he’d already cited as an influence in 
interviews. (149) 
Da Vinci, canonical and long dead, posed no legal challenge, but Alex Raymond’s syndicated 
Flash Gordon strip did, so Kane invented a commercially expedient creation myth for the 
character, staking a bogus claim of priority. Despite Kane’s admission in his autobiography, the 
Nolan Batman films credited him alone for the character, continuing that particular fiction.  
  Omitting reference to Zorro allowed Nolan and Goyer to create their own fiction of Bruce 
Wayne’s originality in creating the Batman persona, but it also allowed them to cloak themselves 
in a similar aura, insofar as it helped them to conceal their own apparent borrowings from the 
1940 Mark of Zorro. The 1940 Don Diego Vega, unlike that of 1920, has just returned from 
years overseas, where he, like Bruce Wayne in Begins, he has trained in the martial arts. Also 
unlike the 1920 version, the 1940 Don Diego has a father who, like Thomas Wayne in Begins, 
will not take lawless action even against those who take lawless action against him. The son 
assumes a masked alter ego, trounces the Alcalde’s tax collectors, and, like Batman, leads the 
soldiers in elaborate chase sequences. At the film’s end, Zorro coerces the corrupt alcalde into 
resigning, thereby restoring his father, Don Vega, to the position, much as Bruce Wayne 
engineers his restoration to majority ownership of Wayne Enterprises. The 1920 Mark of Zorro 
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has obvious mise en scène elements in common with the Batman universe, but the 1940 film 
provides not just these elements but conflicts and set-pieces—the son returning from overseas 
with secret fighting skills, the father rendered helpless by his own principles, elaborate chases of 
the vigilante by inept police—that Nolan and Goyer re-purpose without explicit 
acknowledgment. If nothing else, the presence of multiple sword fights in Batman Begins 
bespeaks Nolan and Goyer’s borrowing from the 1940 swashbuckler; Batman stories do not 
traditionally feature swordplay, yet it figures centrally in Zorro stories. Drawing attention to 
Zorro in Batman Begins would have pointed the way for audiences to recognize Nolan and 
Goyer’s own copying, opening not only Warner Brothers but also DC Comics to legal 
challenges, while also highlighting the historical contingency of Time Warner’s control of this 
entertainment brand. 
 
Batman Begins: Erasing Labor, Concealing Crime 
Begins tells a story of Bruce Wayne’s adoption of the Batman alter ego. The film opens 
with Wayne imprisoned in the People’s Republic of China for taking part in an attempted heist in 
Hong Kong, then follows him through training with a secret crime-fighting order, the League of 
Shadows, led by the mysterious Ra’s al Ghul. As Bruce trains in swordsmanship, martial arts, 
and “ninja” tactics of “theatricality and deception” under mentor Henri Ducard (Liam Neeson), 
flashbacks reveal Bruce’s past as the heir of the Wayne family fortune. When Bruce learns that 
the League of Shadows requires that he execute criminals, he defies them and returns to Gotham 
City; there, he gains access to a mothballed cache of experimental military gear in the research 
and development wing of Wayne Enterprises. After airbrushing these gadgets black, he embarks 
on a career of midnight vigilantism as Batman, pitting himself against a conspiracy of gangsters, 
 119 
a drug-dealing masked psychiatrist who dubs himself the Scarecrow, and, finally, Ducard and the 
League of Shadows. Ducard reveals himself to be Ra’s al Ghul, who plans to destroy Gotham to 
save it from its own “corruption.” Batman prevails, but only at the cost of the destruction of 
Wayne Manor and rejection by his childhood sweetheart, Rachel Dawes. 
The film invents some of these narrative elements, but draws others from Miller’s 1986 
Batman: The Dark Knight Returns and his1987 Batman: Year One. These graphic novels make 
an unlikely pairing because of their different settings in time: Dark Knight Returns takes place in 
a grim near-future, as an aging Batman comes out of retirement to thwart old foes, while Year 
One charts the beginning of his double life of vigilantism. To Year One’s story of Batman’s 
campaign against ordinary gangsters, Begins adds the super-villains Ra’s al Ghul and the 
Scarecrow, a conspiracy involving weapons of mass destruction, and characters written for the 
film, like Rachel Dawes. Both of these graphic novels appeared outside the regular continuity of 
monthly Batman comics, and both remain in print as trade paperbacks. Comics readers hold The 
Dark Knight Returns in high esteem, with a 2014 poll by the nonprofit Sequart Organization 
placing Dark Knight Returns in second place by both number of votes and by weighted score, 
second only to Watchmen (Carpenter). Dark Knight Returns also sells well; in 2000, Publishers 
Weekly noted that the book still held sixth place on comic distributor Diamond’s list of 
bestselling collections (Wolk). As Warner Brothers prepared to release Begins, DC coordinated 
with them “to repackage existing titles that highlight the movie’s main villains, the Scarecrow 
and Ra’s al Ghul” (MacDonald). DC’s publisher Paul Levitz said, “We have a handful of 
Batman titles that have proven themselves disproportionately over the years as catalogue titles 
that become natural promotional tools [….] Batman Begins, for all the expectations, will still 
surprise people. It’s an opportunity for the entire line’” (qtd. in MacDonald). Despite The Dark 
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Knight Returns’ high sales and acclaim among fans, Batman Begins does not identify itself as an 
adaptation of it or any other textual source, because to focus one would foreclose on “an 
opportunity for the entire line.” By giving the film a title not used by any prior Batman comic, 
the filmmakers staked a claim to their film’s relative originality even as they promoted a range of 
publications. 
In its most salient borrowing from either book, Begins re-imagines Batman’s car as a 
blocky, military vehicle. For decades, the vigilante has driven a sleek, black roadster, known as 
the Batmobile within his fictional universe and by fans, but Miller’s Dark Knight Returns 
presents an armored version equipped with caterpillar treads and ordnance. In an internal 
monologue, Miller’s Batman attributes the name “Batmobile” to his former sidekick, Robin, and 
calls it the “kind of a name a kid would come up with” (74), a line that evinces the 
embarrassment that Miller’s book continually betrays toward the playful elements of superhero 
narratives. However, because audiences found the Schumacher films objectionable because of 
their playful approach to the character, Nolan and Goyer’s script goes one better than Miller’s 
disavowal, eliminating the word “Batmobile” from the trilogy altogether. One stunned Gotham 
cop describes it simply as a “tank.” We can therefore understand inclusion of the armored 
vehicle, minus its long-standing name, as simultaneously an intertextual citation of an element 
from one of the film’s sources and also as a metatextual response to earlier films in the Batman 
cycle. 
As the filmmakers cobbled together elements from earlier Batman stories, adding original 
elements here and unacknowledged borrowings and responses there, so does Bruce Wayne 
cobble together his vigilante brand out of elements created by other parties for other purposes. 
When he returns from his wanderings abroad, demoted executive Lucius Fox (Morgan Freeman) 
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gives him a tour of Wayne Industries’ Applied Sciences department, a storage-basement for 
unused prototypes of their military gear, ranging from the vehicle that will become the 
Batmobile to the grappling gun that Batman will use to escape danger. Fox shows off a “Nomex 
survival suit for advanced infantry” with “Kevlar bi-weave, reinforced joints” (working product 
placements for two different DuPont trademarks into a single line of technobabble). When Bruce 
asks why the company never mass-produced the suit, Fox explains that the “bean-counters didn’t 
think a soldier’s life was worth three hundred grand.” Begins appeared while the US conducted 
two wars of occupation, so Fox’s implicit disapproval of the utilitarianism of governmental and 
corporate “bean counters” functions to secure audience sympathy while avoiding real-world 
geopolitics; hawks and doves can agree that Fox’s non-instrumental, avuncular concern sounds 
Good. When Wayne asks to borrow the suit without the knowledge of the CEO, Fox replies, 
“Mister Wayne, the way I see it, all this stuff is yours anyway.” Fox thus enables Wayne the son 
to claim the patrimony and philanthropy of Wayne the father, and aligns all three against the 
instrumental rationality of the corporation. If Bruce’s training with the League of Shadows risks 
tainting the film with the homicidal vigilantism of Bernhard Goetz, the scenes with Fox help 
redeem it, not simply by disassociating Bruce from the bean-counting logic of the other 
executives, but also by presenting the commodities produced by this war profiteer as somehow 
already belonging to the company’s heir. 
Even as the film offers a seemingly more “realistic” Batman by tracing the production of 
the vigilante’s gear, it obscures the relationship between Bruce Wayne’s wealth, the Applied 
Sciences division, and the labor that makes the military prototypes. Hollywood usually conceals 
productive labor, but Begins performs a more complex dissimulation by showing us Bruce 
Wayne’s work of ordering and modifying gadgets, while keeping their primary manufacture off 
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screen. We first see the armor that will become the Batman costume lying in a drawer, not in the 
factory where workers made it; our next view shows Bruce airbrushing it black while wearing a 
respirator, in a caricature of the factory labor that produced it.41 In the same sequence, we see 
Bruce and Alfred hunched over catalogues and sketches for the future Batman’s cowl.  
Alfred: We order the main part of this cowl from Singapore. 
Bruce: Via a dummy corporation… 
Alfred: And then, quite separately, we place an order to a Chinese company for these. 
[Alfred points to a sketch of the bat-ears.] 
Bruce: Put it together ourselves… 
Alfred: Precisely. They’ll have to be large orders, to avoid suspicion. 
Bruce: How large? 
Alfred: Say, ten thousand. 
Bruce: Well, at least we’ll have spares. 
A subsequent scene opens with a close-up of the cowl’s forehead getting smashed by a baseball 
bat. Alfred, removing his safety goggles after this demonstration, explains to Bruce.  
ALFRED: It’s a problem with the graphite sir. The next ten thousand will be up to 
specifications.  
BRUCE: At least they gave us a discount. 
While Bruce and Alfred outsource the (over)production of cowl parts, Bruce makes by hand the 
bat-shaped throwing stars (the “Batarangs” of the comics), since they consist of the Batman logo, 
which could not “avoid suspicion.” Bruce, too, wears safety glasses as he sharpens the throwing 
stars on a bench-mounted grinding wheel, in a scene that gives viewers their first diegetic view 
                                                
41 Burton’s 1989 vision of Gotham includes industrial production, factories where the Joker 
manufactures poisoned cosmetics, but the post-industrial Begins removes them overseas. 
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of the flat-topped bat logo, which they will see a second time before Batman makes his first 
appearance in full costume. Martin Fradley notes that Wayne’s “neurotic branding of his crime-
fighting persona—his unmistakable logo and militarized ‘toys’—all too clearly mirrors the 
American film industry’s selfsame practices” (22), but I would add that these practices also 
involve concealing the un-glamorous labor of machine shops and factory floors, labor that 
requires protective gear. Exploited labor produced Bruce Wayne’s fortune, which he now uses to 
pay for his outsourced Bat-parts, yet the film presents Batman as somehow his creation. I would 
also add to that the film’s concealment of productive labor behind heroic branding also continues 
industrial practices used by Batman’s owners since the first Batman stories appeared in Detective 
Comics, practices that Nolan and Goyer elaborate on the screen with Bruce Wayne’s factory-
floor cosplay. Many commentators on the film adduce the narrative of Bruce Wayne’s assembly 
of the Batman kit as one of the film’s many realist gestures, but Mark Fisher calls this a 
specifically “capitalist realism,” a series of neoliberal assumptions that “projects a vision of what 
is ‘Possible’” (5). That horizon of possibility includes vigilante heroics; it does not include 
challenges to corporate power or wealth inequality. 
 Batman Begins shies from stating the obvious: in the context of the past forty years of US 
economic history, Wayne Industries and the Wayne family appear to have played a causal role in 
the immiseration of Gotham. While Bruce Wayne uses Chinese and Singaporean factories to 
deliberately overproduce Batman gear by orders of magnitude beyond his “needs,” Wayne 
Enterprises outsources its manufacturing to China. When Hong Kong police arrest Bruce Wayne, 
they catch him and his accomplices about to steal a shipment of goods prominently stamped 
“Wayne Enterprises” and “Made In China.” The film presents this as a moment of irony, where 
the wealthy son hits bottom, yet the film does not comment on the relationship between the 
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outsourcing of US manufacturing, or the fall of real wages since the 1970s and the corresponding 
growth in wealth for the richest Americans. The script mentions a “depression” in Gotham’s 
past; a prosecuting attorney notes that it hit “working people” “hardest of all.” Junior prosecutor 
Rachel Dawes claims that its effects remain: “Things are worse than ever down here.” David 
Harvey, writing in 2005, notes that when capital moves seeking lower production costs,  
it leaves behind a trail of devastation and devaluation; the deindustrializations 
experienced in the heartlands of capitalism (such as Pittsburgh, Sheffield, and the Ruhr), 
as well as in many other parts of the world (such as Bombay), are cases in point. If capital 
does not or cannot move, on the other hand, then overaccumulated capital stands to be 
devalued directly through the onset of a deflationary recession or depression. (116) 
Capitalists face a choice, its stakes intensified during globalization: protect the space of their 
investment at the expense of their capital, or protect their capital at the expense of the space of 
their investment. The managers of Wayne Enterprises clearly chose the former. In Gotham, the 
law-abiding workers we see either work in law enforcement (police and lawyers), service 
(servants, secretaries), or corporate management (executives), suggesting an economy without a 
middle class. 
After Bruce and Rachel witness the murder of Joe Chill, the paroled killer of Bruce’s 
parents, Rachel assigns blame for this and Gotham’s other crime not to the policies and 
economic practices that create Gotham’s social conditions, but to the gangsters who exploit those 
conditions. Rachel blames mafia boss Carmine Falcone, who “floods our streets with crime and 
drugs, preying on the desperate, creating new Joe Chills every day. Falcone may not have killed 
your parents, Bruce, but he’s destroying everything that they stood for.” The script constantly 
reminds us of Thomas Wayne’s philanthropy, yet the senior Wayne’s name now “stands” for 
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outsourcing to authoritarian states in Asia, a practice that the junior Wayne continues without 
comment. Yet the Batman brand requires that Bruce Wayne neither name nor solve the problems 
that generate Gotham’s crime, even if they bear his name. Gotham needs not a masked vigilante 
but unionized factory jobs and wealth redistribution, but media conglomerates have no interest in 
telling stories that might undermine the interests of the shareholding class.  
The social costs of the corporate quest for profit thus constitute the background 
conditions for the contemporary real world and the screen world of the Nolan Batman films, but 
one can only figuratively call that quest, and its side effects, criminal, because corporations 
operate within frameworks of law. Yet throughout the Nolan trilogy, Wayne Enterprises 
produces more crime than any other institution, for they provide the hardware not only for the 
supervillains that Batman fights, but also for Batman himself—whose vigilantism, we must 
remember, violates both civil and criminal law, as he breaks and enters, tortures gangsters, and 
resists arrest. We can understand the behavior of both Bruce Wayne and Wayne Enterprises as 
power crime, which Vincenzo Ruggiero and Michael Welch define as “offences committed by 
actors such as states, corporations, financial institutions, and other similarly powerful 
organisations,” actions that “should be located against the background of differentiated 
opportunities which are offered to social groups” (298). When the Hong Kong police arrest the 
young Bruce Wayne, one of the officers calls him “a criminal” (in flawless English), to which 
Bruce responds, “我不是犯人!” [“I am not a criminal!”] (in unconvincing Mandarin). Bruce 
rejects the label, despite its literal accuracy, but so does the film, which spends two hours styling 
this ex-convict vigilante as Gotham’s last defense against crime. His ability to reject the label, 
and to rehabilitate himself, depends on his vast resources. Again, Ruggiero and Welch:  
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If we translate the notion of freedom into that of resources, we can argue that those 
possessing a larger quantity and variety of them also have greater possibilities of 
attributing criminal definitions to others and repelling those that others attribute to them. 
They also have greater ability to control the effects of their criminal activity, and usually 
do not allow this to appear and be designated as such. (298) 
 Not only does Wayne return to Gotham from Asia in a private jet, but by the end of the film, he 
arranges to buy a controlling interest in Wayne Enterprises during the company’s initial public 
offering, thereby restoring a Wayne to control of the company and ascending to the heights of 
respectability. Yet the film’s ending sounds notes of nostalgia: in the burnt ruins of Wayne 
Manor, Bruce finds the charred and twisted case of his father’s stethoscope, prompting a 
flashback and reminding the viewer of the loss that no amount of respectability or vigilantism 
can recover.   
We might read the ease with which Wayne and his accomplice Lucius Fox defraud 
Wayne Enterprises of military prototypes as proof that the heroes have gotten the better of 
military-industrial “bean counters,” but the contemporary, real-world background of military 
procurement fraud in occupied Iraq casts a shadow over any redemptive reading. Wayne 
Enterprises supplies Batman not only but also his foes. They manufacture a microwave emitter, 
“designed for desert warfare,” a weapon of mass destruction that “uses focused microwaves to 
vaporize the enemy’s water supply”; the League of Shadows steals it, and plans to use it against 
the city of Gotham. If the military contracts of Wayne Industries did not already evoke 
companies like Halliburton, profiting from the US occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, then the 
reference to “desert warfare” does. Nikos Passas, a criminologist writing about the occupation of 
Iraq, calls the environment there “inherently criminogenic,” largely because the “Defense 
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Department led the government in outsourcing military tasks to private contractors” (5). In this 
criminogenic environment, “$8.9 billion was unaccounted for in just the first eighteen months” 
(14); audits by the USA’s Special Inspector General for Iraq (successor to the Coalition 
Provisional Authority) in 2006 and 2007 found that “$36.4 million in weapons and equipment 
could not be accounted for” (19). Wayne Enterprises, like the real-world war profiteers operating 
in Iraq, can’t keep track of the hardware it produces for the US military, yet the film presents 
defense procurement fraud as the necessary condition for the Batman that audiences know, for 
without it, this non-inventor Bruce Wayne would have only his money and his kung-fu. 
Criminologists Raymond Michalowski and Ronald Kramer argue that cases “state-corporate 
crime” committed by government contractors usually “do not involve crimes in the juridical 
sense of the word. That is, most do not involve violations of criminal law [because] violations of 
regulatory law are not crimes. The distinction between crime and regulatory violations, however, 
is itself an expression of political power” (202). Within the diegesis, Bruce Wayne has enough 
power to conceal his crimes, but outside the diegesis, Warner Brothers constructs Bruce 
Wayne—power criminal, procurement fraudster—as the hero of their franchise, while in Iraq, 
militias and insurgents stole American weapons.  
 Bruce Wayne constructs his Batman identity through bricolage of not only military 
hardware and bespoke costume parts, but also the hardware and techniques of the League of 
Shadows. When Bruce trains with the League of Shadows, he learns from Ra’s al Ghul 
techniques of “theatricality and deception,” as well as the use of “explosive powders” to dazzle 
foes. He also learns the use of gauntlets that bear backward-pointing metal blades, which the 
League uses for both offense and defense; viewers will recognize these as newly weaponized 
versions of Batman’s familiar finned gloves. Without ever mentioning them in the dialogue, the 
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film retroactively creates a new origin for these pieces of offensive armor, as one of the trade 
secrets that Bruce Wayne copied—or, in the metaphor of anti-piracy campaigns, “stole”—from 
his vigilante mentors. We might usefully map Bruce Wayne’s copying into Singapore’s “Honour 
IP” campaign: “Whether it is a grappling gun, a bulletproof jacket, or bladed gauntlet, someone 
invested time and effort to create it and owns the IP in it. We need to realise that it takes 
numerous parties working endless 18-hour days to bring to us a unique piece of vigilante magic.” 
But unlike the hypothetical addressee of “Piracy: It’s a Crime,” Bruce Wayne would steal, and he 
does, throughout the trilogy. Much as comics artists cobbled together the real-world Batman out 
of disparate elements, from masked detectives to Zorro to Superman, Bruce Wayne cobbles 
together his fictional Batman out of disparate elements, then applies the “theatricality and 
deception” of branding to pass off his synthesis as an original and non-derivative work.  
 Yet despite their criminality and deception, both Bruce Wayne and the supervillains he 
fights remain attractive figures because they reject the instrumental rationality of the neoliberal 
order that surrounds them, an order without public goods. In Nolan’s venal Gotham, only one 
sign remains of Thomas Wayne’s philanthropic vision of a public good: the elevated train that 
the senior Wayne built to unite rich and poor within the city. The League of Shadows mounts on 
this train the stolen microwave emitter, which they then plan to crash into Wayne Tower, thus 
weaponizing even capitalist philanthropy against the demos. Batman saves the city, as China 
Miéville notes, only through the “demolition of the mass transit system that ruined everything” 
(qtd. in Fisher par. 19). The train does not reappear in the subsequent films, not as a hole in the 
ground, and not as a construction project, confirming Justine Toh’s reading of its destruction: “In 
saving the tower yet crashing the train, Bruce/Batman establishes a fresh covenant for the post-
9/11 era” (133). Yet I would argue that the Nolan Batman thus establishes a covenant with a 
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specifically neoliberal vision of the city that pre-dates September 11, where public goods can 
only arise as the incidental side effects of unregulated capitalism and its concomitant 
inequalities; by destroying the train to save the tower, Batman protects the sign of capital at the 
expense of the sign of a planned public good. The good vigilante saves Gotham from the bad 
vigilantes without addressing the criminogenic environment that allows both to operate. As Toh 
points out, Batman, “far from solving Gotham’s problems,” “instead recreates the conditions for 
their reproduction” (136). In Batman Begins, the agents of the enfeebled public sector—the 
police, the municipal courts, and even, implicitly, the border guards who allow the League of 
Shadows to enter the USA—cannot protect Gotham, so the film ends with power criminal Bruce 
Wayne doing what the state cannot. As Michalowski and Kramer argue, in an unintentional 
parody of a Marvel Comics slogan, “Great power and great crimes are inseparable” (212). 
Batman Begins suggests that the ineffectiveness of the state and the inefficiency of Wayne 
Enterprises, by enabling the criminality of both Bruce Wayne and the League of Shadows, 
function simultaneously to immiserate the city and to allow its salvation from still worse fates. 
 
The Dark Knight: The Jurisdiction of Capital 
The Dark Knight picks up an unspecified time after Begins, in a Gotham where lesser 
crime families have risen to fill the void left by the fall of Carmine Falcone. The handsome, 
charismatic new district attorney, Harvey Dent, has vowed to clean up organized crime, earning 
him the label “Gotham’s White Knight.” Gangsters feel pressure not just from Dent’s office but 
also from the clown-faced Joker, who has taken to robbing them, so they pool their money for 
safe keeping by a Hong Kong finance capitalist, Lau. Meanwhile, Lau Security Investment tries 
to form a transnational partnership with Wayne Enterprises. The Joker engineers a series of 
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increasingly daring and terroristic crimes against both the mob and against the city, one of which 
kills attorney Rachel Dawes and leaves Dent’s face disfigured; Dent becomes the coin-flipping, 
homicidal Two-Face of the comics. Batman thwarts the Joker’s most ambitious crime, the 
bombing of two passenger ferries, while Dent tracks down and murders suborned police, his 
rampage culminating in the kidnapping of police Commissioner Gordon’s family. Batman 
rescues them, accidentally killing Dent. However, rather than reveal Dent as a murderer, thus 
damaging his posthumous reputation as a defender of the rule of law, Batman and Gordon 
conspire to blame Batman for Dent’s crimes. The film ends with Gordon’s voiceover declaring 
the vigilante the city’s “dark knight.” 
Christopher Nolan and brother Jonathan Nolan’s screenplay for The Dark Knight also 
draws on elements Miller’s Dark Knight Returns, as well as from Jeph Loeb and Tim Sale’s 
Batman: The Long Halloween. Like Batman Begins, the second film suppresses signs of 
intertextuality while creating suspense through the synthesis of new narrative elements with 
elements borrowed from earlier Batman texts. From Miller’s text comes the subplot of citizen 
vigilantes who imitate the Batman costume but use firearms instead of high-tech gadgets, and 
who attack criminals with lethal force. From Loeb and Sale’s comes the film’s “I believe” motif 
(“I believe in Harvey Dent,” “I believe whatever doesn’t kill you makes you stranger,”) and 
other dialogue, as well as the twenty-foot pyramid of mafia cash, doused in gasoline and set 
ablaze. However, the Nolans invent the main narrative between Batman and the Joker, as well as 
the subplot of gangsters looking to an overseas financier to protect their money from both police 
and supervillains. Although they draw from Loeb and Sale some elements of Harvey Dent’s fall, 
the Nolans make radical changes to the character and his arc, thereby surprising viewers who 
have read The Long Halloween. Late in the book, Dent suffers his disfiguring burns when a 
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gangster throws acid on his face in court, so when, fifteen minutes into The Dark Knight, a 
gangster on the witness stand pulls something from his jacket to attack Dent, those familiar with 
the book experience a moment of mixed recognition and confusion: the movie can’t maim Dent 
so early, can it? But the weapon proves to be a carbon-fiber pistol, which misfires. Dent 
wrenches it from the gangster’s hand, then remarks, “Carbon fiber, twenty-eight caliber, made in 
China… If you want to kill a public servant, Mister Maroni, I recommend you buy American.” 
The scene allows the film to style Dent as a bold, crowd-pleasing patriot to both his intradiegetic 
courtroom audience and his extradiegetic cinema audience. At the same time, it reminds us of the 
secretive and often only quasi-legal global flows of capital and goods that make possible both the 
crimes and the crime-fighting in this series. 
 The Long Halloween displays a striking degree of explicit intertextuality that The Dark 
Knight suppresses. The book appeared in serial installments, and DC later collected them in a 
trade paperback, and Loeb’s introduction to the volume makes clear its profound intertextuality. 
Loeb writes that DC’s editor, Archie Godwin, suggested that Loeb and Sale do “a film noir tale” 
(5), and he notes that Frank Miller “approved of our mining his stunning Batman: Year One” for 
Carmine Falcone and other characters (6). Surprisingly, Loeb then reminisces about childhood 
hours spent not reading comic books (the anecdote one expects in such an introduction) but spent 
watching film noir on television (6). He admires “Warner Bros. Films” starring “Bogart, Raft, 
Cagney, and Robinson,” and remarks on the irony that Warner Brothers would eventually 
“become the parent company of DC comics” (6). Loeb also notes that editor Godwin dubbed the 
book The Long Halloween (6), though he does not parse the implicit intertextuality of this title, 
which alludes to Raymond Chandler’s Long Goodbye. The title of The Long Halloween thereby 
serves as a compact signifier of Batman’s textual and tropological heritage, part crime pulp and 
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part Gothic dress-up. The salient intertextual moments in The Long Halloween allude not to 
comics, but to American crime films of the 1930s and 1940s: the opening pages establish 
venetian blinds as sources of barred shadows against walls and faces, the most recognizable 
visual cliché of film noir, a motif that recurs throughout the book. Carmine Falcone bears a 
prominent scar on his cheek, legible in the shadow-heavy context as an allusion to Scarface 
(Howard Hawks, 1932). Harvey “Two-Face” Dent obsessively flips a coin in the manner of 
George Raft’s character in the same film; and Gilda Dent, Harvey’s wife, shares her name with 
the femme fatale of Gilda (Charles Vidor, 1946). But Nolan script eliminates the scar and Dent’s 
wife, possibly to avoid “postmodern” effects, but probably to avoid alluding to the intellectual 
property of United Artists in the case of Scarface and Columbia in the case of Gilda. According 
to the recurring “Graphic Novel Bestsellers” column in Publishers Weekly, the trailer of The 
Dark Knight alone gave DC’s “backlist classics a sales push […] Grant Morrison and Dave 
McKean’s Batman: Arkham Asylum; Frank Miller and David Mazzucchelli’s Batman: Year One; 
Miller's The Dark Knight Returns; and The Long Halloween” (Reid, 2008, 18), as well as “the 
special hardcover edition of Alan Moore’s The Killing Joke, which spent most of the year on this 
bestseller list” (Reid, 2009, 16). The film again pushes sales of the “entire line.” 
While Time Warner cross-promoted its intellectual property between DC and Warner 
Brothers outside the narrative, Batman policed his within. The Dark Knight begins with a 
Nolanesque feint: as two gangs prepare to negotiate in a parking garage, “Batman” appears from 
the shadows. As the gangsters prepare to release attack dogs against him, more Batmen emerge 
from the shadows, and the first raises a pump-action shotgun and begins shooting. The gun 
violates viewer expectations about how the vigilante acts, because his unwillingness to use guns 
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has long defined the character.42 More Batmen emerge from the shadows, firing machine pistols 
and carbines, but soon the real Batman arrives, subduing not just the gangsters but also the 
copycat vigilantes. As the defeated knock-off Batmen sit, bound elbow to elbow with the crooks, 
one of them angrily demands of his capturer, “What gives you the right? What’s the difference 
between you and me?” The real Batman replies, “I’m not wearing hockey pads,” suggesting that 
his “right” obtains from the three-hundred-thousand-dollar body armor he filched from the 
basement of his father’s company. (And since the gangsters’ attack dogs have managed to bite 
him through the armor, Bruce Wayne will request a re-designed suit from Fox in a later scene.) 
In Begins, we saw the Batman logo twice before we see Batman, but in The Dark Knight, Nolan 
stages the character’s entrance by means of a different revelation of brand logic: Nolan’s feint 
with the knock-off Batman creates the kind of misunderstanding that trademark law aims to 
prevent. Both the audience and the characters initially think that Batman has arrived on the 
scene, but the guns reveal him as an inferior imitation. Each film in Nolan’s trilogy presents two 
groups of vigilantes, with each group stealing the tools of another’s trade; Batman’s victory in all 
three films, even in this comical moment with the fake Batmen, implies that the strong can steal 
intellectual property and use it as they will, whereas the weak face punishment by the legitimate 
(if not lawful) claimants of that property.43 In contrast to the ambivalence about the stealing of 
                                                
42 In some stories from 1939 and 1940, Batman does use guns to threaten or even to shoot foes, 
as does the Batman of Miller’s Dark Knight Returns. In January 1941, in Batman issue four, a 
panel contains the following: “Editor’s note: the Batman never carries or kills with a gun!” 
(reproduced in “Batman: The Dark Knight Archives”). We can read the no-guns rule as National 
Periodical Publications’ effort to bring the character in line with its other “long-underwear 
heroes” who did not use guns, distancing Batman from his pulp precursors; we can also read it as 
part of National’s other efforts to refute claims that comic book violence corrupted children, 
efforts that included their October 1941 announcement of their “Editorial Advisory Board” of 
child-development experts.  
43 In the epilogue of the tenth chapter of Watchmen, former vigilante turned conglomerate CEO 
Adrian Veidt copies the likenesses of masked vigilantes Nite Owl and Rorschach for a line of 
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trade secrets in both The Prestige and Inception, The Dark Knight presents it as a blend of jolly 
fun and street justice, provided Batman does the stealing.  
With the costumed Batman and Joker attacking on two fronts, the ordinary criminals in 
The Dark Knight appear not merely old-fashioned, but also mired in the pursuit of money and 
local reputation rather than the intangible brands and finance capital. “Criminals in this town 
used to believe in things,” says a mafia banker wounded by the Joker in a robbery. “Honor, 
respect. What do you believe in?” He implies that the Joker believes in nothing except money, 
but this mistakes the Joker’s aims and methods. Nolan’s Joker, who seems part terrorist, part 
performance artist, repeatedly voices his contempt for the goals of conventional gangsters. “All 
you care about is money,” he says, recycling the mafia banker’s own critique. “This town 
deserves a better class of criminal.” I read class in its structuring, socioeconomic sense: Gotham 
deserves a criminal who makes his money not by stealing or selling, but by owning, a criminal 
capitalist. The Joker’s robberies of the mob, crimes that the police cannot stop, thus resemble the 
primitive accumulation of Marx, the violence that creates property relations (784). When he 
offers to kill Batman for the assembled crime families, he asks not for a fee but for a share—
“half”—seeking a controlling share analogous to what Bruce Wayne owns in Wayne Enterprises. 
Dan Hassler-Forest notes that the film depicts “the gangsters’ financial resources, unlike those of 
Batman or the Joker […] as cash money,” but not as Capital (150). The hoodlums 
depend upon physical access to actual money, and are now forced to rely on Asian 
finance capitalists [….] [T]he Joker’s grasp of the virtualization of money brings him 
                                                                                                                                                       
toys. They have legal recourse: the company’s lawyers “think that since the costumed identities 
themselves are outlawed and illegal, there can be no legal claim to copyright upon their 
costumed images, leaving us free to register a copyright ourselves” (ch. 10 epilogue, p. 1). More 
importantly Nite Owl and Rorschach also cannot defeat Veidt by force, even combining their 
strengths, so the company seems to have an iron claim. 
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conceptually closer to his nemesis Batman […] whose financially irresponsible behavior 
reflects a similarly decadent disdain for cash. (151) 
The Joker claims not to care about money, but he makes many conflicting claims during the film, 
such as the stories of how he got his facial scars, giving us reason to be skeptical, or even to take 
these stories as mere self-marketing, brand management. Like Batman, he obviously uses money 
to make money; his every stunt, even his torching of the gangsters’ pile of cash, involves not 
only the labor of hired goons, but firearms and other tools, from poison to trucks to explosives. 
Like the rival magicians of The Prestige, Batman and the Joker treat wealth not as an end but as 
a means of advancing seemingly principled claims—here, claims about criminality and justice, 
rather than art or performance as in The Prestige.   
Much as Bruce Wayne’s wealth and brand management sets him apart from small-time 
vigilantes, the Joker’s set him apart from other criminals by allowing him to become his own 
brand. When Commissioner Gordon arrests the Joker in the film’s middle, the police cannot 
determine his identity. “Clothing is custom,” Gordon tells the mayor. “No labels. Nothing in his 
pockets but knives and lint.” Common vigilantes buy their armor at the sporting-goods store, and 
common criminals buy clothes off the rack, but gentleman costumed freaks get their outfits 
tailor-made; no makers’ marks spoil the Joker’s appearance as pure brand, free from all 
particularities of biography or manufacture. And like the gentleman Bruce Wayne, the Joker 
does not carry house keys. When Alfred the butler remonstrates with Bruce Wayne that Bruce 
has misunderstood the Joker by assuming that he is an ordinary criminal seeking wealth, he tells 
Bruce about a period he spent in Burma “a long time ago.” 
My friends and I were working for the local government. They were trying to buy the 
loyalty of tribal leaders by bribing them with precious stones. But their caravans were 
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being raided in a forest north of Rangoon by a bandit. So we went looking for the stones. 
But in six months, we never met anyone who had traded with him. One day I saw a child 
playing with a ruby the size of a tangerine. The bandit had been throwing them away. 
The wantonness of the Burmese bandit’s and the Joker’s rejections of wealth de-politicizes them, 
making them into individual acts of bravado unlike a Robin Hood’s socially entangled 
redistribution. If the Joker gave the money to labor unions or to communist political parties, he 
would commit a crime not within the Batman fictional universe, but against that universe, since 
that universe takes as an unstated axiom that the unequal distribution of lawfully acquired wealth 
does not constitute a social evil. For even a villain to call it such risks undercutting the moral 
authority of a vigilante hero who, working outside the law, has no authority but moral authority. 
And to undercut that would damage Batman’s brand equity. 
 The film’s presentation of Batman and the Joker as obverses of each other rehearses a 
familiar trope from Batman comics, including The Dark Knight Returns, The Killing Joke, and 
The Long Halloween. Yet the film also innovates in offering not just a double for Batman, but 
another a double for Bruce Wayne: Mr. Lau, a character written for the film. Like Bruce Wayne, 
Lau’s name appears as part of the name of a large corporation, and both he and Wayne secretly 
use their companies as fronts for illegal activities. Lucius Fox suspects Lau, but Wayne 
Enterprises accountants cannot find positive evidence of wrongdoing. Fox tells Bruce, “Lau’s 
company has grown eight percent annually like clockwork. His revenue stream must be off the 
books, maybe even illegal.” Lau’s “shareholders” include the Gotham crime families whose 
money he launders, yet they implicitly include law-abiding investors as well. When Harvey 
Dent’s investigation endangers the mob’s money, Lau hides the gangsters’ “deposits” in “one 
secure location” then returns to Hong Kong to avoid arrest since “the Chinese will not extradite 
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one of their own.” In a videoconference, he reassures these criminal investors, “your money is 
safe.” This placates them, but the Joker taunts: “As for the television’s so-called plan, Batman 
has no jurisdiction. He’ll find him, and make him squeal.” And so he does: in a scene out of The 
Green Berets (John Wayne, 1968), Batman renditions Lau using a CIA-style Skyhook (courtesy 
of Lucius Fox), then delivers a bound and haggard Lau to Commissioner Gordon’s door. Unlike 
Lau, the Joker understands that Batman, like capital, makes his own law, and that national 
borders, especially in financial centers like Hong Kong and Gotham, do little to impede his 
flight. The feeble state cannot arrest Lau, nor can they detect Wayne Enterprises’ 
mismanagement of military hardware in a major American city, or capture the Joker, or 
prosecute Gotham’s gangsters without Batman’s help. Even the People’s Republic of China 
cannot stop Batman’s violation of their airspace and rendition of one of their citizens.  
In contrast to a superhero or a villain, Lau the mere crook remains calculating when 
captured, rationally pursuing his own safety. The Joker does not crack even under Batman’s 
torture, but when threatened with the county jail, where his former clients could reach him, Lau 
starts to bargain, offering to turn over the financial information that prosecutor Dent wants for 
his case against the mob. “I handled all their investments,” he says, “one big pot.” This delights 
Dent, who exclaims, “RICO,” referring to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act. “If they pooled their money,” says Dent, “we can charge them with one criminal conspiracy. 
[…] In a RICO case, if you can charge one of the conspirators with a felony, you can charge 
them all.” RICO allows the prosecutor’s office to virtually “incorporate” the gangsters against 
their will, to legally formalize their social and economic relationship and thereby to prosecute 
that virtual corporation.  
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The film presents this as a success for Dent, Rachel Dawes, and the forces of law and 
order in Gotham, but later events in the film raise a troubling possibility: RICO laws might also 
allow the prosecution of Bruce Wayne and Lucius Fox for their conspiracy to use Wayne 
Enterprises as a front for Batman’s vigilantism. Two thirds of the way through the film, the 
Wayne Enterprises accountant who scrutinized Lau’s business dealings approaches Lucius Fox. 
REESE: You wanted me to do the diligence on the LSI holdings deal, again. Well, I 
found some irregularities. 
FOX: Their CEO is in police custody…. 
REESE: No, not with their numbers. With yours. Applied Sciences, a whole division of 
Wayne Enterprises, just disappeared overnight. I went down to the archives, and I started 
pulling some old files. [Reese lays schematics of the Batmobile on Fox’s desk.]  
Don’t tell me you didn’t recognize your baby out there, pancaking cop cars on the 
evening news. Now you’ve got the entire R&D department burning through cash, 
claiming it’s related to cell phones for the army? […] I want ten million dollars a year for 
the rest of my life. 
FOX: Let me get this straight. You think that your client, one of the wealthiest, most 
powerful men in the world, is secretly a vigilante who spends his nights beating criminals 
to a pulp with his bare hands, and your plan is to blackmail this person? Good luck. 
Again the script erases the labor of the people who build the Batman-gadget prototypes, for 
surely even in this “realist” version of the Batman universe the audience does not imagine Fox, 
who always wears a necktie, single-handedly constructing the military prototypes. The scene’s 
humor, rising from the incongruity of Fox’s threat with the patient charm of Morgan Freeman’s 
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star image and performance, sweep us along before we can think deeply of the improbability of 
Fox concealing this conspiracy from even the Gotham police.  
Where Batman Begins opened with an unannounced flashback to a traumatic past, The 
Dark Knight begins in the present then proceeds forward using linear and objective narration, 
without its predecessor’s emphasis on introspection and memory. Its classical form means that 
Nolan leaves a relatively light stylistic signature on this middle entry in the trilogy, at least in 
terms of its narration; however, as the film begins by misdirecting the audience with the copycat 
Batmen, so too the film closes with another kind of misdirection. Bruce Wayne, in his Batman 
disguise, deliberately takes the blame for Harvey Dent’s murders, thereby assuming a secondary 
disguise. Nolan’s earlier films display a fascination for compromised protagonists whose 
appearances deceive both the other characters and the viewer, but his Batman films present a 
troubled but otherwise transparent protagonist. Only at the end of the second film does Nolan’s 
Batman cycle arrive at the kind of constitutive lie that structures Nolan’s non-Batman films, the 
kind of lie that provides the narrative foundation of Memento, Insomnia, The Prestige, and 
Inception, as Batman talks Commissioner Gordon into blaming him for the killings. Sound 
bridges connect this scene to flash-forwards of Gordon speaking Dent’s eulogy and smashing the 
Bat-signal. Their conversation continues over a cutaway to another protective deception: Alfred 
burns the letter that Rachel Dawes left for Bruce before she died, in which she tells Bruce that 
she plans to marry Harvey Dent. “Sometimes the truth isn’t good enough,” Batman rasps in a 
voiceover. “Sometimes people deserve more. Sometimes people deserve to have their faith 
rewarded.” Until now Alfred has appeared trustworthy, but here he shows a willingness to 
suppress an inadequate truth in order to reward Bruce’s faith that Rachel would ultimately 
choose him. Only in the last moments of The Dark Knight does the hero enter into the multi-
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layered deceptions typical of the protagonists of Nolan’s non-Batman films, even as he himself 
becomes the victim of Alfred’s deception. These two deceptions will form the ground of The 
Dark Knight Rises, against which the final entry in the trilogy will complete Bruce Wayne’s 
family melodrama and its enunciation of the Batman as brand, one that transcends not only 
individual wearers of the cowl inside the diegesis, but also individual Batman commodities, 
including film cycles, outside the diegesis.  
 
The Dark Knight Rises: Brand Succession 
Nolan’s final Batman film begins by introducing Bane, a masked “mercenary” with 
fanatically loyal henchmen, who kidnaps a nuclear scientist from the custody of a group of CIA 
operatives. Back in Gotham, eight years have passed since the events of the previous film, with 
no sightings of Batman. The city memorializes Harvey Dent with a holiday in his name, and the 
Dent Act has helped law enforcement to eliminate the city’s organized crime. Bruce Wayne has 
become reclusive, and he has nearly bankrupted Wayne Enterprises by investing heavily in a 
fusion reactor project with the help of investor Miranda Tate; however, upon learning that the 
reactor could be turned into a nuclear weapon, Wayne halted the project. Corporate raider John 
Daggett hires Bane and cat burglar Selina Kyle (the Catwoman of the comics, never named so 
here) to help him engineer an attack on the Gotham Stock Exchange, so that his company can 
take over Wayne Enterprises. When Batman comes out of retirement, Bane breaks his spine and 
casts him into a dungeon in Central Asia. Bane reveals that he belongs to League of Shadows 
and that he has come to fulfill their goal of destroying Gotham; to that end, he steals the reactor 
and armored vehicles from Wayne Enterprises’ Applied Sciences. Miranda Tate reveals her true 
identity as Talia al Ghul, daughter of Bruce Wayne’s ninja mentor, and the new leader of the 
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League of Shadows. With the help of Selina Kyle, Commissioner Gordon, and Gotham police 
detective John Blake, Batman captures the reactor and flies it out over the ocean, where it 
detonates, leaving open the question of Bruce Wayne’s fate.  
Once again, the Nolan brothers draw on a multitude of textual sources in their script 
while adding elements created for the film. The “Knightfall” storyline from the Batman comics 
of 1993 and 1994 provides the villain Bane, his (temporary) crippling of Bruce Wayne, and 
Bruce’s falling out with butler Alfred. But more comes from Frank Miller’s bestselling Dark 
Knight Returns, elements ranging from Batman’s “return” after a long retirement, to Bruce 
Wayne’s use of high-tech braces to support a body worn down by years of brawling, to the 
funeral for Bruce Wayne, believed to be dead.44 Batman does not appear until 46 minutes into 
the film, and in a scene adapted from The Dark Knight Returns, a veteran cop schools a rookie: 
“You are in for a show tonight, son!” When the rookie draws his gun on Batman, the veteran 
warns, “Put that thing away before you hurt yourself!” In the comics, Bane’s mask resembles the 
full-head covering of a Mexican luchador, but Nolan’s film renders the mask as a respirator that 
leaves Bane’s bald head exposed while obscuring his mouth in a grille that resembles fangs. The 
combination makes Nolan’s Bane look not like the comics’ Bane, but like the leader of the 
Mutants gang from The Dark Knight Returns. The Mutants’ leader, like Bane, defeats Batman in 
hand-to-hand combat in the second quarter of the narrative, only to fall to Batman in their next 
encounter. Miller’s book had remained in Publishers Weekly’s top ten bestselling titles among 
backlist graphic novels in both 2010 and 2011 (Reid, 2010, 13 and 2011, 19), but the summer 
                                                
44 Only here, at the end of the last film in the trilogy, does the cycle explicitly quote an earlier 
print text, when Gordon reads Sydney Carton’s last words from A Tale of Two Cities in his 
eulogy for Bruce Wayne. 
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2012 release of The Dark Knight Rises gave DC’s Batman titles an additional boost. As 
Publishers Weekly reported on 5 July 2012, 
Though The Dark Knight Rises doesn’t hit theaters until July 20, books starring the 
Caped Crusader are already making waves on Amazon’s bestseller list. The most popular 
book as of July 5 was the upcoming graphic novel Batman: Earth One by Geoff Johns 
and Gary Frank from DC Comics. That book, publishing July 10, is currently #15 on the 
bestseller list, up from #43. Three other Batman books jumped in the past 24 hours: The 
Dark Knight Manual: Tools, Weapons, Vehicles and Documents from the Batcave by 
Brandon T. Snider (#781 to #315), Alan Moore’s Batman: The Killing Joke (#329 to 
#195), and Frank Miller’s Batman: The Dark Knight Returns (#378 to #278). (“Tracking 
Amazon”) 
By using the phrase Dark Knight in the title of the latter two films, Warner Brothers could evoke 
an acclaimed Batman title without framing the film as a one-to-one adaptation and thereby 
risking complaints about infidelity (or excessive fidelity, as we will see with responses to the 
2009 Zack Snyder Watchmen movie). The strategy of Nolan and his co-writers borrowing from 
comics without singling out any one source kept working for DC. 
 The third film in the series not only continued but also intensified its precursors’ fixation 
on industrial secrecy, branding, and the necessity of protecting intellectual property in a world of 
virtual capital. While Bruce Wayne sinks Wayne Industries’ profits into an experimental fusion 
reactor, Gothamites cannot find work. Detective Blake visits an orphanage to question the 
younger brother of a man who died working for Bane in Gotham’s sewers.  
KID: A lot of guys were going down in the tunnels when they age out. They say you can 
live down there. They say there’s work down there. 
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BLAKE: Work? What kind of work you gonna find in the sewers? 
KID: More than you can find up here, I guess. [He chalks the Batman logo on the bench 
that the two sit on.] 
BLAKE [noticing drawing]: So you know about him? 
KID: Course. You think he’s coming back? 
The boy’s nostalgia for Batman, who has not yet appeared in the film, changes the topic of 
conversation from nostalgia for an America where people who wanted to work could make a 
decent living. Capital thrives, with John Daggett bankrolling coups and Bruce Wayne 
bankrolling dead-end energy projects; meanwhile, the billionaire’s vigilante brand lives on, 
despite his long absence; but ordinary people must work in sewers for masked freaks for lack of 
options. 
Where The Dark Knight begins with a bank robbery, in which the Joker’s men steal cash, 
Bane’s first crime in Gotham targets the stock exchange, showing that Bane begins at a level of 
beyond the meta-criminal and would-be capitalist Joker. Bane and his henchmen use guns to 
intimidate the brokers, but they use a laptop and stolen login information to commit the theft 
itself. If The Dark Knight tells the story of the Joker becoming a predatory finance capitalist who 
wants to buy a controlling interest in the mob’s “production,” then Rises begins with Bane 
already operating at this level of abstraction. Bane’s attack on the stock exchange advances the 
interests of his employer, John Daggett, who earlier paid Selina Kyle to “steal” Bruce Wayne’s 
fingerprints to use in the stock exchange’s biometric login system.45 Lucius Fox explains the 
aftermath to Bruce Wayne.  
                                                
45 The corporate raider Daggett hires Bane for commercial rather than principled ends. Bane and 
his men help Daggett engineer “a coup in West Africa that secured mining operations” for 
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FOX. It seems you made a series of large put options on the futures exchange, verified by 
thumbprint. […] Long term we may be able to prove fraud, but for now, you’re 
completely broke. And Wayne Enterprises is about to fall into the hands of John Daggett. 
WAYNE: The weapons. We can’t let Daggett get his hands on Applied Sciences. 
FOX: Applied Sciences is all locked up and off the books. The energy project, however, 
is a different story. 
The scene makes legible the consensual fictionality of capital: marks on paper and data recorded 
on hard drives guarantee Bruce Wayne’s ownership of his wealth. An illicit copy of a thumbprint 
does not differ ontologically from a copy willingly given, yet the film uses Bruce Wayne’s hands 
as its metonym for ownership. Selina Kyle steals fingerprints from Bruce Wayne’s safe, then 
sells them to Daggett’s men, withholding the thumbprint to ensure that she gets paid, and to 
remind the audience for a second time of Wayne’s physical hands. In Fox’s first scene, he tells 
Wayne that he has kept Applied Sciences hidden, “shuttering and consolidating all the different 
prototypes under one roof—my roof” “to keep them from falling into the wrong hands.” Batman 
uses the same metaphor when he tells Selina Kyle that he has the legendary Blank Slate 
software, which allows users to permanently erase their criminal records, that she has been 
seeking. “I acquired it,” he says, “to keep it out of the wrong hands.” Yet when he speaks these 
words, he wears gauntlets that he copied from the design of the League of Shadows, reminding 
alert viewers that Nolan’s Batman, much like the Batman registered as a trademark by DC 
Comics, consists of a historically contingent bricolage of elements presented as original by a 
corporate actor. In Begins, Batman fought ninjas wearing these gauntlets, but in Rises, the agents 
                                                                                                                                                       
Daggett’s company, but when Bane no longer needs Daggett’s money, Bane kills him, less than 
halfway through the movie.  
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of the League do not wear them, once again allowing Nolan to style his version of Bruce Wayne 
as the auteur of the Batman persona.  
 The Dark Knight presented the illicit copying of Batman’s methods and technologies as 
farce, but the trope returns in Rises as something closer to tragedy. Instead of schlub vigilantes 
wearing hockey pads in a poor man’s knock-off of the rich man’s brand, Rises brings back the 
ur-vigilante League of Shadows, this time not merely to pirate a shipment of Wayne Enterprises 
weapons, but to break into Applied Sciences itself. “Your precious armory!” says Bane to the 
crippled Batman. “Gratefully accepted!” While Bruce Wayne languishes in Bane’s dungeon, he 
watches on Gotham News Network as the League of Shadows patrols the city using the same 
model of vehicle that he used as the Batmobile in the previous films.46 Gotham’s police might 
have played a more active role in preventing the League’s attack on the city, if they had had 
better technology, but Bruce Wayne hoards even that. Early in the film, Batman returns to his 
cave with the antenna he recovered from one of Bane’s laptops, but Alfred questions his 
paternalism. 
ALFRED: Are the police supposed to be investigating, then? 
WAYNE: They don’t have the tools to analyze it. 
ALFRED: They would if you gave them to them. 
WAYNE: One man’s tool is another man’s weapon. 
In hoarding these “tools,” Wayne and his conspirator Fox implicitly help generate this film’s 
threat to the city, in that they deliberately limit the ability of the police to investigate crime. 
Worse, in the hands of the League of Shadows, the fusion reactor that investor Miranda Tate had 
                                                
46 The Gotham News Network’s “GNN” logo throughout the Nolan’s Batman films doubles as a 
subtle brand placement for Warner Brothers’ conglomerate sibling CNN. No competing news 
outlets appear. 
 146 
called “free clean energy for an entire city” now becomes a neutron bomb, the means to threaten 
and then to destroy Gotham. In the film’s eagerness to conclude the melodrama of Bruce 
Wayne’s virtue and sacrifice, it fails to explain how Wayne’s hoarding of fusion technology 
makes anyone safer in a country that already has a large nuclear arsenal; as Tate points out, 
physicists have published papers on the technology, but nobody explains why or if the reactor 
represents a proliferation danger distinct from older nuclear weapons. Within the neoliberal 
political horizon of Nolan’s Batman cycle, the idea of trusting a nation state, whether 
democratically accountable to its people or not, with such power simply does not come up. The 
film offers only the choice between a billionaire philanthropist and apocalyptic terrorists. 
 Those terrorists demonstrate that they understand the branding logic that organizes 
Batman’s activities. Like Batman, they risk and give their lives for ends greater than themselves. 
When the CIA agents pick up three of Bane’s men in the opening scene, the lead agent refers to 
Bane with some awe as “the masked man.” The agents three captives all wear black hoods 
during their rendition, so at first we do not realize that Bane numbers among them; like the Joker 
in The Dark Knight, Bane uses his capture to stage a still more daring crime from custody. The 
lead agent demands of the still-hooded Bane, “Who are you?” to which Bane replies, “It doesn’t 
matter who we are. What matters is our plan.” At this, the agent removes the hood, and Bane 
continues, “No one cared who I was until I put on the mask.”47 However, although the League of 
Shadows’ goal of destroying Gotham remains constant between Begins and Rises, the League’s 
brand strategy has developed to a level beyond even Batman’s. In Begins, the League wore 
                                                
47 Bane has a traumatic backstory, but like Batman, he does not tell it himself; we hear it only 
from Talia al Ghul. Bruce Wayne has continued his father’s philanthropic work with projects 
like the fusion reactor, and Talia al Ghul also frames her attempt to destroy Gotham in terms of 
familial succession, becoming Bruce Wayne’s antithesis: “I honor my father by finishing his 
work.” 
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recognizable ninja-suits, but here, they dress in civilian clothing or generic fatigues, lacking a 
visual brand identity; Bane, with his mask, bizarre accent, becomes the League’s recognizable 
“range” brand, but for the first half of the film, this leads only to misrecognition, as observers 
assume that this mercenary works simply for hire. Meanwhile, Miranda Tate, leader of the new 
League of Shadows, hides in plain sight and succeeds where Daggett failed, taking over as CEO 
of Wayne Enterprises. While camouflage-pattern Batmobiles patrol the streets, the ultimate 
horror of the film plays out in the boardroom, where Talia al Ghul, the principled villain, steals 
not simply Bruce Wayne’s hardware but the means of its production, and establishes herself as 
CEO.48  
 We might usefully read such films’ anxieties about the takeover of the means of cultural 
production as eruptions of the suppressed anxieties of conglomerate Hollywood’s upper-level 
creative workers. Film scripts address a potential audience of moviegoers, but they must first 
address an actual audience of executives who shape and vet those scripts on the basis of the 
needs of the conglomerate and the interests of shareholders. Imagine a thousand screenwriters, 
their scripts filtered through a board of ten producers at a conglomerated studio, each producer 
keen to exploit a different intellectual property for the parent conglomerate: the selective 
pressure that such a board would exert on screenplays would produce the pattern that we see in 
Hollywood superhero blockbusters, with their obsession over IP: screenplays that make the cut 
appeal ambiguously to a mass audience and to producers anxious about their work as curators of 
                                                
48 The Dark Knight showed one diligent accountant within Wayne Enterprises uncovering the 
conspiracy between Fox and Wayne to equip the Batman, but in Rises, nobody comments on the 
familiar design of the vehicles that Bane’s men use to patrol the city. Surely millions of people 
recognize the model from footage of the Batman “pancaking cop cars.” But if the script 
acknowledged this, it would complicate Nolan’s efforts to make Bruce Wayne into a heroic 
innovator. So in this third film, the Batman uses a motorcycle and a stealth helicopter, 
distinguishing him from the villains; nobody mentions his old car.  
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the conglomerate’s portfolio. For the scripts that succeed resemble anxiety dreams of corporate 
secrets disastrously exposed, pirated, and shared. The mass audience never wakes in a cold sweat 
from nightmares of intellectual property theft, but we don’t run media corporations or approve 
scripts for summer blockbusters. These screenplays traffic in the dreams and nightmares of the 
people who do.  
The advertising for Rises did something extraordinary for a superhero movie franchise: it 
signaled the end of the series. “The Legend Ends,” declared the posters. Never before had the 
hero of a multi-film superhero cycle retired, and neither had any cycle advertised its plan to 
conclude. Paradoxically, Rises deviates from these genre norms for the good of the brand. The 
previous Batman cycle had no formal conclusion; Warner Brothers gave each film an open 
ending, hopeful for a sequel. Batman and Robin (1997) ends with Batman, Robin, and Batgirl 
declaring their partnership, and the final shot shows their silhouettes running toward the viewer, 
promising further adventures. In Rises, the retirement or death of Bruce Wayne brings a degree 
narrative closure that we see in no other superhero film franchise. However, while the film 
narrates Bruce Wayne’s exit from vigilantism, it concurrently narrates the beginning of Detective 
John Blake’s entry into vigilantism. 
In this third film, we might say that the trilogy finally distills Bruce Wayne out of the 
Batman persona, fulfilling the Nolan series’ rhetoric about Batman as a symbol, through its 
conversion of the character into pure brand. Early in the film, before Wayne has come out of 
retirement, Blake visits him at Wayne Manor, and reveals that he has known of Bruce Wayne’s 
identity as Batman all along. Blake, too, grew up orphaned by gun crime, and he intimates that 
he witnessed his own father’s murder; moreover, he claims that when Bruce Wayne visited his 
orphanage, he “knew” immediately of Wayne’s secret identity. In “solving” such a crime 
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through intuition alone, Blake may demonstrate a less-than-realistically-plausible degree of 
natural talent as a detective, but he also sets himself up as a (brand-)plausible successor to Bruce 
Wayne. In a later meeting with Wayne, Blake asks, “Why the mask?” “The idea was to be a 
symbol,” replies Wayne. “Batman could be anybody. That was the point.” In Blake’s next scene, 
he uses his sidearm to defend himself against two of Bane’s henchmen, killing both but thereby 
rendering them unable to tell him where Bane plans to detonate his explosives; Blake looks in 
horror at his sidearm, then casts it away, much as Bruce Wayne cast away a revolver in Batman 
Begins, showing the viewer that Blake has moved a step closer to Batman’s “no guns” rule. The 
film bookends Blake’s epiphany with dual reminders from Selina Kyle, who uses guns readily.49  
Blake does not merely show that he merits taking up the cowl: the film shows that Bruce 
Wayne names Blake as his successor. In Batman’s final encounter with Commissioner Gordon, 
he reveals his true identity, but Gordon keeps silent. When Blake quits the police, he laments to 
Gordon that “No one’s ever gonna know who saved the entire city.” Gordon rejoins, “They 
know. It was the Batman,” suggesting that he understands that the vigilante has more value as a 
symbol than as any one man. After the reading of Wayne’s will, Blake goes to claim an item left 
to him, but the estate clerk cannot find him on the list until he gives his “legal name,” Robin. 
With this name, Blake ceases to be legible as an “original” character written by the Nolans, and 
instead becomes legible as their revision of one of the oldest supporting characters from the 
Batman universe, Robin, fellow orphan and ward of Bruce Wayne. By keeping Blake and Wayne 
from working together in costume, and by keeping Blake well-clothed throughout the film, Rises 
manages to include this perennial element of the Batman universe without introducing significant 
                                                
49 In her first action set piece with Batman, the Selina Kyle wrests a gun from one of Bane’s 
lackeys, but before she can use it, Batman knocks it from her hands, saying “No guns.” At the 
film’s end, she shoots Bane to death, saving Batman, then remarks, “About the whole ‘no guns’ 
thing, I’m not sure I feel as strongly about it as you do.” 
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homoerotic tension, “de-queering” the Dynamic Duo. Blake’s inheritance from Wayne consists 
of a satchel containing (at least) a set of GPS coordinates, a GPS handset, and climbing gear, 
which Blake then uses to enter the cave beneath Wayne Manor. As he explores, a swarm of bats 
flies around him, and a cutaway shows us Commissioner Gordon lay his hand on the bat-logo on 
the Bat-signal, possibly in nostalgia, but possibly in preparation to switch it on. The next shot 
returns us to Blake, still ducking the bats, making clear the inference: Batman “begins” again. As 
Blake wades across a stream in the cave, beneath him suddenly rises the rectangular block that 
Wayne used as a landing pad for his stealth helicopter; within the frame, this black platform 
functions as a vertical wipe as it and Blake “rise.” To help us get the metaphor, after the screen 
wipes to black, the title, The Dark Knight Rises, appears, helping us make the inference: Blake 
has succeeded Wayne, and has risen as the new Dark Knight.50 
Such successions happen in the comics, and even with the Hobgoblin villain in the Sam 
Raimi Spider-Man films, but no Hollywood superhero blockbuster has portrayed the succession 
of the title character. Rises thereby takes up the “problem” of different actors playing Batman in 
the Burton-Schumacher cycle—Michael Keaton, Val Kilmer, George Clooney—and turns it into 
a strength of the Batman brand. A new Dark Knight can rise, provided the brand remains 
                                                
50 Compare the proprietary brand logic of the Nolan Batman with what we might call the “open-
source” approach of V for Vendetta. In both the graphic novel (by Alan Moore and David Lloyd) 
and the film adaptation (directed by James McTeigue, 2006), the anarchist vigilante hero wears a 
common Guy Fawkes mask, which renders him both anonymous and easy (read: cheap) to copy. 
Although Nolan’s films repeat their “just a symbol” rhetoric, the do so in the service of a 
proprietary symbol, policed by force inside the diegesis and policed outside by trademark law. 
In contrast, V’s mask indicates that he could be anyone and, conversely, anyone could be 
V, as when a crowd of thousands wearing the masks defy police orders to disperse, or when the 
heroine Evey dons the mask after V’s death, taking on his role. After the release of the film V for 
Vendetta, many activists, including hacker group Anonymous, adopted the Guy Fawkes mask as 
a means of concealing their identity while also showing solidarity. A more subversive approach 
might directly pirate proprietary brands, declaring a new mask every year: Mickey Mouse 
tagging banks in London, Superman unlawfully assembling in Istanbul, and so on.  
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continuous in terms of its salient tropes: bats, caves, an orphan vigilante who eschews guns, and 
his friend at police headquarters. Rather than simply producing open-ended films until they had a 
flop, Warner Brothers produced a trilogy simultaneously self-contained and open ended, one that 
implicitly prepared audiences to expect a different actor in the role the next time they see Batman 
on the big screen, by showing a different actor assuming that role in the final minutes of the 
cycle. 
 
Conclusion: Reifying the Brand 
 Where most critics read the Nolan Batman films as allegories of American life under the 
“war on terror,” I read them instead as an allegory of brand management. Their stories of 
industrial theft and copying, whether thwarted or triumphant, sound like bedtime stories for 
corporate executives, in which the smartest guy in the room wins by beating everybody at their 
own respective games. Nolan’s films model the construction, maintenance, and renewal of a 
brand in a world where the difference between criminal and hero depends not on breaking the 
law but on getting caught, where the powerful create conditions under which their unlawful 
actions can disappear into the appearance of lawfulness and where the same conditions that allow 
a brand to succeed also generate systemic inequality and injustice. These films alternately reveal 
and obscure the historical, social origins of 21st-century wealth and poverty, hinting toward and 
then re-mystifying the economic relations that make possible Bruce Wayne’s crimes. 
Wittingly or unwittingly, Nolan and his screenwriting collaborators have worked into 
their narrative an explicit and thoroughgoing account of the commercial brand as virtual and 
generative, something that exists in discourse and in mind but not in the world of commodities. 
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In his comments on Rises for the science fiction and fantasy blog io9, Will Brooker calls this 
virtual and generative function “myth”: 
This movie is about the battle for Gotham; the city and its citizens. It’s not man-against-
man, or Dark Knight against Joker, as we saw in the previous film. It’s the fight for the 
loyalty and command of the masses. By learning the language of the street, and realizing 
that Batman has to be more than just a single individual, Bruce Wayne is recognising the 
importance of myth, folklore and urban legend to the Dark Knight—and that's going to be 
the key to his own victory. (“Clues”) 
Claims like this obscure the corporate production of culture behind the legitimating and 
democratic categories of myth and the folk; they reify the brand, doing the work of marketing, 
not cultural studies. Fans may not want to hear that someone owns their “myth,” yet critical 
scholars have a responsibility to tell them. We also have a responsibility to help media fans 
envision forms of cultural production not driven and shaped by the need to generate profits for 
shareholders, who have only an economic interest in the object of the fans’ love. 
During the years when Warner Brothers produced the Nolan Batman trilogy, Marvel 
Studios began integrating their “Cinematic Universe” by connecting their Iron Man (Jon 
Favreau, 2008) and Incredible Hulk (Louis Leterrier, 2008) films, then Thor (Kenneth Branagh, 
2011) and Captain America (Joe Johnston, 2011). By May 2012, two months before Warners 
released The Dark Knight Rises, Marvel released The Avengers (Joss Whedon, 2012), which 
integrated four Marvel franchises into a single film. Warner Brothers did not connect their 
Batman films to Superman Returns (Bryan Singer, 2006) or Green Lantern (Martin Campbell, 
2011). Instead, Time Warner began connecting their superhero movie franchises five years after 
Marvel, and then only in the most oblique way: pause Man of Steel (Zack Snyder, 2013) at 
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2:06:23, and you will see an upside-down Wayne Enterprises logo on a satellite that General Zod 
throws at Superman. Yet Time Warner seems intent on making up for lost time with their 
Batman vs. Superman: Dawn of Justice (Zack Snyder, 2016), which features in its trailers both a 
new Batman and the big screen’s first Wonder Woman. The Dark Knight Rises primed audiences 
to welcome a new actor into the “symbol” called Batman; whether they will welcome Dawn of 
Justice remains to be seen. Time Warner, once the leader of the conglomerate pack in transmedia 
franchising and the opening of new video markets, now works to catch up to its competitor in 
terms of the integration of its superhero movie franchises. However, during Nolan’s term at the 
helm of the Batman film cycle, Time Warner launched the most unusual of comic-book 
superhero film franchises, Watchmen, using an inversion of the branding logic at play in the 
Batman cycle. Where the Batman films convert a mass of disparate sources into a closed trilogy 
of films, Watchmen converts a single textual source, relatively closed and self-contained, into a 
proliferating line of new commodities. To this we now turn.   
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CHAPTER THREE: WATCHMEN AND THE “UNFILMABLE” BRAND 
Introduction 
If the Batman films show us the paradigm of how a Big Six studio exploits a long 
established superhero brand in the 21st century, by piecing together narrative elements from 
decades of comics, then Watchmen (Zack Snyder, 2009) represents how a conglomerate 
coordinates its subsidiaries to transform a self-consciously original, off-brand, and modernist 
superhero text into a branded franchise. DC Comics published Watchmen, written by Alan 
Moore and drawn by Dave Gibbons, in twelve installments from 1986 to 1987, then sold the film 
rights; two decades later, Time Warner would use Warner Brothers’ acquisition of the film rights 
as an occasion to launch a transmedia franchise built around this graphic novel. Although 
scholars have said much about the book, they have said little about the film, and still less about 
its role as the linchpin of an emergent media franchise, which the conglomerate built using DC 
Comics, Warner Brothers, direct-to-video production unit Warner Premiere, computer game 
division Warner Brothers Interactive Entertainment, and even news outlets. Commercial 
imperatives shape all blockbusters, but in the case of Watchmen, Time Warner’s marketing 
effectively set the terms that news media and even scholars used to discuss this emergent media 
brand. Moreover, Time Warner did this with a book that contains a thoroughgoing critique of 
conglomerate synergy. 
Watchmen’s ostensible villain, CEO Adrian Veidt, uses the disparate global holdings of 
Veidt Enterprises to engineer an apocalyptic hoax and to obscure the unity of his plan. His 
company not only copies the likenesses of his former vigilante associates for commercial use, 
without their permission, but he also uses the work-for-hire labor of writers and other artists to 
create a bogus alien monster, then erases that labor by disappearing and murdering the artists. 
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Through that erasure, the world misrecognizes Veidt’s monster as an integral and non-derivative 
whole, rather than the fetishized labor of cultural workers. Vigilantes Nite Owl and Rorschach 
only discover Veidt’s plot through painstaking detective work, assembling disparate clues to 
connect the economically interested parties. My reading of the Watchmen transmedia franchise 
that Time Warner launched after 2005 therefore takes a methodological hint from the masked 
detectives in the story, alternating between the skepticism of Nite Owl and the suspicion—
bordering on paranoia—of Rorschach, in order to construct a reading. Much as the book’s 
narrative of investigation foregrounds and thematizes the difficulty of reading fragmentary 
textual clues, so does the book’s form. The book’s first eleven chapters include four- to six-page 
prose epilogues that present intradiegetic texts, such as a retired vigilante’s memoir, but because 
these epilogues do not consist of comic panels, a careless reader might skip them; however, these 
epilogues contain story information that appears nowhere else, rendering intelligible many events 
in the comic-panel sections. Disguised as mere paratexts, they prove as integral to Watchmen as 
the editor’s commentary in Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire or the footnotes in David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest, postmodern novels that simultaneously depend on and subvert the 
distinction between what counts and what does not count as “part” of the text. Taking a hint from 
the complex form of Watchmen, this chapter therefore treats Time Warner’s many utterances 
about the book as part of the larger object of study: the conglomerate’s transformation of a self-
contained, off-brand graphic novel into a media multimedia franchise. 
Moore designed the book with a beginning and end, a self-contained formal experiment 
that ran counter to norm of open-endedness in the comics industry, a norm that Hollywood has 
increasingly adopted as conglomerated studios seek to create transmedia franchises rather than 
stand-alone box-office hits. DC sold the film rights, which then spent nearly two decades in 
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development hell, until Warner Brothers reacquired the film rights in 2005, at the height of the 
DVD boom. As they developed and marketed their Watchmen movie, Time Warner stressed the 
evaluative notion of their adaptation’s fidelity to this reputedly “unfilmable” text that had defied 
earlier attempts at screen adaptation. This same putative unfilmability also served as their 
rationale for a proliferation of ancillary Watchmen media in other platforms. Yet despite the 
filmmakers’ claims of fidelity, which news media repeated, the movie revised elements of the 
book that conflicted with the imperative to sell ancillaries to their core demographic. The 
conglomerate used the modernist credentials of the book as a self-contained and formally 
ambitious text to convert it into an open and generative media brand; however, this picture 
emerges clearly only if we pay attention to the marketing of the film, including cross-promotion 
via ostensible news media, and in the context of markets not just for feature films, but also for 
graphic novels and home video. By analyzing the book, the film, the home videos, and the 
publicity for all three, I show how Time Warner extended and exploited Watchmen across 
multiple platforms, using news reporters and even scholars to help propagate their marketing. 
The advertising, official paratexts, and the movie itself reveal an adaptation primarily “faithful” 
to the idea of Watchmen as a brand. My reading of Time Warner’s construction and framing of 
this franchise reveals not only the dangers of less-than-critical acceptance of corporate discourses 
about media but also the limits of media franchising, as fans and critics ultimately resisted Time 
Warner’s proliferation of Watchmen texts. 
 
Franchising and Conglomerate Adaptation 
My analysis of Time Warner’s material and rhetorical construction of this franchise 
draws on recent scholarship on media franchises and the distinctive modes of communication 
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that conglomerates use in creating them. Conglomerates build franchises not only by means of 
primary texts like movies and comic books, but also by means of framing texts like the press 
release and the Comic-Con panel, teaser trailers and book-jacket blurbs, poster taglines and the 
promotional inserts in DVD cases. The Watchmen graphic novel’s twelve main sections, 
composed of comics panels, demand an intensive and extensive mode of reading in order to 
understand its formal patterns, dispersed clues, flashbacks, and flash-forwards, but its prose 
epilogues demand a different kind of reading, requiring that the reader attend to paratexts and 
seeming afterthoughts with the intensity we usually reserve for the “primary” text. Without that 
attention, we cannot fully understand the book’s narrative; similarly, we cannot understand Time 
Warner’s construction of the Watchmen franchise without attention to its paratexts. As I parse 
the corporate discourse around Watchmen, I borrow a guiding axiom of Jonathan Gray’s Show 
Sold Separately: because media producers “invest so heavily in previews, bonus materials, 
merchandise, and their ilk, so should we as analysts” (8). Gray argues that such paratexts “tell us 
how producers or distributors would prefer for us to interpret a text” (72). The reception of 
Watchmen suggests that media producers’ “preferred readings” can shape interpretations not 
only among scholars who ought to know better, but also among journalists and civilian audiences 
hostile to the new text or to the franchise. From paratexts we can learn how corporations want us 
see the franchise, while from the trade press we can learn how corporations actually use 
intellectual properties that constitute it; such comparisons reveal significant incongruities in the 
case of Watchmen.  
My reading assumes that media corporations constitute a social relation between 
shareholders, executives, and media workers, and that beneath every value that the corporation 
expresses, whether aesthetic, ethical, or social, runs the imperative to increase the wealth of its 
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shareholders. As William G. Roy puts it in Socializing Capital, “In contemporary America, one’s 
relationship to corporations is now the most important determinant of wealth. Whether one 
works for a corporation, manages a corporation, owns stock in a corporation, or lends money to a 
corporation differentiates the wealthy from the rest” (12-13). Some investors in Time Warner 
may care about modernist superhero comics, but I work from the assumption that most care only 
about the return on their investment, even if executives at different branches of a conglomerate’s 
subsidiaries have their own goals or their own affective interests in a given property. However, 
as Jean-Marc Lehu points out, “Brands must constantly ensure their positive presence in the 
mind of consumers, if possible through recourse to media detached from purely commercial, and 
sometimes very damaging, connotations” (224). Brand managers therefore have a paradoxical 
and class-aligned interest in concealing the profit drive that motivates corporate endeavor; after 
all, no fan ever loved a comic book, novel series, or game because of its profitability. On the 
contrary, I assume that for most media fans, affective investment in a text, such as my own 
affective investment in the graphic novel Watchmen, springs not from that text’s economic 
functions but from its aesthetic and narrative properties, as well as its availability for self-
narration about our own encounter with the text. When I read Watchmen, I enjoy the text on its 
terms, but also because it lets me take pride in feeling like someone who enjoys difficult, artsy 
comic books about masked weirdos and giant monsters. Yet my affective investment offers 
marketers a point of appeal, a means of interpellating me, and therefore I must remind myself to 
keep up guard. 
A conglomerate of Time Warner’s power generates both texts and the context in which 
most people begin to interpret them, even when those interpretations turn oppositional in the end. 
Like gravity, the profit motive constitutes the invisible orienting condition for all corporate 
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activity, even if individual workers ignore or transcend it. In Convergence Culture, Henry 
Jenkins explores corporate motives for styling commercial texts as the work not of professionals 
seeking work or the work artists seeking to expand their chosen media, but the work of loving 
fans; media companies thereby create an aura of what Jenkins calls participatory culture. In 
Spreadable Media, Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green examine ways that corporations adapt 
cult texts for mass audiences. Warner Brothers did both with Watchmen, but I diverge from 
Jenkins and his co-authors in treating the discourse of the fan-turned-creator as radically 
misleading, in that executives, editors, and marketers and who have no affective attachment in a 
franchise control hiring decisions in a conglomerated industry. In light of the tendency of 
scholars working on mass media to present themselves as fans, we must hold in suspicion not 
only corporate presentations of industry workers as fans, but also the category of the fan itself, as 
a means of interpellation into brand loyalty. Jerome Christensen, writing about the classical 
Hollywood era, argues that each studio “projected its preferred identity and screened its 
ambitions by marketing commodities that proposed plausible versions to the world, then, now, 
and in the future” (America’s Corporate Art 19). Christensen creates a useful ambiguity with the 
word screened. If we substitute conglomerate for studio, his statement holds: the conglomerate 
both presents its plans to an audience (as one screens a trailer at Comic-Con), but it also conceals 
from view (as one screens a backstage area for Comic-Con panelists). This ambiguity will 
inform my interpretations of Time Warner’s speech about Watchmen.51  
                                                
51 Contra Christensen, the inner workings of any particular Time Warner subsidiary hold little 
relevance to my analysis. Although I look closely at the words of a variety of people working for 
Time Warner subsidiaries, my analysis of Watchmen does not look at intra-conglomerate 
politics, and instead assumes a broad continuity of interests among corporate actors. 
Ethnographies or histories of individual subsidiaries I leave to other analysts, especially those 
better positioned in terms of access to the archives of or informants within these secretive and 
risk-averse organizations. 
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This chapter, therefore, reads the 2009 Watchmen film as an adaptation of a single text, 
but it also reads Time Warner’s larger Watchmen media franchise first as brand, and only 
secondarily as a mass of texts that includes a modernist, formally experimental, twelve-part 
graphic novel by Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons—the grain of sand around which Time Warner 
tried to accrete a multimedia pearl. As Clare Parody argues, “adaptation in a franchise context 
can be read as an act of brand management, key dimensions of the intertextual dynamics it sets 
up explicated and produced by brand logic” (215). If we look at the Watchmen graphic novel 
with the eye of the brand manager, we see its narrative closure relative to most open-ended, 
serial comics, but we also see elements that make it franchise-friendly, such as its detailed world-
building, the complex backstories of its characters, and the relative openness of its ending 
(despite the deaths of several major characters).52 The previously self-contained commodity, the 
graphic novel, becomes the stem-cell vat from which Time Warner can culture a new brand; in 
Lash and Lury’s terms, it becomes “a source of production” (6) for new commodities. 
In this light, Time Warner’s insistence throughout their marketing on their fidelity to the 
graphic novel becomes slightly paradoxical. Scholars of adaptation have abandoned the 
moralistic language of an adaptation’s “fidelity” to its source as a relic from the years when 
cinema studies strove to legitimate itself by association with literature. In A Theory of 
Adaptation, Linda Hutcheon writes, “there are many and varied motives behind adaptation and 
few involve faithfulness” (xiii ). When Time Warner’s marketing of Watchmen explicitly 
invoked fidelity as the filmmakers’ guiding principle, critics responded in kind, accusing the 
movie of being too “faithful” even as they ignored the film’s politically and commercially 
                                                
52 Both Parody (214) and Hutcheon stress the importance of world-building and setting in 
adaptation for transmedia franchises. Hutcheon calls this useful property the “heterocosm” of a 
text (14). 
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significant revisions of the source material. These revisions matter to me insofar as they reveal 
motives contrary to those expressed by Time Warner employees. The conglomerate used fidelity 
as a means of creating the kind of “negative cachet” that Thomas Leitch attributes to the period 
adaptations of novels by Merchant Ivory Productions: audiences perceive the company as 
striving for fidelity to the adapted novels, such that Merchant Ivory’s brand value inheres in the 
audience’s expectation that the filmmakers will alter the source narratives as little as possible (6). 
I argue that Warner Brothers aimed claimed fidelity to Watchmen not only because it allowed 
them to generate negative cachet, but also because it gave them a chance to refer at every turn to 
the book and its supposed genius: this served both to advertise a commodity for DC Comics and 
also to differentiate Watchmen in a media market increasingly saturated with other superhero 
films, including Warners’ own lucrative Batman cycle, which did not explicitly proclaim fidelity 
to single Batman text.  
 
Possessory Credit and the “Graphic Novel” 
In Time Warner’s discourse about Watchmen, Alan Moore’s authorship functions both as 
a sign of the books’ modernist formal credentials and as a reminder of the commercial 
arrangements of exploitation and expropriation still the norm in the comics industry. The native 
of Northampton, England, began writing strips for local periodicals before moving up to the rock 
music weekly Sounds, Marvel UK’s Doctor Who series, and the British science-fiction comics 
anthology magazines Warrior and 2000 AD (Moore, Interview by Burbey, 79). Moore does not 
draw but writes scripts that explain his layouts in painstaking detail. For example, the first page 
of Moore’s Batman: The Killing Joke contains nine wordless panels, yet Moore’s script runs 
3,571 words, just over eight pages. DC hired Moore to write for their Swamp Thing in 1984, and 
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over the next three years, he transformed this second-tier horror comic into the talk of the 
industry. Moore’s stories combined achronological, multi-track narratives with a readiness to 
subvert reader expectations about character and genre. During Moore’s run, Swamp Thing’s 
circulation grew fivefold (Moore, interview by Weiland); he won industry awards on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Yet he continued writing for titles with proprietary characters originally created 
by others. As Andrew Hoberek points out, Moore “initially conceived Watchmen as a story using 
the ‘properties’ DC had acquired from Charlton” (88), the defunct comics company whose 
catalogue DC had purchased. Hoberek rightly challenges DC’s styling of Moore as a Romantic 
genius, as well as Moore’s own habit of styling himself as a creator of hermetic texts that must 
not be altered. Moore built his reputation as an artist by re-working the creations of others.53  
 Moore’s work at DC contributed to the emergence of a new discourse of authorship in the 
US comics industry: possessory credit. Marquee titles began to announce authors’ or artists’ 
names on the covers of comic books. Only in the 1960s had writers, pencillers, letterers, and 
inkers begun to get regular credit inside the covers of monthly comics (Brooker 192). By the 
1980s, independent publishers hoping to compete with the DC-Marvel duopoly offered artists 
cover credit, as Mirage Studios did in 1984 with “Eastman and Laird’s Teenage Mutant Ninja 
Turtles”; independent publishers also offered artists shares in profits and even ownership of 
characters. As Paul Lopes notes, “it was only when Marvel and DC’s economic interests were 
challenged by independent publishers that they significantly changed their treatment of artists” 
(102). Moore’s many awards and his interviews in Comics Journal and Comics Interview meant 
that his name had become a selling point, and DC used it in their promotion of Watchmen. A 
                                                
53 Regarding Charlton, Hoberek notes that the company “had come into business when its 
founders met in the New Haven County Jail, where one of them, John Santangelo, was doing 
time for illegally selling copyrighted song lyrics” (83).  
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1985 DC Spotlight celebrated DC’s 50th anniversary and touted upcoming publications with a 
preview of Watchmen, which begins by quoting Moore:  
“Dave Gibbons and I came up with a way to approach superheroes that hasn’t been done 
before,” Alan Moore says [….] Working closely with Dave Gibbons, who will pencil, 
ink, and letter the maxi series, Moore is intending to create a project that will stand apart 
from any other hero comic published today. (“Beyond the Summer”) 
The nameless author of this ad copy frames Moore’s contribution in the Romantic terms of 
authorial agency: intention, creation, and uniqueness. Two decades later, Warner Brothers would 
take a different approach to the authorship of the graphic novel, talking around Moore’s name 
even as they continued to praise the work he had done for DC. As the industry came to use 
authorship in its marketing, they also came to use the new term “graphic novel.” The term 
remains controversial in the comics world, with some writers seeing it primarily as an 
advertising gimmick to lend comics the cachet of a respectable prose form whether or not they 
merit the comparison on the basis of structure (Di Liddo 16-20). Notwithstanding the rhetorical 
functions of the term, it does let us distinguish self-contained story arcs from the open-ended 
serial comics that predominated in the superhero genre, hence my use here.54  
Moore conceived of Watchmen as radically unlike open-ended serial comics, and he saw 
the limited series as a form in which he could do a different kind of work:  
with the advent of the mini-series […] and the direct-sales market, it has become possible 
to create a number of characters that are designed only to exist for the duration of that 
series. It’s a bit like the sort of freedom that all book authors enjoy, you know. There was 
                                                
54 Marketers of graphic novels count on their audience having a short historical memory: the 
English prose novel once faced scorn as an upstart form, published in serial installments, dealing 
with sentimental or lurid matter, and read by the middle and working classes. 
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no call for Charles Dickens to write possible to create a number of characters that are 
designed only to exist for the duration of that series. [emphasis in original] (Moore, 
Interview with Darrel Boatz, 9)55 
Moore invokes the novel here not to claim prestige or specific aesthetic qualities, but to claim an 
autonomy enjoyed by few professional artists working in this medium. Elsewhere in the 
interview, Moore invokes the novel as a sign of certain aesthetic qualities that open-ended serial 
comics lack:  
we’ve tried to sort of bring the sensibilities of a novel to the maxi-series, because the 
maxi-series would seem to me to be the perfect vehicle for the creation of comic book 
novels. […] what we did when we approached Watchmen was to design it as a novel. We 
knew what was in each of the twelve chapters. We knew the various design elements, so 
that we could work upon it as a coherent whole, and just produce it as that. There isn’t 
going to be a sequel to Watchmen. (11) [emphasis in original] 
Moore stresses wholeness, coherence, and creative control, a control that extends to the after-
lives of characters. Moore said in another interview, “it’s got a beginning, a middle and an end… 
complete” (“Watchmen Roundtable…” 31). When he asked for the freedom to kill off the 
Charlton characters in the project that would become Watchmen, DC refused, because allowing 
Moore that freedom would have allowed him to destroy intellectual property that the company 
could otherwise “subsequently exploit” (Hoberek 93). So Moore created new characters, loosely 
modeled on Charlton’s.  
 In their promotion of Watchmen, DC stressed the creators’ individuality and brilliance, 
                                                
55 “Direct sales” refers to the publishers’ sales to specialty comic-book shops, a practice that 
arose in the 1970s in the US. Unlike older protocols, where distributors bundled comics 
haphazardly with other periodicals, direct sales allowed readers reliable access to monthly titles, 
allowing writers to develop more complex serial storylines. 
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not the work’s finite narrative or modernist form. An ad in DC’s Infinity, Inc. #29 advertised 
Watchmen as a “12 issue deluxe series by Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons.” In October 1987, the 
month Watchmen ended, Titan Books released their UK edition of the trade paperback; their 
promotional flyer announces, “the most acclaimed graphic novel of 1987 is here” (reproduced in 
Gibbons, Kidd, and Essl 240). That same month, Moore and Gibbons went on a promotional tour 
of England and Scotland; the tour poster informed fans of the pair “signing copies of the highly 
acclaimed Watchmen graphic novel” (reproduced in Gibbons, Kidd, and Essl 241). When DC’s 
ad for the US edition of the trade paperback appeared in the literary section of the New York 
Times, it invoked the book’s creators but obscured the book’s relationship to monthly comic 
books: 
From Alan Moore, critically acclaimed and bestselling comic book writer of Saga of the 
Swamp Thing, comes an extraordinary graphic novel. Illustrated by Dave Gibbons, 
Watchmen is a visual and lyrical tour de force. “Transcends mere comics—it’s a brilliant 
piece of fiction. What Moore could you ask for?” –Village Voice. 
The text not only stresses Moore’s authorship, but it does so in the terms of literary ad copy, 
using high-toned adjectives like lyrical, a soupçon of French, and a blurb from America’s oldest 
alternative weekly. The ad gives no indication that the book deals with costumed adventurers and 
seems loath to admit that Watchmen consists of comics panels. A general readership did not 
know the term “graphic novel” in 1987; rather than calling Watchmen a comic or reproducing a 
panel showing its characters, the ad coyly calls Moore a “comic book writer.” The blurb’s claim 
that Watchmen “transcends mere comics” praises the book while disparaging its medium, at best 
a halfhearted admission. A reader unfamiliar with the term “graphic novel” could be forgiven for 
failing to infer that Watchmen consists mostly of comic panels and speech balloons, but no one 
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could miss its adulation of Moore or his artistry. 
Despite DC’s rhetoric of individual creativity, their evocation of literary publishing, and 
their use of the creators’ names to promote Watchmen, DC’s dealings with Moore and Gibbons 
actually conformed to the comics industry’s standard practice of treating artists’ creations as 
company property under work-for-hire agreements. DC proposed a contract that sounded 
progressive: DC would own Moore’s new characters only while Watchmen remained in print, but 
after that, ownership would revert to Moore and Gibbons (Johnston). In 1985, Moore joked in an 
interview: “The way it works, if I understand it, is that DC owns it for the time they’re 
publishing it, and then it reverts to Dave and me, so we can make all the money from the Slurpee 
cups” (“Alan Moore on…”). In 2005, Gibbons explained why they accepted the deal. 
In 1987, once a comic book series had run its course, that was pretty much the end of it. 
There might be sporadic foreign editions or reprints in the back of other titles, but even 
series conceived as self-contained stories, such as DC’s Camelot 3000, were thereafter 
unavailable except in the back-issue bins. The notion of collecting just-published material 
and re-marketing it in book form was virtually unknown. (Gibbons, Kidd, and Essl 237) 
However, DC found an expedient that allowed them to keep the rights from reverting to Moore 
and Gibbons: they kept Watchmen in print, and the trade paperback has remained one of the 
Anglophone comics market’s bestsellers ever since. Gibbons speaks diplomatically about his 
dealings with DC, but Moore later said that DC “swindled” them (qtd. in Itzkoff, “The 
Vendetta”).56 In his study of serial characters and unauthorized sequels in 17th and 18th century 
England, David Brewer observes that “the linkages between authorship, ownership, and the 
copyright statutes which now seem so self-evident were at the time both highly contested and 
                                                
56 Moore left DC in 1988, and would later leave WildStorm Comics when DC bought them out. 
See Di Liddo. 
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widely disregarded” (23). Changes to the ways that the comics duopoly negotiated with creators 
in the 1980s led Alan Moore to believe that he would ultimately gain ownership of the 
Watchmen characters in this period of similar flux for the American comics industry.  
The president of DC Comics, Jenette Kahn, had founded Dynamite magazine for 
Scholastic before taking over DC in 1976. A 1985 New York Times profile of Kahn described her 
strategy for DC as twofold. First, because the company wanted licensing revenues, proprietary 
characters would function as a means to that end. Second, to make licensees want to license DC 
characters, those characters had to appear in good stories, so DC would treat artists better in 
order to attract the best artists.  
Kahn, married to Morton J. Fink, “a former president of Warner Home Video,” knew 
well the value of internal markets within Warner Communications Incorporated. As Eileen 
Meehan has argued about WCI,  
their use of the Batman product line to feed its internal markets for media products 
indicates how media conglomerates bring together media industries that were once 
distinct and separate. The interpenetration of the music, film, print, and video industries 
does not arise in response to demand from moviegoers, record buyers, or comics 
subscribers. Rather, this interpenetration is orchestrated by the conglomerate in its search 
for more profitable and cost-efficient ways to manufacture culture. (56) 
The manufacturer creates a commodity, but the marketer creates the conditions for selling that 
commodity. In this case we might think of franchising itself as the commodity that DC wanted to 
create. To create the conditions for selling that commodity, DC courted top talent with promises 
of “more creative control and better financial terms” (Gutis). Such promises brought both Alan 
Moore and Frank Miller to the company. The New York Times profile tells of Kahn leaving 
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Scholastic for DC in search of similar opportunities: “My ideas had made millions for the 
company, but they wouldn’t pay me a fraction of what I was worth” (qtd. in Gutis). William 
Sarnoff, chair of publishing at Warner Communications, Incorporated, had offered Kahn “total 
editorial control” over DC: “‘I always knew that I wanted creative autonomy,’ she said. ‘I had 
confidence in my ability to have good ideas and implement them. I didn’t want to see them be so 
modified by people that I couldn’t recognize them” (Gutis). In light of DC’s treatment of Moore, 
we can see that Kahn objected not to the principle of corporations paying workers less than their 
work’s value to the company, but to corporations paying Jenette Kahn less than her work’s value 
to the company. Kahn, like Moore, aspired to creative autonomy and compensation for her work, 
yet her work required her, within the horizons of DC’s commercial interests and contractual 
practices, to deny both to employees, and to expropriate their creations for company use.   
 
“The Unfilmable Graphic Novel.” 
The Watchmen graphic novel presents an alternate 1985 where Richard Nixon still serves 
as president, the United States creeps toward nuclear war with the Soviet Union, and “costumed 
adventurers” have played key roles in US history since 1938. Only one adventurer has 
superhuman powers; others have talent and motivations ranging from altruism to 
sadomasochism. The plot begins with the murder of an aging “mask”; as other masks investigate, 
they unravel a conspiracy to trick the US and USSR into cooperating against a hoax alien 
invasion. Moore deliberately foregrounds and subverts many conventions of the genre, including 
the most important: the “heroes” fail to stop the “villain,” whose apocalyptic scheme ushers in a 
new era of social relations (or at least seems to). Throughout the book’s narrative of 
investigation, Moore foregrounds difficulties of interpretation by using a narrative form that 
defies linear reading. Moore juxtaposes the multiple registers of word and image available in the 
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comic panel: diegetic images, speech balloons, intradiegetic texts and images, and text insets. 
For example, a boy’s reading of the comic Tales of the Black Freighter becomes a mise en 
abyme, as words and images from the intradiegetic pirate story “Marooned” intrude into the 
diegetic panels such that the text from each register ambiguously applies to both. Often, one or 
more of these registers comments ironically on one or more of the others, though usually the 
reader does not grasp that irony until later in the book. Patterns and meanings emerge from 
relations between panels across the single page, the two-page spread, or throughout the chapter, 
and these relations depend on the reader’s ability to stop and turn back to correlate resemblances 
and recurrences. 
In 1986 Lawrence Gordon, then at 20th Century Fox, bought film rights to Watchmen, but 
production repeatedly stalled. Over the next two decades, Gordon tried to develop the film first 
at Universal, then at Paramount; when his attempt with Paramount failed in June of 2005, 
Gordon began shopping the film around again (Horn). After negotiating with Warner Brothers, 
Gordon finally sold the rights to the studio in December 2005 (Horn). Since Time Warner owned 
both DC and Warner Brothers, the conglomerate had a strong incentive to develop the movie in-
house: between the success of Batman Begins (Christopher Nolan, 2005) and the thriving DVD 
market, Gordon brought “home” the film rights to the property at what must have seemed the 
perfect time.57 Moore has never expressed enthusiasm for film adaptations of his work.58 Instead, 
                                                
57 Legendary Pictures, one of the production companies behind the film, “was organized as a 
vehicle through which hedge funds, such as AIG Direct Investments and Bank of America 
Capital Investors, could sink a half-billion dollars into Warner Bros. movies” (Epstein 112). 
These investors bet on Warners, a proven franchise-maker that seemed to be rising to new 
heights of success with Harry Potter and Batman films.  
58 In contrast, Moore actively collaborated in the adaptation of Watchmen for the DC Heroes 
tabletop role-playing game developed by licensee Mayfair Games during the initial twelve 
months of the graphic novel. Both Moore and Gibbons worked with game designers Dan 
Greenberg and Ray Winninger on two adventure scenarios and a sourcebook, supplying 
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he has repeatedly argued that his work exploits the formal possibilities of comics rather than 
creating narratives designed for export to other media. Despite superficial resemblances between 
the cinematic frame and the comics panel, Moore considers such comparisons limiting: if 
cinematic techniques “are seen as the highest point to which comic art can aspire then the 
medium is condemned forever to be a poor relative of the motion picture industry” (“On 
Writing” 91-92). Instead, Moore argues that comics writers should explore techniques “that we 
can do with our storytelling that cannot be successfully duplicated by other media” (Interview 
with Burbey, 81). On the basis of Moore’s statements about his formal aims, Andrew Hoberek 
characterizes his work in Watchmen and elsewhere as modernist, in Clement Greenberg’s sense: 
an attempt to realize fully the technical potential of the medium and even to draw attention to the 
properties of that medium, rather than to make the medium invisible, as realism attempts (22). 
Later accounts of Watchmen’s trip through Hollywood development hell would reduce Moore’s 
claims about medium specificity and his artistic goals for the book down to one word, 
unfilmable, then use that word to explain the movie’s troubled history. 
Meanwhile, Moore’s relationships with both DC and Hollywood deteriorated. In 1989 
Moore stopped work for DC, in part over what he saw as their disingenuous use of the Watchmen 
contract.59 He subsequently worked for smaller publisher Wildstorm Studios, but in 1998, DC 
bought Wildstorm (Itzkoff, “Vendetta”’). Hollywood released two adaptations of Moore’s work, 
From Hell (Albert Hughes and Allen Hughes, 2001) and The League of Extraordinary 
Gentlemen (Stephen Norrington, 2003), both of which omitted political critiques that oriented 
                                                                                                                                                       
character background, setting details, and artwork. Timothy Callahan describes the Sourcebook 
as resembling “an extended version of the text supplements that end each chapter of Watchmen, 
featuring notes and documents and other ephemera that expand on the stories of all the heroes” 
(143).  
59 In 1988, DC’s star writers, Alan Moore and Frank Miller, both left DC, seeking better 
treatment at independent comics publishers (Lopes 114).  
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their sources. Then, in 2005, Joel Silver falsely claimed that Moore had endorsed the script of V 
for Vendetta (James McTeigue, 2005), which adapted another of Moore’s works that DC still 
owned. When Warner Brothers refused to correct Silver’s claim, Moore quit Wildstorm 
demanding “that his name be removed from the V for Vendetta film” and “from any of his work 
that DC might reprint” (Itzkoff, “Vendetta”). Moore subsequently refused to participate in screen 
adaptations of his work and forbade his name to appear on them (Johnston).  
Time Warner began publicity for a possible Watchmen movie in the 21 October 2005 
issue of subsidiary Entertainment Weekly, where Jeff Jensen proclaimed, “Watchmen is poised to 
reenter the pop consciousness”: “talks are under way to produce a long-in-development movie 
adaptation at Warner Bros” (“An Oral History” 1). Around this simple announcement of a movie 
entering development, Jensen builds an article running over 2,600 words, which also functions as 
a primer on the graphic novel. Jensen likens Watchmen to Citizen Kane, “a masterwork 
representing the apex of artistry” in its medium (1). He praises Moore but omits Moore’s 
troubles with DC, noting vaguely that Moore opposes the adaptation “for artistic, business, and 
personal reasons” (4). Jensen stresses Watchmen’s kinship to DC’s Batman: “For most fans, the 
memory of Watchmen is intertwined with Frank Miller’s watershed Batman saga, The Dark 
Knight Returns, released earlier that year” [i.e. 1986] (3). Jensen also quotes DC editor Len 
Wein, who says that Watchmen and Dark Knight “defined the industry for the next decade” (4). 
It appears that Time Warner now hoped to re-define superhero movies the same way, with a jab-
cross combination of two complementary superhero movie franchises, each using its comic-book 
sources in different ways. Jensen even provides a Watchmen who’s-who that calls the vigilante 
Rorschach the “darkest of dark knights” (5), suggesting that the Watchmen movie will resemble 
Batman Begins, only more so. Jensen turns a minor piece of studio gossip into an occasion to 
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tout movies yet unmade and comics nearly two decades old. As Gray notes, “one of the great 
economic benefits of conglomeration has been the ability to advertise on commonly owned 
channels” (7-8), especially when one of those channels appears to report the news, however 
light. Significantly, Jensen’s article appeared three days after Publishers Weekly (not a Time 
Warner property) announced DC’s plans for an “Absolute” edition of Watchmen, a slipcased 
hardcover retailing for $75 (Wolk). The timing suggests that the talks between rights-holder 
Gordon and Warner Brothers prompted the announcement of Absolute Watchmen, too.  
Warners consolidated the Batman-Watchmen association by releasing the Watchmen 
trailer with The Dark Knight in July of 2008. That trailer promised, “In 2009, everything we 
know will change…. From the visionary director of 300… the most celebrated graphic novel of 
all time: Watchmen.”60 At the time, Christopher Nolan’s turn toward neo-noir had already helped 
Batman compete with Marvel’s Spider-Man and X-Men movie franchises; by the winter of 2008-
2009, many commentators noted that the billion-dollar gross of The Dark Knight foreshadowed 
the public’s willingness to see Watchmen, another grim superhero movie with a long running 
time (Cieply; Horn; Itzkoff, “How Zack Snyder”; Jensen, “Will Anyone”). Watchmen had a 
moderately large budget of $130M, less than those of Batman Begins ($150M), The Dark Knight 
($180M), and Superman Returns ($209M), giving the studio further reason for confidence.61 
Moreover, Time Warner’s ownership of DC and Warner Brothers meant that any new ads for the 
book could cross-promote the movie, and even a movie with weak box office could still cross-
promote the book. 
                                                
60 In contrast with this strategy of foregrounding the film’s source, DC has never foregrounded 
Moore’s unannounced adaptation of the Charlton characters. 
61 All box office figures come from www.BoxOfficeMojo.com. 
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Yet Time Warner’s marketing stressed the riskiness of adapting Watchmen. The 
conglomerate’s subsidiaries took up the word that had emerged in British press accounts of the 
movie’s troubled development: unfilmable. In 2001 the Independent’s David Thompson called 
Watchmen a book “described by [Alan] Moore as ‘unfilmable.’” In April 2005 the Guardian’s 
Steve Rose called Watchmen “judged to be unfilmable by the author himself.” This word became 
de rigueur in reporting on the film. On 17 July 2008 Entertainment Weekly ran an interview with 
Zack Snyder, conducted by Jeff Jensen, which marks the conglomerate’s appropriation of the 
unfilmable tag and the beginning of their Watchmen promotional blitz. Jensen calls the book a 
“cult-pop artifact that many had deemed unfilmable, but Snyder may have proven them wrong” 
(“A Chat” 1). Note the timing of this interview: the following day, 18 July, the Watchmen trailer 
would debut before The Dark Knight, which opened on 9,200 screens in North America, a new 
record (DiOrio). Moreover, Snyder would appear one week later at San Diego Comic-Con 
International, from 24 to 27 July, to tout the Watchmen movie. Jensen therefore asks leading 
questions: 
JENSEN: First 300, now Watchmen—have you always been a comics fan?  
SNYDER: I loved fantasy art—I love Frank Frazetta. […] My mother saw I was into this 
comic called Heavy Metal magazine, so she got me a subscription…. (1) 
JENSEN: Are you nervous about going to Comic-Con this year and appearing before all 
the fans who hold [Watchmen] sacred?  
SNYDER: I’m nervous but really excited. I feel like there has never been a movie more 
custom-made for that crowd. Not at this scale. Comic-Con fans have become the 
gatekeepers of pop culture. (4) 
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Note Snyder’s mingled reverence and caution. His ethical appeal to his Comic-Con audience 
rests first on his 2006 success adapting Frank Miller’s graphic novel of ancient Sparta, 300; 
second on his avowed fondness for “adult” and avant-garde comics like Watchmen and Heavy 
Metal (instead of, say, Justice League); and third on his humility. As Jenkins, Ford, and Green 
note, “Comic Con attracts more than 130,00 active fans each year, many of whom have blogs, 
Twitter accounts, and influential followings on social network sites focusing on popular culture,” 
such that many workers in media franchises “have described their presentations at Comic-Con as 
a cornerstone of their promotional efforts” (143). We can count Snyder among these workers. 
The 25 July 2008 print edition of Entertainment Weekly, on newsstands in time for Comic-Con, 
devoted its cover to Watchmen, calling it “the Riskiest Superhero Movie Ever.” 
In 2008 and 2009 most commentators noted the film’s trip through development hell, and 
many adduce the graphic novel’s sexuality and violence as obstacles to adaptation. Nearly all 
call it “unfilmable.” MTV attributes the term to fans: “fans have wished that someone would 
come along and turn [Watchmen’s] seemingly unfilmable brilliance into a movie” (Carroll). The 
Los Angeles Times and London Observer use the passive voice to turn unfilmable into doxa: 
Watchmen “has been called ‘unfilmable’” (Horn); it “has been billed as ‘unfilmable’ for more 
than 20 years” (Thorpe). Warner Brothers use the tag in their press kit, where passive voice 
conceals Time Warner’s agency as propagator of this meme: “Watchmen has long been 
considered […] unfilmable” (4). Vague grammatical subjects do the same: “‘People always said 
Watchmen was the unfilmable graphic novel,’ says Zack Snyder” (5). The press kit also stresses 
Snyder’s fidelity: “Zack respected the source material so much that he knew the only way to 
adapt it was to hew as close to the source as possible” (4). By early 2009, this narrative became 
the norm: “Dubbed unfilmable until director Zack Snyder came along…” (Hiscock). “Alan 
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Moore believes his Watchmen is unfilmable—and Zack Snyder agrees” (McLean). The hype had 
become contagious, self-propagating.  
Shortly before the 6 March premiere, other Time Warner organs repeated the pressbook’s 
claims. On 25 February, Jeff Jensen, now writing for CNN, another Time Warner subsidiary, 
announces that despite “Watchmen’s rep as the Unfilmable Graphic Novel,” Snyder’s movie 
“faithfully” adapts the book (“Will Anyone”). By capitalizing Unfilmable Graphic Novel, Jensen 
reifies the very tag that he introduced into Time Warner’s promotional discourse back in July 
2008. The following day, Mairi Mackay reports for CNN that Snyder has made “the unfilmable 
film”: “Early reviews […] are overwhelmingly positive. […] Snyder has remained very true to 
the source material—apparently there was a copy of the Watchmen graphic novel sitting on 
Snyder’s monitor during filming which the cast and crew would refer to like a Bible.” With due 
respect to the challenge of aggregating early reviews for a movie, hindsight shows that Mackay 
overstates the “overwhelmingly positive”: RottenTomatoes.com rates Watchmen at 65%, 
Metacritic.com at 56%. Nick Hunt and J. D. Cargill’s stories for CNN, to their credit, point out 
something that most of their colleagues omit: ties between these companies. Cargill notes that 
Time Warner owns CNN and Warner Brothers, and Hunt notes that Time Warner owns CNN 
and DC. However, neither Hunt nor Cargill connects CNN and DC and Warner Brothers. Both 
gesture toward disclosure, but neither fully discloses the conglomerate’s overarching interest in 
the project.  
Cargill and Hunt do both cite Watchmen’s position on Time magazine’s list of the 
hundred greatest novels published since the magazine’s 1923 inception. Compiled by Time editor 
Richard Lacayo with novelist and regular Time contributor Lev Grossman, the list comprises 
Watchmen and ninety-nine prose novels: no short-story cycles, poems, or plays. Time had 
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announced Watchmen’s addition to the list on 16 October 2005, the same week DC announced 
Absolute Watchmen, the same week that Jensen announced the Watchmen movie talks at Warner 
Brothers. Grossman calls Watchmen “cinematic” and writes, “it’s a landmark in the graphic 
novel medium. It would be a masterpiece in any” (“Watchmen” 10). Grossman’s remark that 
Watchmen “would be a masterpiece in any” medium seems a non-sequitur, unless we consider 
the timing of this claim, during negotiations for the film rights, which also explains Grossman’s 
claim that the book has “cinematic” qualities. Grossman’s remarks and their timing suggest that 
Time made its exception for Watchmen as part of a larger strategy to promote not just the book 
but also adaptations of it into other media. Grossman’s past conduct makes his listing of 
Watchmen even more suspect: in the 1990s, he created fake online identities—“sockpuppets”—
to post favorable reviews of his own novel on Amazon.com. In 1999, he admitted using 
sockpuppets without expressing remorse for “the lies” or “the deception” (“Terrors of the 
Amazon”). Even his wording evades responsibility: he doesn’t call them “my lies” or “my 
deception.” At the time of writing, Grossman has not answered my query about his rationale for 
including Watchmen on the list. Yet despite the dubious value and credibility of the books’ 
inclusion on Time’s hundred-novels list, most press reporting about the Watchmen movie cites 
that list as evidence of the book’s greatness and the movie’s ambition. Moreover, of six scholarly 
essays on Watchmen that mention the list, all cite it uncritically as evidence of the book’s stature 
(D. Barnes 51; Davidson 19; Dietrich 137-38; Rehak 155; Wegner; Wood 104), and most do so 
without mentioning Lacayo and Grossman’s agency. None question Grossman’s credibility, 
Time’s conflict of interest, or the oddity of a single comic book on a list of prose novels. On the 
first page of his monograph on Watchmen, Andrew Hoberek does raise the suspicion “that 
Grossman was simply cross-promoting another product in his company’s portfolio” (3), but he 
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pursues it no further, proposing instead to pursue “what we might learn by taking Watchmen’s 
inclusion seriously and treating it as a work of literature” (3-4). Why should we find so 
surprising these less-than-critical citations of Time’s list? Four reasons.  
First, Watchmen itself critiques the shadowy reach of conglomerates through CEO 
Veidt’s use of his company to create a bogus alien monster. He hires geneticists and other 
scientists to construct a telepathic monster, then writers, visual artists, and avant-garde musicians 
to create a plausibly alien cultural context for the decoy. When it dies, it telepathically broadcasts 
this “terrible information”: “Max Shea’s descriptions of an alien world, Hira Manish’s images 
and Linette Paley’s sounds” (ch. 12, p. 10)62. When these workers finish, Veidt uses a network of 
assassins to kill them all, concealing the labor that went into his mediating monster. “No one will 
doubt this Earth has met a force so dreadful it must be repelled, all former enmities aside,” says 
Veidt, confident that the USA and USSR will step back from the brink of nuclear war. However, 
if we think of the monster as a work-for-hire media utterance, then Veidt becomes legible as the 
duplicitous corporate power behind the scenes, exploiting laborers and erasing their credit for his 
own ends. Moreover, the threat of the alien inheres not merely in the “terrible information” it 
carries, but in the threat that it may be the first in an unwanted “franchise” of more alien 
monsters teleporting into Manhattan; since the first monster’s arrival kills millions, nobody 
would want a such a sequel. Andrew Hoberek reads Veidt’s company’s unauthorized use of the 
likenesses of Rorschach and Nite Owl for Minutemen toys as an allegory of “the conflict 
between the work-for-hire creative talent of the comics industry and the corporations which by 
and large controlled and profited from their creations” (81). However, I read Veidt’s exploitation 
of his former colleagues’ likenesses as merely a smaller instance of his larger modus operandi of 
                                                
62 Because the trade paperback lacks continuous pagination, I give both chapter numbers and 
page numbers for citations. 
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claiming ownership (whether in law or in fact) of the aesthetic work of others so that he can use 
that work for his own purposes. His bogus alien instantiates more fully, and on a worldwide 
scale, this pattern of erasure and instrumentalization. 
Second, in the mid 2000s, graphic novels had become a major new publishing market in 
the USA, but not because of superhero comics like Watchmen. Japanese manga brought new 
readers, especially female readers, to the medium; the American comics duopoly of DC and 
Marvel watched as new readers—children, women of all ages, men with no interest in 
superheroes—began to buy comics for the first time. “By 2005,” writes Paul Lopes, “Publishers 
Weekly was touting the unquestionable boom in graphic novels” (160), but this largely bypassed 
the duopoly. Lopes notes that in 2007, “DC announced a new specialty imprint, [170] Minx, 
geared to female readers” (169-70). However, the sluggishness of this response, and the 
company’s continued emphasis on its core demographic of young men, suggest that their strategy 
of curating their high-equity intellectual property left little room for the kind of innovation that 
might create texts appealing to demographics other than the young, white, male reader. In the 
world of direct sales to specialty comic book shops, Lopes argues, gatekeepers “believed, and 
continued to believe, that white fanboys are not interested in any major multicultural 
transformation” (146). Touting Watchmen through a high-prestige platform like Time magazine 
suggests a Time Warner trying to make up for DC’s failures to innovate demographically in the 
2000s by dusting off one of its formal innovations from the 1980s. 
Third, many commentators had already remarked on the Watchmen movie’s role in 
selling merchandise, even before the movie opened. As early as 13 August 2008, the New York 
Times reported that the Watchmen trailer had boosted sales of the trade paperback: “‘from our 
conversations with the book industry people, there has never been a trailer that did this,’ said 
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Paul Levitz, the president and publisher of DC Comics, which has printed 900,000 additional 
paperback copies [...] Last year it sold about 100,000” (Gustines). A week later, EW’s Jeff 
Jensen wrote with candor about the studio’s motives. “Warner sources” said that Watchmen’s 
“above-average potential as an ancillary media cash cow was a big reason why Warner Bros. 
greenlit the picture […] the studio could milk Watchmen for at least three different DVDs: the 
already-announced The Black Freighter companion disc, an animated film based on the graphic 
novel’s comic-within-a-comic; the theatrical version of the film; and possibly a separate 
director’s cut that restores Snyder’s three-hour vision and integrates the Black Freighter story 
into Snyder’s narrative” (“Kevin Smith”). This narrative of exploitation ran counter to the 
narrative of Watchmen’s prestige and unfilmable complexity that Jensen had helped propagate. 
Yet no commentators questioned the coincidence of the movie deal with the book’s appearance 
on Time’s list. In 2005, blogger Ron Hogan questioned Grossman’s motives for canonizing the 
book, but he reported that Grossman denied foreknowledge of DC’s plans to release Absolute 
Watchmen; moreover, Hogan mentioned neither the movie deal nor Grossman’s history of 
dishonesty. By October 2008, Publishers Weekly reported that Watchmen had become “the 
bestselling backlist graphic novel on the planet”: “Over the previous four weeks the title has sold 
more than 70,000 copies” (Reid 16). By March 2009, Watchmen had become the bestselling 
trade paperback of any kind in the United States (Donahue 19).  
Fourth, and finally, Time Warner, in many ways a pioneer of media convergence, had 
previously received criticism for blurring the lines between news and marketing. Unlike previous 
studios that attempted Watchmen adaptations, Warner Brothers belonged to a conglomerate that 
could effectively cross-promote the property by coordinating subsidiaries ranging from DC 
Comics to CNN. As Janet Kolodzy points out, America Online’s 2000 acquisition of Time 
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Warner had made AOL Time Warner “the flashiest and most ambitious example to date of 
economic convergence” (7). Furthermore, the merger “brought another buzzword to the fore, 
‘synergies’” as “AOL Time Warner executives talked about ways to work across the different 
media, taking advantage of all the company’s different properties—online, television, magazines, 
films, and books”(7). Journalists had already criticized Time Warner over its use of Time and 
CNN to cross-promote Eyes Wide Shut (Stanley Kubrick, 1999) (7-8). Other media 
conglomerates received similar criticism for similar cross-promotion between their entertainment 
and news divisions. In 2000, CBS (then a subsidiary of Viacom) had used news programs, 
including The Early Show, “to shill for the network’s prime time ‘reality’ entertainment shows” 
(70), as Lawrence Grossman vividly put it in the Columbia Journalism Review. He also argued 
that CBS News used coverage of hit shows like Survivor to boost the news division’s ratings: 
There’s nothing new about network morning news shows touting prime time 
entertainment fare. But nothing in memory matched CBS News’s promotional blitzkrieg. 
Neither [Early Show executive producer Steve] Friedman nor CBS News’s president, 
Andrew Heyward, seemed at all embarrassed by the extent to which they rode on the 
entertainment division’s coattails. With The Early Show in ratings trouble, Heyward 
called the effort “an experiment well worth taking on.” (70) 
Kolodzy notes that critics argued that this cross-promotion “lowered the acceptable standard for 
the use of news programs to promote entertainment” (8). In 2004, NBC News lowered that 
standard further when Dateline NBC “devoted five hours of programming to the season finale of 
The Apprentice and the series finales of Friends and Frasier” (Kolodzy 8). Tom Shales of The 
Washington Post wrote, 
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NBC had ballyhooed the event [….] Last night’s finale was preceded by weeks of hype 
and, on Wednesday, by a three-hour celebration of the show that included an entire 
edition of NBC’s so-called ‘news’ magazine Dateline […] Katie Couric and Matt Lauer 
supplemented their roles as Today hosts to act as network shills on Dateline, marveling at 
the series and interviewing its stars; Lauer looked spellbound by their every golden word.  
Yet other commentators viewed NBC’s cross promotion between news and entertainment 
divisions as legitimate in a convergent media environment. According to Lawrence Grossman,  
Joseph Angotti, chairman of the broadcast department at Northwestern University’s 
Medill School of Journalism, said five years ago he would have joined the people taking 
shots at NBC News. Not anymore. “The line between news and entertainment is so 
blurred that I don’t think people are concerned whether or not Dateline does a serious, 
tough journalistic story and next week does a little fluffy thing that promotes their own 
network,” said Angotti, a former NBC News executive. “I just don’t think people care 
that much anymore.” 
Time Warner executives did not defend the legitimacy of their cross-promotion of the Watchmen 
franchise by their news divisions because nobody questioned it. This cross-promotion may have 
gone unremarked because Time Warner did a more subtle job or because by 2005, cross-
promotion between a conglomerate’s news and entertainment divisions had simply become the 
new norm for media conglomerates. 
Whether or not Time Warner executives instructed news producers or editors to tout the 
conglomerate’s properties as part of carefully timed marketing strategy, Time Warner reporters 
did exactly that. To assume that these reporters acted under orders may be a case of survivorship 
bias: in a profession made increasingly precarious by the decline of print media, the writers and 
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reporters who get and keep jobs (or freelance work) at conglomerate-owned media outlets may 
be those who say commercially useful things about conglomerate properties at the appropriate 
times without prompting. Those who say problematic things, or who say them at the wrong 
times, may find themselves “filtered” out of a workplace (to borrow Noam Chomsky and 
Edward S. Herman’s term from Manufacturing Consent). Alternately, like the scientists and 
artists that Watchmen’s Adrian Veidt employs to stage his hoax, the reporters who helped cross-
promote this franchise may not have realized the ultimate purpose of their individual utterances. 
Either way, nobody, not even media scholars writing about Watchmen, seemed to notice.  
 
 
“This is Something They Want to Own” 
In 2005, Time Warner had reason to believe Watchmen would prove lucrative on video. 
Between 2003 and 2007, the US media industry underwent what commentators in Billboard, 
Retailing Today, Variety, Video Business, and the Wall Street Journal called a “DVD boom.” 
According to Thomas Schatz,  
The main reasons for the success of this new digital format were, first, the unprecedented 
alliance between the Hollywood film industry and two adjacent industries, personal 
computers and consumer electronics; and second, the decision to abandon the VHS-era 
rental model in favor of a conglomerate-controlled “sell-through” strategy that returned a 
far greater portion of home-video revenues to the studios. (22) 
As consumers embraced the platform, home video retail sales eclipsed rental. Studios with home 
video units, such as Warner Brothers, profited greatly for two reasons: most video “revenues are 
shielded from participations and kept captive,” and “the video division is not directly responsible 
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for production costs” (Ulin 212). Fifty percent or less of a movie’s box office returned to the 
studio, but sixty percent or more of a movie’s DVD revenue returned to the home-video unit. 
Furthermore, during the boom, DVD retail became the “the largest source of consumer spending 
on filmed entertainment across all distribution channels” (McDonald 150-51). By 2007, theatrical 
exhibition supplied only 21.4% of Hollywood’s revenues, while home video supplied 48.7% 
(Ulin 161). 
Hence, potential DVD sales drove blockbuster filmmaking during these years. As early as 
2003, MGM executive Chris McGuirk called DVD “the primary market in determining whether 
to green light a movie or not” (qtd. in Kirkpatrick). Studios greenlit otherwise risky projects by 
using projected DVD profits as a “safety net” (Goldstein ). Affluent young men adopted DVD 
early, and they bought action movies; furthermore, because a sequel boosted sales of its 
predecessor’s DVD, studios made more sequels (Kirkpatrick). This explains the “trend among 
the highest selling titles” toward “fantasy-adventure franchises” (McDonald 150). However, to 
keep DVD profits shielded, studios became more secretive about those profits (Goldstein). 
Mainstream discussion continued to focus on Hollywood’s theatrical revenues, since the major 
studios continued to report those figures to the press. While media corporations have many 
reasons for secrecy regarding their activities, the DVD boom paradoxically increased secrecy 
about their most profitable sector. When the DVD market began to contract in 2008, this secrecy 
left the public largely unaware of the major studios’ panic. Box office figures grew while 
bottom-line profits shrank. 
Warner Brothers greenlit Watchmen at the height of the DVD boom. “Depending on 
whose statistics one believes,” writes Jeff Ulin, the boom “peaked somewhere between 2004–
2006” (188). They could not know in 2005 that by the time they released their Watchmen videos, 
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DVD sales would have begun to free-fall. If anything, Warners demonstrated their typical 
confidence in the platform. After all, in the 1990s, “Warners invested in a DVD authoring and 
replication facility, and simply believed that the DVD was such a superior technology that it was 
inevitable consumers would adopt the platform […] industry people acknowledge Warners’ 
leadership position as the catalyst for the transition to DVD” (Ulin 178-79). In the late 1990s 
Warner Brothers had led the majors into the DVD rental market; Wal-Mart took on Warner 
Home Video as its “category captain,” an arrangement that gave Warner Brothers “access to 
confidential sales data from Wal-Mart in order to advise the chain on the types of product to 
stock” and afforded Warner “privileged information on a large segment of the sell-through 
market” (McDonald 160). To better supply these external markets, in 2006, Warner Brothers 
launched Warner Premiere, a direct-to-video production unit (“Scene & Noted”). Unit president 
Diane Nelson described her mission as “finding projects that have a pre-existing equity […] 
targeted in audience or genre, so that we are able to efficiently let our audience know this is 
something they want to own” (qtd. in Ault). Amanda Ann Klein notes that the relatively low cost 
of direct-to-video production means “releases can afford to limit their audiences,” and thus can 
“cater to a specific demographic” (183); direct-to-video units bring niche audiences “product not 
supplied by mainstream theatrical releases” (180). A home video unit and a theatrical movie 
studio thus complement each other: the studio makes the blockbuster, while the home video unit 
makes videos for segments of that blockbuster’s audience. Warner Brothers bet on Watchmen’s 
mass appeal (the graphic novel’s fame, the unfilmable hype, association with Batman) while 
Warner Premiere bet on Watchmen’s cult appeal. 
In light of this exploitation strategy, Warner Brothers’ choice of Zack Snyder to direct 
Watchmen begins to makes sense. Snyder had directed only two features, Dawn of the Dead 
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(2004) and 300 (2007), commercial successes that had attracted little critical praise. At the 2008 
Comic-Con, Snyder explained how he came to Watchmen: 
I got a call from Warner Brothers, that they wanted to ask me if I’d be interested in 
making this into a movie, and I said, “Yeah, it’s [shakes head] seems like a crazy idea.” 
But I think that—you know, once they asked me, I kind of felt like—responsible. Even if 
I said no, they would have moved on, and then whatever happened to the movie, I still 
would have had my chance, and if I blew it—if the movie, for whatever reason, didn’t 
turn out, I would have—it’s still my fault. So I figured I might as well make it my fault, 
anyway. And so then we started working on it. It’s been, for me anyway, a labor of love 
to try and get as much of the graphic novel into this movie as I could. 
This account would not stop Time Warner from constructing an image of Snyder as a driven 
Watchmen fanatic. The press kit says, “Snyder, while still in production on what would become 
the blockbuster 300, expressed to the producers his affinity for the graphic novel and desire to 
direct it” (4). This sounds true, insofar as reluctantly accepting an unsolicited job offer counts as 
expressing “desire.” 
Entertainment Weekly and CNN both presented Snyder as a fanboy, appealing to fans of 
the comic in two ways. First, the narrative of Snyder moving from consumption to production 
gave the movie the air of what Jenkins calls participatory culture, where the traditional 
consumer-producer dichotomy of mass culture blurs (3). Second, identification with Snyder 
inclined fans toward forgiveness, and toward purchases of expanded, DVD-only versions of the 
movie if the theatrical cut didn’t live up to their expectations. EW’s Jensen coaxes answers from 
Snyder toward these ends: 
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 JENSEN: Watchmen was published in comic-book form in 1986—but you discovered it 
in its graphic novel a few years later when you were in college, right? [sic] 
SNYDER: I had seen it in the store when it first came out as a comic, but I never got the 
first issue, and I couldn’t get into it at the middle; I felt like I missed it a little bit.  
JENSEN: When you finally read it, what did you think? 
SNYDER: Watchmen is like the music you feel is written just for you. (“A Chat” 1-2) 
Watchmen’s press kit extends Snyder’s ethic of fidelity to the cast and crew, whose goal 
becomes “to create an experience true to the feeling of the graphic novel”(11). Actor Carla 
Gugino uses the rhetoric of comic-book heroism: “There was a great amount of responsibility to 
do it justice” (6). Watchmen penciller Dave Gibbons compliments Snyder’s “attention to detail”: 
“thought had been given to every little corner, even things I had stuck in the artwork that I hadn’t 
given a second thought to” (16). The precision of Gibbons’s illustrations helped Watchmen 
achieve the formal density that has made it subject to praise and scholarship; for example, 
Gibbons maintains strict spatial continuity in his drawings of the fictional Manhattan intersection 
where much of the action takes place, such that readers can construct a map not just of the 
intersection but of the major buildings surrounding it. Gibbons therefore offers high praise when 
he suggests that the filmmakers have transcended even his attention to detail. The press kit’s 
quotation of Gibbons instantiates Gray’s claim about making-of paratexts: they “surround the 
text with aura, and insist on its uniqueness, value, and authenticity in an otherwise standardized 
media environment” (Gray 82). The press kit offers Snyder’s production not as something 
derivative but as a new source of authenticity. 
In early 2009, Snyder said of Watchmen, “if we help sell 2m more copies of the book by 
the time the film comes out, I’ve pretty much done my job” (qtd. in McLean). We can best 
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understand Snyder’s “job” in Hollywood as the advertising his clients’ brands. Of Snyder’s 
filmography, only the commercially weak, critically reviled Sucker Punch (2011) (which he co-
wrote) neither remade an earlier film nor adapted a print text. We might think of him as a 
director of TV commercials who graduated to directing the most lavish commercials of all: 
Hollywood franchise blockbusters. Snyder began in advertising, where his commercials for 
brands like Budweiser, Jeep, Sega, and UPS shortlisted him for five Clio Awards and won him a 
Bronze (“Clio Archive”). The trailer for 300 served as a potent ad not only for the movie, but 
also for the book, prompting 40,000 orders in one month for a title that had sold only 88,000 
copies in the preceding seven years (“Sales of Frank Miller’s 300”). Snyder’s glossy mise en 
scène and heavy use of slow motion and speed-ramping have more in common with car 
commercials than with the violent melodramas of Sam Peckinpah or John Woo, despite their 
superficial resemblances of technique. Snyder’s style resembles the high-contrast, visually iconic 
style of directors like Adrian Lyne, Ridley Scott, and Tony Scott, who also began in advertising 
and who perfected in the 1980s the ancillary-driven “high concept” visual and marketing style 
that Justin Wyatt analyzes (24-26). Snyder does not meet Truffaut’s definition of an auteur, since 
commercial rather than aesthetic or political imperatives shape his successful movies; however, 
viewed as an adman or metteur en scène, Snyder’s career seems a great success.  
 
“With a Minimum of Publicity” 
David Hayter and Alex Tse’s script for Watchmen keeps many elements from the book, 
including sex and violence that Snyder elaborates and emphasizes, earning the movie an R 
rating, making it an outlier in the superhero genre. However, the script kept film at a length that 
multiplexes could screen multiple times per auditorium per day, a prerequisite for theatrical 
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distribution. Although Moore and Gibbons do not own Watchmen, they do own their names, and 
therefore Moore’s demand that Warner Brothers not use his name had legal force, and Moore 
thereby denied the studio one of the film industry’s traditional means of cultivating artistic aura 
for literary adaptations: attaching to the movie the name of the author of the source text. Warner 
Brothers therefore resorted to other rhetorical means to construct the authenticity and merit of 
their Watchmen movie. For example, Snyder’s elaborations of the book’s sex and violence 
function as arguments for the movie’s authenticity, evidence that rather than toning things down 
in order to earn the movie a PG rating and a wider audience, the filmmakers disdained such 
calculations, and instead amplified the censorable elements. 
The movie uses traditional editing and mise en scène, with no titles to suggest the book’s 
chapters and no split-screen compositions to evoke comic-book panels. It quotes visual motifs 
from the book but eliminates the symmetries that organize its chapters, simplifying both story 
(fabula) and plot (syuzhet). For example, the graphic novel’s first two pages present three 
intertwined narrative registers: captions of narration from Rorschach’s journal, two detectives’ 
conversation at a murder scene, and flashbacks to the murder. The movie separates these three 
registers and re-plots the story, presenting first the murder, then the detectives, and finally 
Rorschach coming to investigate (while narrating in voice-over). Changes like this serve not only 
to make the film more accessible to viewers who haven’t read the book, but also to de-
familiarize the story for viewers who have read the book. These revisions of the book’s narrative 
therefore generate surprises even for viewers in the know. However, some of the film’s changes 
appear motivated not by the imperative to surprise audiences, or to shorten a hefty book’s story 
for theatrical adaptation, but by political and economic factors. As an example, I will compare 
the two versions of the Comedian’s sexual assault on the Silk Spectre. 
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 The book’s second chapter introduces Sally Jupiter, age 65, who once fought crime as the 
Silk Spectre, in a costume more showgirl than vigilante: fishnets, halter-top, one garter, and one 
opera glove, as if she had been caught while removing an already-revealing costume.63 In 1939 
Sally’s manager helped her parlay this image into a modeling career, and he also organized a 
group of masked adventurers, the Minutemen, as a marketing gimmick (ch. 1 epilogue, p. 8-9). 
Sally has retired and now surrounds herself with memorabilia from her Silk Spectre days. When 
her daughter, Laurie, visits, Sally shows her a gift from a fan: a Tijuana bible starring the Silk 
Spectre. Despite making a living from her image, Sally finds the unlicensed pornographic comic 
book “flattering,” but Laurie finds it “gross” (ch. 2, p. 4). Their disagreement leads to Sally’s 
flashback to 1940, in which another of the Minutemen, the Comedian (Edward Blake) sexually 
assaulted her. 
After the Minutemen pose for a group photo, Sally complains of spots in her eyes. Eddie, 
touching her cheek, offers to “fish ’em out,” but Sally pushes him away, saying “Eddie! Give me 
a break” (5) suggesting that Eddie has made such advances before. Sally crosses her arms and 
turns her back to Eddie, then announces that she will join the group as soon as she changes 
outfits. In a double-width panel at the bottom of the right-hand page (Figure 1), we see Sally in 
her underwear, but neither her posture nor the composition suggests eroticism. A speech 
balloon—“Hi.”—intrudes into the panel, signaling the presence of a voyeur (5). When we turn 
the page, we see that Eddie has crept into the room to watch Sally change. “You gotta have some 
reason for wearin’ an outfit like this,” he says (6). Sally’s reason, the book makes clear later, has 
always been money: she prefers to work as an adventurer and model than to work as she did 
                                                
63 This costume reads as a critique of the pulp and comics industries use of so-called Good Girl 
Art, which exposes and sexualizes the female body for an assumed male gaze. However, 
Gibbons’s renderings of the Silk Spectre also instantiate this same exposure and sexualization, 
complicating any attempt to read the book’s depiction of female superheroes as feminist.  
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before, as a waitress or as a “burlesque dancer” (ch. 9 epilogue, p. 1). Sally covers herself with 
her halter top, but Eddie grabs her, refusing to take her “no” for an answer: “No. Spelled Y-, E-
…” (ch. 2, p. 6). Sally fights back, scratching Eddie’s face; Eddie beats her, then prepares to rape 
her, when another of the Minutemen intervenes. 
The movie presents a different Sally. Where the book’s Sally takes ginseng and vitamins 
(ch. 8, p. 2), the movie’s drinks margaritas at two o’clock in the afternoon, and where the book’s 
Sally disapproves of Laurie’s smoking (ch. 2, p. 2.), the movie’s Laurie disapproves of Sally’s 
midday drinking. Sally and Laurie still disagree over the Tijuana bible, but Snyder’s version 
shows explicit drawings of penetration that Moore and Gibbons only suggest. Snyder renders the 
flashback to 1940 in sepia tones, Hollywood shorthand for a nostalgic view of decades past; in 
contrast, the book uses the same color palette for both eras.64 After the group photo, we see 
Eddie say something to Sally, as non-diegetic music fills the soundtrack, and we see Sally mouth 
only his name, in coquettish refusal. This Eddie does not touch Sally’s face, and she does not 
turn away with arms crossed in disapproval. The film’s Sally does not announce that she will 
change before joining the group, but merely says, with a smile—and to Eddie alone—“Go ahead. 
I’ll be there in five.” Compared to the graphic novel’s Sally, the movie’s Sally sends Eddie and 
the audience what a rape apologist would interpret as “mixed messages.”  
Snyder films Sally’s undressing as a striptease, anatomizing her with close-ups (Figure 
2). She drops her halter-top around her ankles (Figure 3) and begins to unclasp her stockings; her 
                                                
64 Moore’s book critiques nostalgia as a tool of both marketing and ideology, in that Veidt’s 
corporation sells a ubiquitous perfume called Nostalgia. Snyder’s film uses nostalgia as a 
marketing tool, in everything from its addition of FM-radio standards instead of Moore’s less 
familiar song selections (e.g. deep cuts from Iggy Pop albums) to its re-imagining the Gunga 
Diner not as Moore’s grotty fast-food parlor but a “retro” diner with table service and metal 
cutlery.  
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thighs fill the screen until the camera pans to show Eddie watching (Figure 4). For viewers who 
have read the book, Snyder’s version surprises with new and unexpected views of Sally and her 
underwear, which differs from that in the book. However, Moore’s critique of the ways that 
patriarchy in general and male comics artists in particular treat women as sexual objects 
becomes, in the film, a textbook example of the male gaze. This version of Sally does not cover 
herself when she notices Eddie, though she does verbally refuse his advance. When the film’s 
Eddie persists, Sally punches him (another potentially surprising deviation from the book), but 
he still retaliates by beating her. Then, from 37:37 to 37:41, we see the bustiere-clad Sally face 
down, her head outside the frame. As Eddie runs a hand down her back (Figure 5), Sally gasps 
for breath. Unlike the analogous composition in the comic (Figure 6), we do not see Sally’s 
bloodied, weeping face, and she does not plead for Eddie to stop, so that in Snyder’s 
composition—especially if viewed out of context—Sally’s heavy breathing suggests arousal 
rather than pain or shock. Moore and Gibbons render this moment as one of brutality and 
desperation, but the film version renders it like soft-core porn. 
 The book explains Sally’s costume as an escape from low-paying work, but the movie 
offers no explanation. Only in the direct-to-video Under the Hood do viewers learn Sally’s 
reason for adopting the Silk Spectre persona: she liked “the idea of doing something that was out 
of the normal.” The movie franchise thus offers a classically sexist extenuation of the 
Comedian’s assault on the basis of the willfully provocative quality of Sally’s costume coupled 
with her “invitation” to Eddie alone. Moore’s critique of comics’ pandering to heterosexual male 
fantasies about available female bodies disappears. Some might object that this graphic novel 
engages in the same sexual objectification of women that it critiques; after all, most of the book’s 
named female characters—Laurie Juspeczyk, Janey Slater, Sylvia Kovacs, Gloria Long—appear 
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in sexual situations while partially or entirely undressed, and only the lesbian couple Aline and 
Joey appear fully clothed at all times. In contrast, most of the book’s named male characters 
never appear nude or in sexual situations. Moore’s comic passes the Bechdel Test by the thinnest 
of margins, and not until Aline and Joey’s quarrel in chapter eleven (p. 9). However, the movie 
fails the Bechdel Test: every cut eliminates Joey and Aline’s quarrel. Even if the book sexually 
objectifies women, it still critiques their limited economic opportunities: when an interviewer 
asks Sally why she pressured her daughter into becoming a costumed adventurer. Sally angrily 
replies, “What else would she have done? Been a housewife? Got a job in a bank?” (ch. 8 
epilogue, p. 22) The film eliminates this. Lopes argues that DC and Marvel long ago “abandoned 
any thought of publishing mainstream comic books for female readers” (137), instead doubling 
down on their address to young men. The film’s excription of the book’s more feminist elements 
suggests an impulse (or reflex) at Time Warner to cater primarily young men in the new 
Watchmen transmedia franchise as well.  
The filmmakers may have had disinterested artistic motives to extenuate the Comedian’s 
assault—inasmuch as men’s apologia for rape can be disinterested—but it seems likely that 
economics shaped their portrayal. Licensed Comedian merchandise includes T-shirts ($15.95), 
toys ($32.99), iPhone cases ($34.95), Halloween costumes ($52), and Before Watchmen: 
Comedian spin-off comics ($3.95).65 A movie that presented the Comedian as a predator 
motivated by a sense of sexual entitlement, as he appears in the graphic novel, might move less 
merchandise than a movie that presented him as the product of a sepia-toned pre-feminist past 
who got rough with a dame that he thought was “asking for it.” Jenkins, Ford, and Green note 
                                                
65 DC released eight different Before Watchmen limited series in 2012. Moore and Gibbons took 
no part; some high-profile comics creators decried the move as exploitative. On the boycott, see 
Flanagan. 
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that producers appeal to male fans with texts that “reward historically ‘masculine’ interests […] 
while marginalizing historically ‘feminine’ interests” (151). The movie revises Eddie’s assault to 
make it play not only for feminist newcomers to the story, who will still recognize Eddie’s 
actions as attempted rape, but also for rape apologists, who have better grounds in the film than 
in the book to sympathize with Eddie’s sense of being “led on.” Strategic ambiguity serves the 
brand by reducing the possibility of alienating viewers. 
Moreover, the movie eliminates the book’s critique of rape culture. In the book, Sally’s 
manager convinces her “not to press charges against the Comedian for the good of the 
[Minutemen’s] image”; the Comedian then leaves the team “with a minimum of publicity” (ch. 2 
epilogue, p. 10). The assault only becomes public decades later, after another of the Minutemen 
publishes his memoir, Under the Hood. The Watchmen movie, in all its various cuts and direct to 
video spin-offs, eliminates this cover-up: we never learn the circumstances of the Comedian’s 
departure from the Minutemen. Even Matthies’s direct-to-video Under the Hood, based 
primarily on the intradiegetic memoir from the prose epilogues, omits the cover-up.66 Like 
Sally’s manager, the filmmakers protect their brand, covering up Alan Moore’s critique of rape 
culture, a critique that the ancillary-hungry demographic of young males might have regarded as 
too “feminine” or even taken personally as a reproach against the various forms of rape culture 
that they inhabit. While I would not claim that an adaptation’s merit or interest to scholars 
depends upon its fidelity to its source, it remains productive to ask, “How does Departure X from 
the source function in its new context?” In this case, the departure makes the adaptation 
friendlier to the comics duopoly and the DVD industry’s target demographic at the expense of 
                                                
66 In Matthies’s video, Sally’s manager mentions the assault only to deny that it happened. The 
video (unlike the book) never confirms the untruth of the brand-manager’s denial, leaving open 
the possibility that Sally’s manager simply doesn’t know the truth. 
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the most progressive elements of the book’s gender politics. James Reynolds discusses the de 
facto censorship of the political content of V for Vendetta, arguing that when a text challenges 
hegemony, then “disavowal” of that challenge in the film adaptation “ensures the widest possible 
audience, and therefore, the highest return” (131). I stand with Reynolds on this: scholars can 
make tactical use of fidelity “recognize the ideological exchanges taking place” in commercial 
adaptations (132). Commentators who thought Watchmen unfilmable because of its sex and 
violence, or who saw Snyder’s film as “faithful” for including them, miss the point of a critique 
of the Watchmen media franchise as brand-building: depiction of sex or violence per se carries 
no risk, but a critique of rape culture does, because rapists and rape apologists watch superhero 
movies and buy ancillary merchandise. 
 
“Making Watchmen a Movie Experience” 
Reviewers of the movie used the terms that the conglomerate gave them but not 
necessarily in ways that furthered the conglomerate’s interests. Many hurl back the marketing’s 
claims of fidelity, notwithstanding the film’s revisions of the book: “Watchmen’s biggest 
problem, ironically, is that it’s too faithful” (Glaze). Newsweek says the movie “takes loyalty to 
new limits. And that’s exactly what’s wrong with it” (Gordon). Many call Snyder’s fidelity 
“slavish” (Chang 1; Charity; Stevens; Westhoff). The Champaign-Urbana News Gazette calls 
Snyder “crippled by his own insistence to duplicate the look and feel of the book” (Koplinsky). 
Time Warner sold the movie on Snyder’s fidelity, but the reviews confirm George Bluestone’s 
1957 observation: “Whenever a film becomes a financial or even a critical success, the question 
of ‘faithfulness’ is given hardly any thought” (114). The marketing may have worked too hard to 
court perceived fans of the comic. Mistaking “the desires of this particularly involved segment 
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for those of their potential overall audience” can doom a blockbuster adaptation (Jenkins, Ford, 
and Green 146).67 The improbability of all those movie reviewers reading the 300+ page graphic 
novel for the sake of reviewing an R-rated superhero movie with a March opening suggests that 
many, even most who decried the film’s excessive fidelity simply threw Warner Brothers’ own 
marketing back at them.   
Scholars who have discussed the film have done so in terms of its adaptation of the 
graphic novel. Hoberek remarks on the film’s untanglings of the book’s multi-track narrative, 
which result in “precisely the boilerplate superhero story that Watchmen seeks to complicate” 
(68). Jared Gardner analyzes the film’s focus on the detection narrative over the book’s complex 
form. Against the studio’s claims about the difficulty of making the film, Garner remarks, “Aside 
from special effects and some remarkable digital design work, the film we saw in theaters could 
have been made in 1986” (188) [his emphasis]. Gardner does situate the film in the context of a 
larger marketing plan, in which “the filmmakers from the start did not conceive of the theatrical 
release as their primary text” (188); however, he does not examine that larger Watchmen 
transmedia franchise and its marketing. Liam Burke contrasts the marketing of Watchmen with 
that of 20th Century Fox’s adaptation of Alan Moore and Kevin O’Neill’s League of 
Extraordinary Gentlemen (Stephen Norrington, 2003): “Unlike The League, fidelity was 
fetishized at each turn in the production and promotion of Watchmen” (122). Bob Rehak argues 
that the movie “embodied the many paradoxes of contemporary blockbuster film production, so 
capable of outré visualization yet so constrained in its operations” (“Adapting” 158). Elsewhere, 
Rehak calls the film fanservice with a $120 million budget” (“Stuck”). Anime fans use the term 
fanservice to refer to media creators’ gratuitous attempts to please their imagined core audience, 
                                                
67 I also wonder how many, and how many simply threw Warner Brothers’ own marketing back 
at them on the basis of the press kit.  
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especially at the expense of narrative momentum and plausibility; I would therefore disagree 
with Rehak’s characterization, in that I read Watchmen not as an attempt to serve fans but to 
create new fans on behalf of an intellectual property holder by expanding that property beyond 
its original medium and into new ones. We could more accurately describe the film as 
brandservice, an attempt to please investors and shareholders by recruiting new audiences to buy 
Watchmen commodities in other media and for other platforms. 
Watchmen made $55.2M during its US opening weekend, then “plummeted 67 percent in 
its second” (B. Barnes). The US run grossed $107.5M, though overseas exhibition brought 
another $77.7M. Both Entertainment Weekly and Time reviewed the film safely after its opening 
weekend, and their reviews sound like aggregates of earlier reviews. Time’s Richard Corliss 
complains about “tone-deaf acting” and characters “tepidly drawn and wanly performed,” but he 
praises the book: “in 2005, Time cited it as one of the 100 best novels [….] The story is also 
available on DVD in ‘moving comic’ form—very limited animation of the drawings, with a 
narrator reading the text—that runs about twice the length of the 2-hr. 40-min. Snyder version.” 
Despite slagging the film, Corliss dutifully name-drops versions of “the story” in other media; he 
also directs us to Lev Grossman’s review of the film in the same issue. Grossman says little 
except to dismiss the movie as “an homage to the original or perhaps an advertisement for it, but 
nothing more” (“A Fan’s Notes”). Some might object that Grossman’s dismissal of the film 
renders improbable his knowing participation in any marketing strategy by Time Warner; after 
all, if he aimed promote the Watchmen brand, why damn the film with faint praise? I would 
respond that Grossman’s canonization of Watchmen by means of Time magazine’s hundred-
novels list had far more influence than any single reviewer’s praise of the movie could have had, 
since the great majority of news writing about the film, both before and after its release, cited 
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that list. Most of Grossman’s full-length reviews for Time review books; his film reviews usually 
consist of 50- to 100-word capsules in his “Five Things you Should Know About” media 
roundups. Grossman’s position at a prestigious news magazine gave him power as shaper of 
literary taste, and his review of the Watchmen graphic novel performed significant cultural work. 
In contrast, his review of the film, especially a week after its premiere, had little power to shape 
the fortunes of the franchise. 
Meanwhile, Warner Premiere had developed Watchmen home videos. As producer 
Deborah Snyder, wife of director Zack Snyder, explains in the press kit, Watchmen  
has always been more than the sum of its parts. There were aspects we knew we couldn’t 
include entirely—like Under the Hood […] and Tales of the Black Freighter—but we 
knew we could do something with these ancillary bits on the DVD. For Zack, the key for 
doing this massive project was to always stay true to the graphic novel. (4-5) 
Deborah Snyder works backwards from the franchise’s planned product line to a reading of the 
source text, such that integral parts of the book become “ancillary.” Her claim about Watchmen 
being “more than the sum of its parts” pays lip service to the idea of the book as a self-contained 
aesthetic whole, but her implication that parts can be excised and re-packaged undercuts that 
idea. Warner Premiere released five different Watchmen home videos in 2009, and although 
most viewers of the movie would buy none, some viewers would probably buy all because of 
their loyalty to the emerging Watchmen brand. Warner Premiere targeted that minority.  
The two-disc Watchmen: The Complete Motion Comic appeared 3 March 2009, before 
the film’s debut. The Motion Comic digitally animates the book: characters move like cutouts, 
and speech balloons appear as a male actor reads them all (male and female) in character. The 
DVD case declares, “Dave Gibbons oversees this digital version.” The Motion Comic thus bears 
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the imprimatur of the original penciller, in what Gray would call an attempt to “add context, 
‘tradition,’ and ‘presence,’ and thereby increase aura” (97). Alan Moore, the book’s much more 
famous “co-creator,” remains unmentionable, so Warner Premiere works with the name that they 
can mention. A resistant spectator might note that although the Motion Comic runs 325 minutes, 
it falls short of adapting the entire book: while the case claims, “The entire Watchmen graphic 
novel comes to life,” the Complete Motion Comic cuts about half of the dialogue and all 46 pages 
of prose epilogues. Notwithstanding the complete of the title, this version makes significant 
elisions of both plot and story. 
Watchmen: Tales of the Black Freighter appeared on 24 March, while Watchmen still 
screened in theaters. The eponymous 25-minute video renders the book’s intradiegetic pirate 
comic as an animated cartoon; on the same disc appears Under the Hood, a live-action pseudo-
documentary based on the book’s prose epilogues. The DVD’s case calls both “fan-essential 
stories.” Special features include a featurette, “Story within a Story: The Books of Watchmen,” 
in which executive producer Lloyd Levin explains: “the graphic novel is always going to be 
there […] the supporting material, as a Black Freighter anime, or an Under the Hood 
documentary, finds the perfect tone for making Watchmen a movie experience” [sic]. Levin, like 
Deborah Snyder, treats integral parts of the book as “supporting material,” parts of an 
“experience” comprising the theatrical version as just one component. In the same featurette, DC 
executive Gregory Noveck explains the interplay between the feature and the home videos: 
you go and see the Watchmen movie, and then you go get Under the Hood and the Black 
Freighter […] then you go back and look at the movie again, and then something you see 
in the movie tells you, “Oh, I better look at Black Freighter again,” then that’s exactly 
how the guys wanted you to experience the comic book in the first place. 
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Like the press kit, both Lloyd Levin and Gregory Noveck use the word experience to name their 
elusive goal for this constellation of media texts. As Lash and Lury note, brands attain what 
Baudrillard calls “sign-value,” the ability to signify certain kinds of feelings; moreover, “Sign-
value and the brand are not qualities of products: they are qualities of experience” (7). That 
experience lies beyond any mere commodity, though commodities seem to constitute necessary 
conditions for reaching it, at least in the telling of the brand’s managers. Noveck accurately 
describes the “experience” of non-linear reading necessary to make sense of the Watchmen 
graphic novel. However, that book, despite its serial release in twelve monthly issues, required 
no ancillary purchases; the Watchmen “movie experience” does. Although Moore and Gibbons 
fill their book with allusions to other texts, including comics, they conceived of the book as a 
self-contained whole. Authorial intentions hold little significance in themselves; after all, many 
of the most interesting adaptations flout authorial intentions. However, Noveck invokes authorial 
intentions as a way of framing commodities produced against the principal author’s wishes, 
production made possible only by DC Comics’ strategic withholding of the rights to autonomy 
and ownership that they had promised to that author.  
In another DVD featurette, “Phenomenon: the Comic that Changed Comics,” former DC 
chief Jenette Kahn presents the company’s work as driven by aesthetic and ethical concerns. 
“We really felt very strongly that the medium allowed for the most sophisticated stories,” she 
says, “the most offbeat stories, the most independent stories.” One can only guess what 
independent might mean in this context; Kahn cannot mean independent comics magazines like 
Taboo or the independent comics companies like Wildstorm where Alan Moore took work after 
leaving DC in 1988. This video makes one of DC’s few acknowledgments in their marketing of 
the origin of Moore’s characters as off-brand re-workings of Charlton characters. Kahn calls 
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those characters “the inspiration originally, but Watchmen became a thing of its own.” Kahn 
writes Moore out of this process, turning Watchmen into a generative force, a brand as a source 
of production (in Lash and Lury’s terms). Moreover, against Kahn’s claim, Watchmen became a 
thing not of “its” own but of DC Comics’ own, as the company turned Moore’s off-brand 
characters into a new range brand within the larger DC corporate brand. “Watchmen itself is sui 
generis,” says Kahn. “People look to it then and look to it now as something that really heralds 
all the possibilities of creating a work of art in comic book pages.” This essentially paraphrases 
Moore’s stated artistic goals for the book, goals for which Kahn now vaguely gives DC credit. 
Nowhere in “Phenomenon” does Kahn mention licensing or franchising, or her strategy in the 
1970s and 1980s of turning DC into a “creative rights company” (qtd. in Gutis). That strategy 
worked: as early as 1985, DC took in “about a third of its approximately $70 million in revenues 
from comics, with the other two-thirds fairly equally split between licensing and other products” 
(Gutis). Lawrence Gordon’s return of the Watchmen film rights to Warner Brothers in 2005 
vindicated Kahn’s strategy two decades after DC agreed to let Moore do the book, although that 
return meant that one Time Warner subsidiary (Warner Brothers) had to buy back intellectual 
property that another (DC Comics) had previously sold. 
On 21 July, Warner Home Video released the theatrical cut of Watchmen (running 162 
minutes) as well as a director’s cut (186 minutes) that included additional live-action scenes; 
then, on 10 November, they released Watchmen: The Ultimate Cut in a five-disc, boxed set 
subtitled “The Complete Story.” This version interpolated the animated Tales of the Black 
Freighter into the director’s cut, running 215 minutes. The set also included a disc of bonus 
features, a “digital copy” of the theatrical cut (i.e. a time-sensitive code allowing the buyer to 
download a copy of movie), and the Complete Motion Comic. As Gray writes of directors’ cuts 
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on home video, “Such is the success of DVDs in creating authenticity that they are regularly 
regarded as containing the true version of the film […] the real work of art’ (83). This boxed set, 
its name denoting finality and its subtitle denoting completion, offers itself as “the true version” 
of the Watchmen movie. 
Reviews of the extended cuts of Watchmen generally agree that these videos contain too 
much for anyone but hardcore completist fans. The director’s cut offers “a mind and butt 
numbing 3 hours and 6 minutes” (Perkis); it “makes the film unnecessarily longer without 
making it better” (Castro). The Ultimate Cut offers a “long and disjointed viewing experience” 
(White), despite its claims of wholeness. However, it does bring the viewer “as close as anyone 
will ever get” to a “cinematic equivalent of the comic”: “if you love the comic and the film, this 
is the definitive cut. And if you’re not a die-hard fan of both, steer clear” (Sullivan). A reader of 
the graphic novel declares that any theatrical cut “with a limited run-time was bound to 
disappoint me” but doubts that “a non-fan could make any sense” of the Ultimate Cut (Venable). 
Instead of the 80/20 rule, where a 20% minority drive 80% of the purchases of a brand, Warner 
Premiere’s Watchmen videos seems to skewed more toward 99/1, as even the cult audience 
expressed mixed feelings about the extended cuts.68 
The book remains the only “complete” Watchmen, and the videos make sure we know it. 
Each DVD case contains an ad for the graphic novel, as well as ads for the Deadline Games’ 
Watchmen: The End is Nigh computer game (for Sony’s PlayStation 3 and Microsoft’s Xbox 
360) and various Warner Home Video releases. The ad for the book calls it “the runaway 
                                                
68 The Complete Motion Comic sold 56K units in its first week, nearly half of its 2009 total of 
136K units, grossing $2.6M. Tales of the Black Freighter did better, but sold slowly, moving 
41K units in its first week and 230K over the year, grossing $4M. The theatrical and director’s 
cuts sold 1.2M units in their first week and 2.5M over the year, grossing $53.1M; together, they 
ranked 30th in DVD sales for 2009. See “Watchmen DVD Sales.” 
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bestseller!” and draws unattributed blurbs from Jeff Jensen’s “Watchmen: An Oral History” and 
Lev Grossman’s entry on Watchmen for Time’s hundred-novels list. A photo shows the trade 
paperback, the hardcover, and the $75 Absolute Watchmen. The theatrical release had boosted 
sales of the Absolute edition, and now the videos aimed to buoy them.69 According to DC’s 
website, Absolute Watchmen  
will be the cornerstone of any serious comic book collection. Each page of art has been 
restored and recolored by WildStorm FX and original series colorist John Higgins and 
approved by Gibbons to appear as originally intended. Additionally, this grand tome will 
include 48 pages of supplemental material […] rare and historically valuable treasures, 
including samples of Moore’s Watchmen scripts, the original Watchmen proposal, 
Gibbons’s conceptual art, cover roughs, and much, much more! 
Not even the trade paperback can compete with the fullness of Absolute Watchmen, which deals 
in origins and intentions, rarity and historicity: a (mechanically reproduced) Watchmen reliquary 
for the home. Here we reach the limit of what Time Warner can sell. Beyond these reproductions 
of sketches and typescripts, only originals remain, and they long ago disappeared into collectors’ 
vaults. 
 
Conclusion 
From 2005 to 2008, Time Warner had reason for optimism about their launch of a 
Watchmen transmedia franchise. They owned the book, Batman Begins had demonstrated the 
viability of “serious” superhero movies, and the DVD market boomed. The Watchmen trade 
paperback flew off the shelves, and the press discussed both the book and the coming movie in 
                                                
69 Before the movie’s release, Absolute Watchmen “surged up from 49 to 14” on Amazon’s list 
of comics bestsellers, and after the release, it peaked at #10. See Carter. 
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terms Time Warner gave them. The movie, however, fared poorly, in part because of its R rating 
and off-season release, but also in part because of its own merits. In January 2010, Variety editor 
Peter Bart observed, “for every Spider-Man there’s been a Watchmen” (2). Despite its potential 
as a “cash cow,” Watchmen ended up becoming the trade magazine’s metonym for 
disappointment. Brand managers can measure their success according to two complementary 
standards: as Christensen argues, “because marketing is not selling but the creation of the 
conditions for selling, the manager will not be judged strictly according to the bottom line but 
according to his ‘economic performance’—a standard that, crucially, introduces a 
nonquantifiable, aesthetic criterion into the assessment of managerial success” (“Time Warner 
Conspiracy” 595). Still, determining even the bottom line proves difficult here. My requests to 
Warners for data on the cost of producing their Watchmen home videos have gone unanswered, 
so I can only speculate about the profitability of that side of the franchise; however, given the 
decline in the DVD market already under way by 2009, disappointment there seems probable. 
Sales of direct-to-DVD titles fell from $696M in 2008 to $501M in 2009, then to a mere $281M 
by 2010 (Marich 12). Warner Premiere retrenched in 2009 from releasing twelve to fifteen titles 
per year down to ten to twelve titles; according to president Diane Nelson, they made “fewer, 
bigger bets, with stronger brand equity” (qtd. in Caranicas 5). Blu-ray acted as a crutch for 
home-video profits but did not replace DVD, which continued losing ground to video streaming 
services, until Warner Brothers shuttered Warner Premiere in 2012 (Kit). They no longer had the 
market to justify a direct-to-DVD unit. Yet short of breaking and entering into Time Warner 
offices, as Rorschach and Nite Owl do, we cannot know what goes on behind closed corporate 
doors and non-disclosure agreements 
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The Watchmen cinema franchise shows contrasting uses of the notion of an adaptation’s 
fidelity. Time Warner’s marketing uses fidelity both to elevate Watchmen as something inspiring 
faith and also to make an ethical appeal on behalf of the filmmakers as persons of faith, in an 
effort to justify a raft of “faithful” Watchmen home videos. While Alan Moore’s opposition to 
the project loomed unacknowledged, Warner Brothers led a cult audience along an asymptotic 
curve toward an unreachable ideal of fidelity, and when fans could go no further, Warner 
Brothers reminded them of the book, or new editions of the book, like the hardcover “Absolute” 
edition—more Watchmen than Watchmen. Yet this franchise also shows that critics can examine 
claims of fidelity to expose evasions and compromises on the part of the agents invoking the 
ideal. The demands of running time do not explain the film’s muting of the book’s critiques of 
rape and rape culture; instead, these revisions make an anti-hero more marketable to segments of 
the audience. One could elaborate on other such “unfaithful” revisions of character and narrative. 
Even in pre-release reporting, most writers noted the film’s most salient revision of the book—its 
elimination of the bogus alien in favor of a less convoluted hoax—but they praised this decision 
as a wise streamlining of the narrative. I agree: considering the number of pages that the book 
devotes to setting up the “alien,” the screenwriters’ find an elegant solution, one that arguably 
surpasses Moore’s sometimes overwrought version.70 However, such a change represents a 
concession to the most basic demands of the medium (i.e. a film short enough for multiplex 
                                                
70 For example, much of the distinctiveness of the Watchmen universe depends on the uniqueness 
of John Osterman (AKA Doctor Manhattan) as the only being with superhuman powers. Yet in 
the later chapters, Moore sneaks in the idea that a “so-called psychic and clairvoyant Robert 
Deschaines” (ch. 8, epilogue p. 4) had real psychic powers. Adrian Veidt steals the brain of this 
dead “sensitive” and clones tissue from it for his bogus alien (ch. 12, p. 10), using it as a psychic 
transmitter for his blockbuster alien. We never see Deschaines alive, so we can easily forget 
Moore’s work-around of one of the otherwise distinctive constraints of the book’s setting.  
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release), rather than the much more specific, and politically questionable, demands of transmedia 
franchising and licensing.  
In contrast to the movie’s revision of the ending, its deletion of the graphic novel’s 
critique of fast-food appears motivated not by constraints like running time but instead by 
concerns about franchisor-franchisee relations and brand marketability not for Watchmen, the 
range brand, but for Warner Brothers, the corporate brand. Snyder’s film revises the book’s 
Gunga Diner from a grungy fast-food chain to a clean, retro-styled diner with steel cutlery and 
table service. Maybe Snyder wanted to evoke nostalgia for the 1980s; alternately, this former 
adman gets work in conglomerate Hollywood because he makes even fictional brands look good, 
so he followed Madison Avenue’s best practices. Warner Brothers regularly licenses tie-ins to 
Subway, Burger King, and KFC, so they have economic reasons to avoid depicting even fictional 
fast-food chains as Moore does, as visual and physical polluters of urban space. Furthermore, 
Snyder’s next superhero film for Warners, Man of Steel (2013), gives a prominent role to a real-
life diner chain: International House of Pancakes. As Devin Leonard reported Bloomberg 
Business,  
moviegoers will notice a surprising corporate co-star: IHOP (DIN) [71] […] the restaurant 
is mentioned by name during a key sequence and a fierce battle unfolds between 
Superman and Faora, General Zod’s deadly sidekick, in the chain’s Smallville outpost. 
More intriguingly, Clark Kent’s boyhood bully eventually becomes an IHOP manager. 
Curious about this overwhelming IHOP-ness, Bloomberg Businessweek reached out to 
Craig Hoffman, a company spokesman. While he wouldn’t discuss the restaurant’s 
contractual agreement with Warner Brothers (TWX), Hoffman fielded a few questions 
                                                
71 IHOP trades as DineEquity, Inc., or “DIN,” on the New York Stock Exchange. 
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about the restaurant chain’s curious prominence in the film, and what it means for 
pancake sales. 
BLOOMBERG: How did IHOP get involved? 
HOFFMAN: Well, first of all, I should say that as a recognizable brand with recognizable 
restaurants. We’re approached a lot about filming opportunities. In this case, we just felt, 
“We’re an iconic American brand, and this is an iconic American story.” So we 
were happy to cooperate. […] 
BLOOMBERG: Did IHOP have any input into the storyline? 
HOFFMAN: No. We just asked that they don’t disparage the brand in the script.  
It seems plausible that Snyder’s cleaning-up of Watchmen’s Gunga Diner smoothed the way for 
such a partnership; Snyder’s Gunga Diner scenes could play as a demo reel to potential cross-
promotion partners like Waffle House, Bob Evans, or Denny’s. The latter, after all, partnered 
with Warner Brothers to release a Middle-Earth-themed menu as a (much-ridiculed) tie-in to 
Peter Jackson’s Hobbit films. Advertising Age called the partnership that produced the “Hobbit 
Hole Breakfast” and the “Build Your Own Hobbit Slam” “one of [Denny’s] biggest-ever movie 
tie-ins” (Morrison). Local investigations of an adaptation’s fidelity, coupled with investigations 
into that adaptation’s larger commercial and industrial context, can suggest critical 
interpretations that might otherwise escape us.  
If my suspicion of corporate motives seems paranoid, then maybe media scholars need a 
little paranoia: we owe it to our students and to our fellow workers to assume the worst about the 
motives and machinations of the secretive, profit-seeking multinational corporations that produce 
so many of the texts that shape our culture. Moreover, scholars need to call each other out for 
uncritical boosterism of corporate properties. The optimism of Nite Owl may keep us happy, and 
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may get us invitations to industry parties, but the pessimism of the foul-smelling, borderline 
fascist Rorschach, who rejects the commodified pleasures that blandish him from every side, 
these may keep us less deluded about our own roles in a cultural landscape dominated by 
corporations.  
This research suggests alternate avenues for further research into a text that spawns a 
transmedia franchise, especially regarding the ways that the franchise interacts with fans. 
Watchmen’s “story” now inheres not only in a graphic novel but also in home videos, computer 
games, and DC’s Before Watchmen comics. Each provides a point of entry for further study of 
transmedia storytelling, marketing, and reception. ComicCon alone generates discourses ranging 
from the publisher selling its title, to the studio courting fan approval (and recording 
disapproval), to fans’ face-to-face and online debates about franchises, media creators, and new 
media platforms. Fan responses to the Watchmen franchise vary from avid purchase, to grudging 
purchase (followed by bitter online reviews), to boycott (in the case of Before Watchmen). Other 
fans have engaged in unauthorized parodies that critique DC’s exploitation of the graphic novel, 
like Rich Johnston and Simon Rohrmüller’s Watchmensch comic, or Harry Partridge’s Saturday 
Morning Watchmen, which imagines the book’s characters adapted for a kid-friendly animated 
TV series along the lines of Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (which revised Eastman and Laird’s 
bloody, black-and-white, “mature readers” indie comic into a colossal children’s franchise). The 
more such a media franchise extends itself, even when those extensions fail with critics or with 
audiences, the more opportunities scholars have to investigate the interacting and conflicting 
labors of managers, marketers, artists, above- and below-the-line workers, casual audiences, and 
self-identified fans, including the anti-fans who lampoon or boycott elements of the franchise. 
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The full ethnography of Watchmen, as a site of cooptation and as a site of resistance, has yet to 
be written. 
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Figure 1. Watchmen, Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons, chapter 2, page 5. 
 
 
Figure 2. Watchmen (Zack Snyder, 2009). 
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Figure 3. Watchmen (Zack Snyder, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 4. Watchmen (Zack Snyder, 2009). 
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Figure 5. Watchmen (Zack Snyder, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 6. Watchmen, Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons, chapter 2, page 6.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RACE AND THE HOLLYWOOD SUPERHERO: BLACKNESS,  
INCLUSION, AND AMBIGUITY 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out to answer a question: how does conglomerate Hollywood adapt 
superhero brands for a domestic market structured by American racial ideologies? As 
commodities and as marketing tools, superhero blockbusters aspire to wide popularity, and the 
norms of this genre demand that the superhero pursue a universalist and pro-social mission, 
fighting not on behalf of a single race or class but on behalf of “the people” broadly imagined as 
having convergent interests. In America since the Civil Rights movement, the race-conscious 
political demands of Blacks, including calls for racial justice and redress over segregation, have 
long met white insistence on universalist values and the liberal notion of individual freedom of 
choice. If one acknowledges that slavery and institutionalized white supremacy played 
foundational roles in American history, then it seems that this complex of differing belief 
systems on race must have shaped many aspects of American culture and the culture industries, 
even those seemingly unconnected to questions of race.72 And so it does: five decades after the 
formal Civil Rights victories of the 1960s, even Hollywood’s most escapist narratives continue 
to reflect a culture and a culture industry shaped by the commercial imperative to appeal to a 
mass audience that necessarily includes both Blacks and racist whites. Careful attention to how 
these films present racial difference reveals an industrial practice of strategic ambiguity 
regarding race as well as a specifically racial inflection of nostalgia. Superhero movies invite 
                                                
72 Throughout this chapter I have followed the convention of Crenshaw and other critical race 
theorists in capitalizing Black, to reflect the historical specificity and constructedness of 
Blackness as a category in the USA. For histories of the construction of whiteness, see Noel 
Ignatiev’s How the Irish Became White, Karen Brodkin’s How Jews Became White Folk, or 
David Roediger’s Wages of Whiteness. 
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people holding various racial attitudes to feel good about America’s present as well its past, 
even—or especially—when America falls short of its professed values. 
This chapter argues that superhero blockbusters demonstrate the successful marketing of 
“symbolic racism,” that is, the “colorblind” and universalist ideology dominant in the United 
States since the limited successes of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s.73 Symbolic racism 
denies white America’s collective implication in racialized slavery and segregation, and it 
minimizes or denies the importance of race in present-day questions of opportunity, justice, and 
fairness. “Colorblind” whites understand racism as an aberration rather than a cornerstone of US 
history and culture, a matter of individual attitudes, choices, and vices rather than social 
structures largely invisible to whites and independent of their volition. Functionally, symbolic 
racism justifies the collective advantages that whites enjoy at the expense of past and present 
generations of Blacks and other minorities: since race has not mattered since the end of Jim 
Crow, the argument goes, existing distributions of wealth and power must indicate a fair 
distribution of opportunities and rewards. Yet the purchasing power of non-white audiences in 
the US means that conglomerate Hollywood still courts them, despite their significantly different 
understandings of how race inflects American life. Superhero blockbusters must therefore make 
themselves intelligible to whites as “colorblind” narratives; such narratives keep Blacks and 
racial Others peripheral to the story, they ignore contemporary racial difference, and they treat 
racial injustice as ancient or foreign. At the same time, these films must also make themselves 
                                                
73 Writers use various terms to refer to this racial ideology, but “colorblind,” with or without 
scare quotes, remains common in writing by psychologists and sociologists, as do “modern” 
racism and “neo-conservative” racial attitudes. See Tarman and Sears for a discussion of 
methods for defining and measuring these ideas and their affects. Despite some differences 
among scholars regarding definition, variants of this ideology functionally share what Howard 
Winant calls the “racial project” of trying “to preserve white advantages through denial of racial 
difference” (79). 
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intelligible to persons of color as respectful to non-whites, presenting Black characters who do 
not conform to the demeaning stereotypes of Hollywood’s past. Studios appeal to a global 
hierarchy of audience segments that places American whites at the top, the largest audience 
segment in their largest market, so blockbuster filmmakers find themselves constrained into a 
narrow channel of ambiguous address. This chapter examines the motivations of that address and 
the functions of these ambiguities within film narratives. Capital has no racial ideology, but for 
the capital invested in the culture industries to grow, those industries must create texts 
compatible with the ideologies of their audiences; a mass-market text that contradicts those 
ideologies risks getting a bad return on shareholder investment.74 
 My analyses therefore treat with skepticism the stories that the US media industries tell 
about America, yet I aim to move beyond the dichotomies that sometimes limit leftist and 
identitarian cultural studies. The success of Hollywood blockbusters depends on their 
heteroglossia, their ability to signify different things to different audience segments, segments 
that have fundamentally different ideas about fundamental questions of history, justice, and 
policy. Hollywood’s simultaneous, multiple address requires of scholars a willingness to explore 
multiple, contradictory readings of the films themselves, but it also demands of us a more 
thorough grasp of the American racial ideologies that underlie various interpretative stances, 
because those stances have shaped the US film industry’s habits of address. Humanistic film 
scholarship has paid too little attention to the work of social scientists who study American 
whites’ attitudes about race, with the result that even anti-racist or otherwise resistant readings of 
                                                
74 Recent historians have argued a much closer connection between slavery and the development 
of modern capitalism during the Industrial Revolution, even in non-slave economies. See Edward 
E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism, 
Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History, or Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: 
Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom. 
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Hollywood film have tended to remain in one of two modes. Either we fail to see any progressive 
or anti-hegemonic potential in Hollywood blockbusters, which limits our understanding of the 
pleasures that audiences of color might obtain from these films; or we fail to see that a 
contemporary blockbuster’s compatibility with symbolic racism constitutes a necessary 
condition of that blockbuster’s production, let alone its success, even if it casts Black actors in 
prominent roles. We must look for the ways that Hollywood has internalized Black demands for 
“better” on-screen representation even as the industry remains white-dominated. 
By analyzing Hollywood’s ability to incorporate resistance while its narratives serve the 
dominant racial ideology, this chapter offers a model for an understanding of the culture 
industries that helps explain how racial ideology functions in a multi-ethnic neoliberal society. 
Research by social scientists has shown that symbolic racism correlates with anti-Black feeling 
and resistance to Blacks’ political demands; the attitudes of whites and Blacks about the nature 
of American racism not only differ, but in recent years they have diverged further. Therefore, 
critical film scholars must seek to understand how racial ideology informs the ways that media 
corporations produce blockbusters (at the level of the conglomerate and its marketing logic) as 
well as the ways that audiences interpret films (on the basis of political or ideological position) 
By combining the insights of sociologists, critical race scholars, and historians of media with the 
close reading practices characteristic of humanist film studies, I offer a fuller understanding of 
the interplay between an overwhelmingly white movie industry, an ethnically diverse and 
growing global audience, and a domestic core audience of “colorblind” whites—the audience 
segment that Hollywood continues to regard as the one segment it cannot afford to lose. 
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The Ideology 
Symbolic racism represents a neoconservative white cultural adaptation to the successes 
of the Civil Rights movement and the end of de jure segregation. It allows whites to disclaim 
responsibility for white supremacist attitudes, policies, and practices while continuing to enjoy 
the material advantages that those attitudes, policies, and practices allowed whites to accrue and 
pass on to their descendants. “Racism,” as most whites understand it, consists not of systems of 
economic access and exclusion, or of unconscious biases, but of conscious feelings of racial 
superiority and animosity, feelings that lead racists to discriminate. Whites holding this ideology 
therefore consider distinctions on the basis of race necessarily unjust; therefore, according to this 
logic, to avoid practicing racism, one must treat race as unimportant. Yet to do so maintains a 
status quo in which Blacks continue to suffer the effects of the century since Emancipation, 
during which whites worked systematically to keep them out of the American Dream. The 
superhero genre, in which heroes have pro-social missions and explicitly universalist values, 
therefore provides a ready vehicle for universalist narratives that flatter the self-image of this 
white majority.  
In order to understand the ways that Hollywood treats race in blockbusters, we must 
better understand the range of racial attitudes among the whites who make up the (shrinking) 
majority of the domestic audience for these films. Sociologist Howard Winant identifies five 
major “racial projects” among US whites: the openly racist far right, the covertly racist new 
right, the “neo-conservative,” the liberal, and the new abolitionist (75). The symbolic racism of 
the neo-conservative project offers an “appeal to universalism” 
far more subtle than open or coded appeals to white racial fears, since it has far greater 
capacity to represent race in apparently egalitarian and democratic terms. Indeed, the very 
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hallmark of the neo-conservative argument has been that, beyond the proscription of 
explicit racial discrimination, every invocation of racial significance manifests “race-
thinking,” and is thus suspect. (80) 
Although the plurality of whites espouse “colorblind” attitudes, millions of other whites—that is, 
those whom Winant categorizes as far right and new right—report attitudes that read as racially 
prejudiced in the traditional sense. A 2012 study by the University of Chicago’s General Social 
Survey found that “more than one-fifth of whites volunteer views consistent with negative racial 
stereotypes”: 28% of respondents assert that “it’s okay to discriminate when selling a home,” 
40% claim that “whites are more hardworking than Blacks,” and 45% explain Black-white 
wealth disparities as the result of Blacks lacking “the motivation or willpower to pull themselves 
out of poverty” (Cox).  These whites constitute a large and powerful minority. In 2010, the US 
Census Bureau put the non-Hispanic white population at 223,553,265, compared to a Black 
population of 37,685,848 (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 7). If the University of Chicago’s 
percentages accurately represent reality, then the 21% of respondents who volunteer that “they 
would oppose having a close relative marry a Black person” (Cox) comprise some 46,946,185 
white people—nine million more than the total Black population of the United States. The 
Chicago survey therefore implies that the US has more whites who report consciously racist 
attitudes than it has Black people. Nevertheless, the hegemony of symbolic racism makes it 
difficult to gauge the racial attitudes of whites in public discourse; the stigma that virtually 
everyone attaches to the label racist makes whites reluctant to speak openly about their racial 
attitudes. Virtually nobody in the US identifies as racist, not even self-styled White Nationalists 
who dream of an Aryan homeland in the Pacific Northwest (Berbrier 433, Bonilla-Silva 16, 
Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 7-9).  
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 Symbolic racism operates as ideology in the Marxian sense, in that it justifies and 
naturalizes a historically particular distribution of resources and power. “Colorblind” whites 
believe that the Civil Rights movement created a society of equal opportunity; Blacks know 
better, but they remain a disproportionately poor minority, so their views remain marginal. 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw notes that whereas hegemony in Antonio Gramsci’s sense 
dominates by instilling false conscious in the dominated, symbolic racism creates false 
consciousness among the dominant: “The most significant aspect of Black oppression seems to 
be what is believed about Black Americans, not what Black Americans believe. Black people are 
boxed in largely because there is a consensus among many whites that the oppression of Blacks 
is legitimate” (1358). Because of whites’ greater numbers and their relative wealth and power, 
their subjective feeling of racial innocence “weighs more heavily than do the past wrongs 
committed upon Blacks and the benefits that whites derived from these wrongs” (1342). White 
delusion trumps Black clarity.  
This deodorized version of white supremacy prevents whites from seeing American 
racism as a structural phenomenon, but it also prevents them from seeing their own, individual 
racism. Quantitative social science has found whites’ subjective feeling of racial innocence 
factually incorrect in two ways. First, symbolic racism correlates strongly with attitudes 
traditionally understood as racist. Robert Entman explains that the notion of symbolic racism as 
“modern racism” “emerged from social scientists’ observing the contradiction between white 
Americans’ endorsement of racial equality in the abstract and their often-intense opposition to 
concrete policies designed to produce more equality” (334). Symbolic racism consists of three 
components: “the belief that racism is dead and that racial discrimination no longer inhibits 
Black achievement”; “anti-Black affect,” or “a general hostility towards Blacks”; and “resistance 
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to the political demands of Blacks” (332-33). Some psychologists and sociologists investigating 
whites’ racial attitudes use the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS), a 20-point 
inventory that “measures participants’ lack of awareness or denial of racism in the United States” 
(Gushue and Constantine 323); Neville et al. developed the scale in 2000 to supplant J. B. 
McConahay’s 1986 Modern Racism Scale (59). High CoBRAS scores correlate with “higher 
levels of fear of racial minorities,” “lower levels of empathy about societal racism,” “greater 
endorsement of anti-Black sentiments,” and “racial and gender intolerance” (Spanierman et al. 
110). Symbolic racism thus “indicates a sort of covert racism, because to deny the importance of 
race is to deny the existence of white privilege, institutionalized discrimination against 
minorities, and other racial injustices” (Weaver 372). The second way that whites’ self-
assessment proves factually incorrect concerns media. Despite the claims of most whites that 
race does not matter to them, they prefer movies with white casts. Andrew Weaver finds that 
persons with higher CoBRAS scores show greater interest “in films with mostly white casts than 
in films with mostly Black casts” (377). Notwithstanding their denials, race matters deeply to 
whites, even when choosing a popcorn movie.75 
 This ideology’s preservation of white privilege and concealment of anti-Black affect have 
an ugly corollary: the belief among whites that they have become the true victims of racism. In a 
study comparing Black and white perceptions of how race relations have changed in the past 
fifty years, Michael Norton and Samuel Sommers find  
a general mindset gaining traction among whites in contemporary America: the notion 
that whites have replaced Blacks as the primary victims of discrimination. This emerging 
                                                
75 A skeptic might note that high CoBRAS scores do not necessarily reflect actual colorblind 
ideology so much as a respondent’s ability to produce answers that conform to that ideology. 
Some persons with high CoBRAS scores might, in truth, hold far-right or new-right racial 
attitudes yet conform to the dominant norms of how whites talk about race. 
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perspective is particularly notable because by nearly any metric—from employment to 
police treatment, loan rates to education—statistics continue to indicate drastically poorer 
outcomes for Black than white Americans [….] (215) That whites now believe that anti-
white bias is more prevalent than anti-Black bias has clear implications for public policy 
debates and behavioral science research in the years to come. (217) 
The implication that this finding has for my analyses lies in its power to help explain Hollywood 
blockbusters’ virtual silence regarding race and racism in contemporary American life. To whites 
who see themselves as the primary victims of racism (for example, in the form of affirmative 
action policies), any film that claims otherwise will appear to them a tendentious, race-conscious, 
and therefore racist attack on an already beleaguered American whiteness. However, because 
Blacks and other persons of color remain vital to Hollywood’s business plans, a film that sides 
explicitly with a narrative of white victimhood risks alienating non-white segments. Therefore, 
the successful blockbuster must contain multitudes, offering to a range of audience segments—
who hold contradictory understandings of their social world—ambiguous opportunities to feel 
good about their social identities. Films that aim to succeed with a majority of whites must flatter 
those whites’ self-conception as “not racist”; films that aim to succeed with Blacks must offer-
non-stereotyped portrayals of Black characters, indicating the filmmakers’ respect for Black 
humanity and the dignity of Black actors. Superhero blockbusters therefore use a double 
strategy: they combine universalist narratives, in which the hero saves the city or the world, with 
portrayals of Blacks calculated to offer both Black and white spectators different, and even 
contradictory, forms of pleasurable engagement with the story.   
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Blade Saves Marvel 
 One could argue that the 21st-century wave of superhero films began with Blade (Stephen 
Norrington, 1998), New Line Cinema’s Wesley Snipes vehicle, a self-consciously grim, R-rated, 
vampire-superhero action movie based on a third-tier Marvel Comics character. In 1997, Batman 
and Robin had killed DC Comics’ only cinematic franchise, and Marvel Comics, who had never 
had a hit movie, floundered after the mid-nineties collapse of the US comics market. In 1992, 
film producer Peter Frankfurt had approached Marvel seeking to license a Black character to 
New Line Cinema for a cheap action film (K. Clark). New Line’s action film Juice (Ernest R. 
Dickerson, 1992) had proved a hit, so Frankfurt hoped to replicate its success with another film 
aimed at “urban” (marketing cant for Black) audiences. Marvel offered to license Blade, a 
vampire hunter who had first appeared in 1973 as part of a wave of heroes inspired by 1970s 
Black and Blaxploitation cinema (Nama 139).  
The resultant film’s budget swelled to a respectable $45 million, but it grossed $131 
million worldwide, giving Marvel something they needed: the interest of movie studios. By 
licensing their characters for the big screen, Marvel returned from bankruptcy to become a major 
player in the transmedia franchise business. As Derek Johnson writes, 
While Marvel sold the rights to make the first X-Men film [Bryan Singer, 2000] to 20th 
Century Fox for only a few hundred thousand dollars […] Sony Pictures subsequently 
paid Marvel $10 million for the rights to make the first Spider-Man film [Sam Raimi, 
2002] in addition to agreeing to a first-dollar participation deal. Marvel received a 
percentage of each ticket sold to the licensed film—regardless of how much the studio 
needed to recoup to turn a profit. (Media Franchising 96) 
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Spider-Man then made box-office history, setting a new opening-day record ($33.5 million) and 
becoming the first movie to gross more than $100 million in its opening weekend (Gray). As 
Johnson notes, “[b]y 2005, these successes encouraged a stabilized Marvel to finance production 
on its own and recapture creative control and box-office profit from its studio partners” 
(“Cinematic Destiny” 1). The R-rated Blade franchise never matched the tentpole successes of 
the Spider-Man and X-Men films, but without the vampire-killing crossover hit, Marvel might 
never have regained its feet. 
Like its half-vampire protagonist, Blade occupies a liminal position both in terms of its 
crossover success and in terms of its mixture of cult and blockbuster film tropes. The early 1990s 
saw a wave of Black-directed and Black-themed films that S. Craig Watkins has called “ghetto 
action” (236). These films range from the social-realist drama Boyz N the Hood (John Singleton, 
1991), to the exploitative Menace II Society (Hughes Brothers, 1993), to the parodic Don’t Be a 
Menace to South Central While Drinking Your Juice in the Hood (Paris Barclay, 1996), which 
signaled the exhaustion of the boom.76 Like many of the 1990s ghetto action films, Blade 
borrows tropes from the Black-themed action films of the first half of the 1970s, though its 
success may lie in its remix of these with the tropes of Hong Kong wuxia and Hammer Films’ 
vampire movies. Yet for all of the overdetermined Blackness of the movie, none of the 
characters actually talks about Black experience or American race relations—just human-
vampire relations. I read Blade, therefore, as a model for the ways that later superhero films 
would elide real-world race even while using signs of racial difference as a means to position 
itself in the marketplace. 
                                                
76 Perhaps because of the salience of Black film during these years, 1997 saw three different 
movies that were based comic books that also featured Black stars: Steel (Kenneth Johnson), 
Spawn (Mark A. Z. Dippé), and Men in Black (Barry Sonnenfeld). 
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From its opening scene, Blade addresses itself to audiences familiar with cinematic tropes 
of urban Blackness in general and 1970s Black-themed films in particular. The streets in Blade 
swirl with trash beneath graffiti-tagged walls and fire escapes; location shooting emphasizes 
mom-and-pop storefronts to a degree anachronistic, and therefore nostalgic, even in 1998. Like 
John Shaft, Blade’s name doubles as a noun denoting part of a weapon. It signifies a power both 
combative and phallic, and it aligns Blade with later Blaxploitation heroes Hammer (Bruce 
Clark, 1972), Slaughter (Jack Starrett, 1972), and Black Gunn (Robert Hartford-Davis, 1972). He 
drives a 1968 Dodge Charger that would look at home in any of those films, but hip-hop and 
techno accompanies his nocturnal drives, giving muscle-car nostalgia a contemporary score. 
Where Pam Grier played a nurse-turned-vigilante in Coffy (Jack Hill, 1973), N’Bushe Wright 
goes one better, playing Blade’s physician-turned-vampire-killer sidekick. Adilifu Nama has 
called Blaxploitation film “a bloody referendum on white authority” (19), and Blade offers 
plenty of blood from white authority figures, both human and vampire. Unlike white superheroes 
who might encourage or even help law enforcement, Blade’s first encounter with the police goes 
badly, and in keeping with the Black male experience of law enforcement. While Blade fights a 
vampire who rampages through a hospital, two white police appear and yell, “Freeze!” When 
Blade turns in response, and before he has taken a step, they unload their guns at Blade, not the 
vampire. Unharmed, Blade demands, “Motherfucker, are you out of your damn mind?” His 
opening-reel defiance recalls Sweet Sweetback's Baadasssss Song (Melvin Van Peebles, 1971), 
whose protagonist takes on white law enforcement to become a folk hero. Like Prince 
Mamuwalde in Blacula (William Crain, 1972), Blade also uses his superhuman strength to fight 
the police, both individually and in groups, and he eventually takes on an entire SWAT team; 
one unlucky white cop, a familiar of the vampires, receives two humiliating beatings from Blade 
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over the course of the film. Like the cocaine-dealing antihero of Super Fly (Gordon Parks Jr., 
1972), Blade also uses an underground economy to fund his resistance. He robs the human 
stooges of the vampires, then sells their valuables to a Black occultist fence. The fence greets 
Blade with an elaborate DAP handshake that suggests an ambiguous solidarity: humans against 
vampires, or Blacks against a white establishment, or maybe both—viewer’s choice.  
 Yet while the film offers an excess of cinematic signifiers of Black power, it also 
banishes actual American racial politics from its dialogue. Here Blade diverges from the Black-
themed films of the 1970s and the ghetto action films of the 1990s, which deal explicitly with 
racialized poverty, police brutality, and Black politics. The only racial boundaries that explicitly 
matter to this film divide humans from vampires, and the “pure blood” vampires (those born of 
vampire parents) from those “turned” by a bite. The film’s villain, Frost (Stephen Dorff), seeks 
to eliminate the pure-bloods’ monopoly on power. Frost, although not of pure blood, still finds 
Blade’s defense of humans contemptible, even traitorous: “Spare me the Uncle-Tom routine, 
OK? You think the humans will ever accept a half-breed like you? They can’t. They’re afraid of 
you. And they should be.” Frost’s reference to Uncle Tom, the archetype of Black collaboration 
with white supremacy, constitutes the script’s closest approach to acknowledging the categories 
of Black and white in American culture. Vampires mark their human familiars with glyphs that 
function like a “cattle brand,” says Blade, indicating vampire “property”; yet the script makes no 
direct reference to America’s history of human chattel. Later, in an Oedipal revelation typical of 
the Hollywood superhero, Frost reveals that he bit Blade’s pregnant mother, passing vampirism 
to her unborn son. Against the backdrop of vampire-human chattel, the revelation of Blade’s 
parentage recalls the practice of white male slaveholders’ sexual exploitation of female slaves, 
and the “one drop” rules of hypodescent that placed the children of any mixed-race union into 
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the less powerful category, regardless of the child’s skin color or parentage. In the film’s racial 
order, Blade counts as a vampire because of one vampire’s assault on his mother, yet Blade’s 
partial vampire (read: white) ancestry remained unknown to him. The scene therefore evokes the 
substantial, yet often unacknowledged and unknown, European ancestry among African 
Americans.77 The film’s allegory converts Black-white race relations into human-vampire race 
relations. To viewers able to read the film’s historical and racial allegory, the script seems 
critical, even revisionist for a medium-budget action movie. Viewers unable to read this subtext 
can still enjoy the narrative at its primary, surface level, as vampire-hunter melodrama.  
 Blade also departs from Hollywood norms by giving its protagonist no romantic interest. 
Donald Bogle, writing about the Black films of the early 1970s, describes the era as one of 
overcompensation for the asexual bourgeois respectability of Sidney Poitier’s 1960s films. The 
1970s, Bogle writes, 
might best be described as the age of the buck, a period when a band of aggressive, 
pistol-packing, sexually-charged urban cowboys set off a heady rampage, out to topple 
the system and to right past wrongs. [Bogle’s emphasis] (232) While the movies 
assiduously sought to avoid the stereotype of the asexual tom, they fell, interestingly 
enough, into the trap of presenting the wildly sexual man. (240) 
Blade seems to combine elements of both stereotypes. His female sidekick, Dr. Jensen, played by 
N’Bushe Wright, spends significant time in Blade’s arms getting rescued, yet only one of their 
embraces approaches the erotic, when she volunteers some of her blood to save the dying (and 
shirtless) hero’s strength. Nama reads Blade’s chastity as a failure of the scriptwriters to 
                                                
77 The practice of mixed-race persons “passing” for white also means that the reverse is true: 
many whites have unacknowledged Black ancestry. See Henry Louis Gates Jr., “How Many 
‘White’ People are Passing?” 
 225 
“humanize” Blade, who, having no romantic interest, must thereby express “either rage or 
detached cool” (142). I agree, but I explain this confined horizon of possibility as a symptom of 
the filmmakers’ fear that a romance between the two Black characters the two would tip the film 
from “crossover” into fully “urban”: that is, that by showing a romantic relationship between two 
Black characters, white audiences would decide that the film was Not For Them.  
Will Smith encountered this fear when the producers of the film Hitch (Andy Tennant, 
2005) waffled on casting the film’s female lead. Smith complained of the “myth” “that if you 
have two Black actors, a male and a female, in the lead of a romantic comedy […] people around 
the world don’t want to see it” (qtd. in Weaver 369). Yet the alternative of casting a white actress 
opposite a Black lead poses, as Weaver puts it, “significant risk because of the lingering taboo 
among some audience members against interracial relationships” (369). The makers of Hitch 
chose to cast a Latina, Eva Mendez, opposite Smith, apparently in deference to American whites’ 
racism. The Will Smith vehicle Hancock (Peter Berg, 2008) presents Smith as (non-franchise) 
superhero who has amnesia because of a beating that he suffered in Miami, at the hands of 
people who disapproved of his walking with Charlize Theron’s character, some “eighty years 
ago.” However, Hancock studiously avoids naming race, or the history of whites’ anxieties about 
interracial relationships, or the history of whites using those anxieties to justify mob violence 
against Blacks. “They attacked us in an alley,” says Theron’s character, unwilling even to name 
those attackers using a concrete noun. “They wouldn’t let me ride in the ambulance,” she says. 
Even though the film places the action in the Jim Crow south, the script still flinches away from 
naming white racism as the motivator for the attack, since to do so would implicate the whites of 
present-day Miami, who may fondly remember ancestors who witnessed such violence, or 
worse.  
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The makers of Blade sidestep the issue altogether by keeping their hero chaste throughout 
the first film and both sequels, Blade II (Guillermo del Toro, 2002) and Blade: Trinity (David S. 
Goyer, 2004). Every other Marvel and DC superhero with a title role has a romance, even 
Catwoman (Pitof, 2004), which pairs the Black Halle Berry with the Latino Benjamin Bratt. 
Despite its nods to Afrocentric action films of the 1970s, Blade has less in common with Black-
directed films like Shaft (Gordon Parks, 1971), Sweetback, Super Fly, and Blacula, and more in 
common with the later white-directed and white-produced films that sought to cash in by using 
Black actors and politics as mise en scène, true exploitation films in both the commercial and the 
ethical senses of the word: Black Caesar (Larry Cohen, 1973), Cleopatra Jones (Jack Starrett, 
1973), Black Belt Jones (Robert Clouse, 1974), Truck Turner (Jonathan Kaplan, 1974) and Foxy 
Brown (Jack Hill, 1974). Bogle calls the latter films “that played on the needs of Black audiences 
for heroic figures without answering those needs in realistic terms” (242). Substitute historical 
for realistic, and Blade fits Bogle’s description: the film all but erases the history of real-world 
race relations, except for its allusion to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 1852 novel. 
White screenwriter David S. Goyer would do likewise in his scripts for Blade II and 
Blade: Trinity, each of which makes but a single reference to historical racism. Yet where the 
first film gestures toward American slavery, the two later films export their allusions to Europe. 
In the second reel of Blade II, the hero goes to Prague, where he must cooperate with a team of 
paramilitaries led a white skinhead vampire named Reinhardt (Ron Perlman). When Reinhardt 
steps forward to meet Blade, a military snare drum plays momentarily on the soundtrack; the 
vampire’s name evokes Operation Reinhardt, the Nazis’ name for their introduction of 
extermination camps in Eastern Europe. If Reinhardt’s name, look, and military theme did not 
already signify unapologetic racism—here in Prague, a city from which Nazi occupiers once 
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deported Jews—then Reinhardt’s dialogue forces the point. He leans in close to Blade and says, 
in an American accent, “Me and the gang were wondering, can you blush?” Two of the other 
white vampires laugh and fist-bump over the taunt, seemingly a jab at Blade’s very dark skin.78 
However, this allusion refers not to Nazism, but to the Christian Identity movement, which 
gained prominence in the US after its followers committed a spate of murders and bombings in 
the 1980s and 1990s. This white-supremacist doctrine holds that only the true descendants of 
Adam have souls, and that skin pale enough to blush signifies this ancestry (“Christian 
Identity”). Despite this incoherence among Reinhardt’s multiple signifiers of racism, Blade did 
not have to deal with this kind of explicitly anti-Black abuse in the USA. Blade: Trinity performs 
a similar move: when the vampires determine “that hunting humans on a piecemeal basis was too 
inefficient,” they build “processing centers” to hold comatose humans and harvest their blood, 
the “vampire Final Solution,” as several characters call it. As in Blade II, the script’s citation of 
racist biopolitics points not toward mainstream American practices familiar from living or recent 
memory—Jim Crow, redlining, stop and frisk—but toward Nazi atrocities.  
In short, Goyer’s scripts locate racism somewhere other than the implied white audience 
for his movies, a common trope in white discourse on racism. As Teun van Dijk puts it,  
the notions of “racism” and “racist” in European and US public discourse are reserved for 
others, for instance, extremist, right-wing, fringe groups and parties outside of the 
consensus. [van Dijk’s emphasis] (93) By selectively attributing racism to the extreme 
right, it is both denied as being a characteristic of the own ingroup of moderate white 
citizens, and at the same time better manageable, for instance occasionally prosecuting 
the more overt right-wing racists. (96) [sic] 
                                                
78 Cinematographers unused to filming Black actors have had difficulty making Snipes’s dark 
complexion show up well in framings set up for white actors. See Dyer, 89-103. 
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Blade inhabits a fictional world where racism lives among vampires, neo-Nazis, and 19th-century 
America; the franchise’s “crossover” success no doubt depended on its ability to appeal to 
Blacks while avoiding any implication that mainstream American whites either practice or 
benefit from racism. The waves of Black-themed cinema in the early 1970s ended with the film 
industry’s overall shift toward blockbusters, films that “profited from both Black and white 
audiences and effectively eliminated the need for Hollywood to continue producing films 
targeted specifically toward Blacks” (Lawrence 25). Bogle writes of the blockbuster form: “if a 
film with Blacks hoped to succeed, it had to have built-in devices to please white audiences. The 
first step towards making crossover movies was to strip the Black film of any raw political 
content” (258). Subsequently, “when a Black performer appeared in a general release, he or she 
had no cultural identity. All ethnic edges had been sanded down, so that while they looked Black, 
everything about them seemed expressed in a white cultural context” [Bogle’s emphasis] (268). 
The Blade franchise exemplifies this principle, and its broad success demonstrated the crossover 
appeal of casting major Black stars in superhero movies. The next Marvel movie franchise would 
continue this practice. 
 
Difference and Negotiated Readings 
 Two years before a neo-Nazi would taunt Blade for his dark skin, X-Men (Bryan Singer, 
2000) opened with a flashback to historical Nazis. A title reads “Poland, 1944,” putting us inside 
one of the extermination camps of Operation Reinhardt: between barbed wire fences trudge 
prisoners wearing the yellow Judenstern. Guards drag a boy from his parents; the boy, Erik 
Lehnsherr, reveals that he has the power to control metal with his mind, but the guards club him 
unconscious before he can escape. For all the ways that this film and four decades of X-Men 
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comics have used mutants as an allegory of the biopolitics of human difference, the X-Men 
franchise appears to use actors of color only as a veneer of diversity over narratives that seem 
otherwise calculated to appeal to “colorblind” and even new-right (i.e. consciously racist) whites. 
In the analysis that follows, I plan to show that the X-Men films reveal Hollywood’s casting of 
Black actors in blockbuster movies as a site where actor, filmmaker, spectator, and popular 
media all inscribe meanings on a character. Despite their apparent tokenism, blockbuster films’ 
avoidance of offense to major audience segments can sometimes result in depictions of Black 
characters that transcend the stereotyped roles that they seem to inhabit, but without openly 
criticizing white American racism. 
Marvel’s X-Men comic series follows the students of Professor Charles Xavier’s School 
for Gifted Youngsters, an institution that secretly shelters and trains “mutants,” persons born 
with genetic abnormalities that give them strange powers. Scholarly and popular interpretations 
have long read the comic series as an allegory of various kinds of difference: race, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, even HIV status. The title began in 1963 as only a “moderate success” 
compared to Fantastic Four and Amazing Spider-Man (D. Johnson, Media Franchising, 80). 
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, Marvel created spin-offs, new series (e.g. New Mutants, X-
Factor, X-Force) and solo-character titles (e.g. Wolverine, Deadpool, X-Man) that turned this 
intra-company franchise into their most lucrative property (84-85). When 20th Century Fox 
developed their film adaptation, they cast Halle Berry as Ororo Munroe (better known as Storm), 
one of the film’s ten named mutant super-beings, and the only one played by an actor of color. 
Berry returned to the role in X2: X-Men United (Bryan Singer, 2003), X-Men: The Last Stand 
(Brett Ratner, 2006), and the prequel X-Men: Days of Future Past (Bryan Singer, 2014). 
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Like Blade, Storm goes through an entire superhero cycle without a romantic 
relationship, but this contrasts strongly with Berry’s star image. Wesley Snipes had often played 
characters with romantic relationships, but Berry built her career on highly sexualized roles, such 
as a trick-turning addict in Jungle Fever (Spike Lee, 1991), a white politician’s mistress in 
Bulworth (Warren Beatty, 1998), and the title role in the TV biopic Introducing Dorothy 
Dandridge (Martha Coolidge, 1999), which depicts Dandridge’s rise to fame through her 
portrayal of the man-eating Carmen Jones (Otto Preminger, 1954), followed by Dandridge’s 
long affair with Otto Preminger. Between the first two X-Men films, Berry won the Academy 
Award for Best Actress for her role in Monster’s Ball (Marc Forster, 2001), in which her 
character has a sexual relationship with the white prison guard who supervised her husband’s 
execution; Berry performs with Billy Bob Thornton in a nude sex scene quite explicit by 
Hollywood standards. Popular writers who discuss Berry call her not merely “sexy” (Barnett) or 
“stunning” (Williams, “Halle”), but “a symbol of Black beauty” (Corbett), and a “sex symbol” 
(“The 58”, Ogunnaike). They mention her early days of competing in beauty pageants (“The 58,” 
Fleming, Norment) and her winning of the Miss Teen Ohio pageant (Fleming, Maynard), as well 
as her graceful aging (Bowie, “How”), and they cite her modeling since 1996 as a Revlon “Brand 
Ambassador” (Brew-Hammond). Some Black female spectators not only admire her looks but 
wish to emulate them:  
“My African-American female patients will often bring in a photo of a Beyoncé or J. 
Lo’s butt because they like the shape,” says Beverly Hills plastic surgeon Anthony 
Griffin, M.D., who has performed procedures on celebs and ordinary folks alike. […] 
“When it comes to facial features, Halle Berry is the actress who’s most often used as a 
reference.” (Burford) 
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Berry, however, tires of this fixation: “I wish people would talk more about my talent than they 
do my beauty” (qtd. in Barnett).  
Yet to understand Berry’s eroticized star image, we must understand the centrality of her 
body to that image, in not just sexual but racial and historical terms. Although Berry identifies as 
Black, she has a Black father and a white mother, and the racist stereotype of the “tragic 
mulatto” has haunted both her career and discourses about it. Even when she plays characters not 
identified as biracial, so many of Berry’s roles hinge on sexual relationships with white men that 
her career effectively functions as a metonym for illicit or doomed interracial sexuality. In the 
popular (white) imagination, sexual crossings of the color line still bring tragedy. As Sika Alaine 
Dagbovie notes,  
titles of articles on Berry reveal a tendency to read her as a modern day tragic mulatto. 
“Halle Berry, Bruised and Beautiful, Is on a Mission,” “The Beautiful and Damned,” 
“Am I Going to Be Happy or Not?” and even an unauthorized biography entitled Halle 
Berry: A Stormy Life all highlight Berry’s troubled personal life, recalling mixed race 
literary characters whose beauty was rivaled only by their ugly misfortunes. (221)  
We can understand some of these “misfortunes” as the result of Berry’s struggles in a film 
industry that has, historically, treated light-skinned Black women as “exotics” (Bogle 291). 
Before 1970, dark-skinned women like Hattie McDaniel, Butterfly McQueen, and Juanita Moore 
played asexual mammies and maids, while light-skinned women like Nina Mae McKinney, Fredi 
Washington, Lena Horne, Dorothy Dandridge, Diahann Carroll, and Eartha Kitt played leading 
roles, usually vamps tormented as much by their sexual desires as by their sexual desirability. 
Not only did Berry play Dandridge, but in her 2001 Oscar acceptance speech she cited 
Dandridge, Horne, and Carroll by name. As Rebecca Wanzo notes, “The actresses she evoked do 
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not include the Black women who won Best Supporting Actresses before her who were not 
acclaimed as beautiful. […] She places herself in a tradition of actresses who were acclaimed as 
beautiful Black women but were limited by an absence of opportunities to be glamour girls on 
some white leading man’s knee” (146). Berry has spoken of the continuing absence of 
opportunities for women of color in Hollywood, complaining of “having been told, over the 
years, that she was alternately too Black or not Black enough” (Maynard). Berry’s role as a 
superhero in the X-Men films breaks ground for Black women in Hollywood, even as it reveals 
the limitations Hollywood continues to place on Black representation in mass-market films. 
The first X-Men cycle, with its PG-13 ratings, contains less explicit sexuality than 
Monster’s Ball, but for a summer blockbuster it devotes an unusual amount of screen time to 
female desire—but not to Storm’s desire, for she has no romantic interest in any of the films. In 
contrast, the two white women of the X-Men team, Jean Grey (Famke Janssen) and Rogue (Anna 
Paquin), have romantic relationships with men; furthermore, both show a strong and illicit 
attraction to Wolverine (Hugh Jackman). In the third film, the team adds another white woman 
(Shadowcat, played by Ellen Page), thereby creating yet another love triangle among the white 
X-Men, but Storm neither seeks nor finds romance. In the comics, Storm has boyfriends, and 
even marries T’Challa (Black Panther), but the cinematic Storm appears constrained by the same 
fears about Black sexuality and interracial romance that kept Blade loveless. This elision of 
Storm’s love life seems part of the cycle’s larger strategy of denying Storm a backstory 
altogether. X-Men gives us scenes of Rogue running away from her bourgeois home in Meridian, 
Mississippi, and X-Men: The Last Stand shows the first meeting of Professor Xavier with a 
troubled young Jean Grey and her parents, in their sub-division somewhere in New York, but 
none of the films makes visual or verbal reference to Storm’s life before the X-Men or to her 
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Kenyan origin, which in the comics constitutes a major part of her character. In both the comics 
and the films, Storm has straight white hair that serves to mark her as exotically Other, but 
Berry’s Midwestern American accent makes her Storm sound like she hails from Cleveland 
(Berry’s hometown), and her speech contains no African American vernacular that would mark 
her ethnically. Comics fans can project onto Storm their knowledge of her background, but to 
most viewers, she remains a blank. 
Although the makers of the first X-Men cycle seem to have balked at using either 
Storm’s inner life or Halle Berry’s star image to eroticize their film, this does not mean that the 
films refrain from using female bodies as objects of intra- or extra-diegetic sexual desire. In the 
first three films, Berry sometimes appears in a low-cut blouse while in civilian clothes, but this 
reveals much less than does her costume from the comics, a bustiere with cape and thigh-high 
boots. On missions, Berry wears the same utilitarian black uniform as her teammates. In the 
films’ visual economy of female bodies, the mutant villain Mystique spends the most time 
exposed to the spectator’s gaze. Played by Rebecca Romijn in the 2000s and Jennifer Lawrence 
in the 2010s, this blue-skinned shape-changer wears a revealing costume in the comics, but in the 
films, she goes nude, appearing clothed only when she imitates others; for most of her screen 
time, she wears only blue body-paint and a few feathery scales. Compared to Mystique, Storm 
barely qualifies as an object of the camera’s or the spectator’s eroticizing gaze.  
As an against-type role for Berry, Storm arguably offers one of the more progressive 
elements in the X-Men films, even as it raises significant questions about the methods as well as 
the political stakes of interpreting Black images in Hollywood film. Some commentators, such as 
Dagbovie, have read Storm as continuing Berry’s habit of playing racially liminal roles (222). 
Media blogger Lynne Johnson writes, “Though not a tragic mulatto in the classic sense of the 
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myth,” Storm nevertheless functions as a “representative of this idea,” in that she seems neither 
stereotypically Black nor, as a mutant, strictly human. Yet where some resistant spectators might 
read Storm as an unacceptably stereotyped role because of its racial liminality, or in light of the 
“tragic” discourses that already surround Berry, others might read the character as departure 
from Berry’s pattern of sexualized roles, and therefore as a step beyond the clichés and 
stereotypes that have confined her and other Black actors. Even if Storm’s asexuality in the X-
Men films results from white producers’ fear of alienating reactionary whites, the precedent 
nevertheless expands representational and employment opportunities for actors of color.79 
Producers can inadvertently create a functionally progressive character for reactionary purposes. 
The opposite also holds true: 1960s Sidney Poitier vehicles like Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner 
(Stanley Kramer, 1967) offered a progressive response to white bigotry, but they arguably re-
created Poitier an unthreatening, bourgeois assimilationist that neoconservative whites could 
congratulate themselves for liking (on screen, at least) while they opposed Black demands for 
substantive economic and political redress. The producers may have left Storm blank for cynical 
reasons, but onto this blank, resistant Black spectators can project their own fantasies. I say this 
not as a flight from political criticism into the subjectivism of “whatever makes someone feel 
empowered must be good,” but as an effort to complicate the sometimes simplistic popular and 
even scholarly evaluations of Hollywood’s images of Blacks, whether approving or critical.  
 Since the 1980s, Black film scholars have offered theories of spectatorship that revealed 
the limitations of earlier psychoanalytical and apparatus theories that ignored race. At their best, 
                                                
79 Berry’s prominent role in the first two X-Men films suggested to producers at Warner Brothers 
to cast Berry in her own superhero vehicle. In the week before the opening of Catwoman (Pitof, 
2004), Berry expressed hope that the film would let her “prove—if I’m really lucky, if the movie 
god is watching—that a woman, especially a woman of color, can open one of these summer 
movies” (qtd. in Waxman). The movie flopped.  
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these interventions explored the complexity of Black responses to cinema. Contra Mulvey, bell 
hooks argued that feminist film criticism had failed to think about any women other than white 
women, and that Black women remained “‘on guard’ at the movies” (298), “not duped by 
mainstream cinema” (295). Manthia Diawara proposed the “resisting spectator” “as a heuristic 
device to imply that just as some Blacks identify with Hollywood images of Blacks, some white 
spectators, too, resist the racial representations of the dominant cinema” (“Black Spectatorship” 
892). Diawara also theorized the contrast between the social realism of Black independent 
cinema and the ahistorical fantasy of the Hollywood mainstream, where Blacks “exist primarily 
for white spectators whose comfort and understanding the films must seek” (“Black American 
Cinema” 3). Hollywood films that appealed to whites engaged in a “textual deracination and 
isolation” of their Black characters from any specifically Black social or political context, 
thereby refusing Black spectators “the possibility of identification with Black characters as 
credible or plausible personalities” (“Black Spectatorship” 896). Yet such criticisms of 
Hollywood representations of Blackness did not adequately explain the pleasures that Black 
spectators nevertheless drew from Hollywood films. Jacqueline Bobo examined ways that Black 
female spectators could enjoy and value The Color Purple (Steven Spielberg, 1985) despite the 
film’s stereotyped, even atavistic depictions of Blackness (272). Rather than merely fault 
Hollywood films, Bobo argued, scholars should seek ways “to affect the reception to the works 
so that they are seen not in isolation but in relationship to the total lives of Black people” (286). 
My analysis of the potentially anti-hegemonic readings of these films aims to sketch possible 
points of articulation between superhero movies and the “total lives” of Black spectators. As 
Robin R. Means Coleman has argued, most media presentations of Blackness “do not lend 
themselves necessarily to dichotomies between negative stereotypes and positive images,” and 
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“good-bad representational queries” do not exhaust the meanings that media texts contain (83). 
Therefore, I argue for what Stuart Hall calls “negotiated” readings (516), which look for 
contradictions, so that scholars can reveal the oppositional potential of seemingly hegemonic 
texts, as well as the hegemonic potential of the seemingly oppositional.  
While the Black popular press generally praised Berry’s roles in the X-Men films, some 
viewers objected to what they saw as Storm’s marginal role. As my own students have noted, in 
X2, Storm mostly pilots the X-Men’s jet while the other characters get all the melodrama. Before 
the release of the third film, X-Men: The Last Stand, Berry herself complained about this in 
Variety:  
“I suffered through two movies where die-hard fans would come up to me and say, ‘How 
come you let them make Storm wimp out all the time?’” she says. “As if I have any 
control. Last time I asked them to let Storm do something more than drive the plane, and 
she drove the plane. Storm is a formidable fighter in the comic books; she has a cape and 
can fly. I’ve never flown anywhere in two movies except behind the wheel of that plane.” 
(Fleming)  
Berry acknowledges her limited agency in this film in particular, but her comments also remind 
us that despite the auteurist convention of assigning primary credit to the director, a blockbuster 
film represents a social relationship between workers with competing goals. Moreover, in 
franchise blockbusters, any filmmaker or actor serves at the pleasure of producers and 
executives, who themselves claim to serve shareholders and a fickle public; in an industry driven 
by the need for shareholder profit, every agent can disclaim responsibility for reactionary forms 
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of representation, assigning agency elsewhere.80 Berry does, but as Wanzo argues, “examining 
Black actresses’ readings of these stories can produce more complex understandings of their 
texts and their worlds [….] Too often, informal cultural analyses from varied political positions 
rely on a ‘just’ syntax: ‘Isn’t she just a mammy,’ ‘just a prostitute,’ ‘just cooning,’ ‘just a welfare 
queen,’ or ‘just a sellout?’” (136-37). Although Berry expressed displeasure with Storm’s role, 
Storm does not “just” fly the plane while the white characters engage in heroics; she also takes 
an active role in the narrative, using her super-powers to save the team and to help thwart the 
villains. Similarly, Berry does not “just” break the hypersexual tragic-mulatto mold by keeping 
her clothes on; she also plays the only core member of the group denied both a romantic interest 
and a backstory. Looking at Berry’s role in terms of genre, star image, and racial politics, we get 
a more complex picture than Berry herself narrates in her Variety interview. Even in this genre 
not known for profound characterization, the reductive “‘just’ syntax” can still obscure 
contradictions that illuminate the cultural work that blockbusters perform. 
If the first three X-Men films allowed Berry to transcend stereotype, then the prequel-
reboot X-Men: First Class (Matthew Vaughn, 2011) seems a revanche of that stereotype. First 
Class tells of the formation of the X-Men, and their intervention in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
1962 to avert a nuclear war. Neither Halle Berry nor Storm appears in this film; however, as if in 
substitution, First Class casts another light-skinned, biracial model-turned-actress, Zoë Kravitz. 
Where Storm breaks the stereotype of the sexual, exotic, tragic mulatto, the casting of Kravitz 
                                                
80 In the same piece, X-Men: The Last Stand co-writer Zak Penn expresses regret that Storm had 
little to do in the first two films, but he adduces the limits on a screenwriter’s creative power: 
“There was a whole sequence at the beginning of the last film that showed the origins of her 
character in Africa, and it got cut simply because there are 14 characters to service.” Although I 
remain skeptical that the Black character’s backstory got cut by white filmmakers “simply” 
because of time constraints, Penn’s comment reminds us of the institutional, generic, and 
franchise constraints under which even the more autonomous above-the-line personnel work. 
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revives it. In the middle of the film, a montage sequence sends Erik Lehnsherr and Professor 
Xavier around the USA recruiting young mutants on behalf of the CIA. They find Angel 
Salvadore (Kravitz) working in a strip club, and Lehnsherr and Xavier then pose as customers to 
approach her. Lehnsherr hands her a banknote, which she accepts: “For that, Daddy-O, you get a 
private dance.” She takes them into a curtained booth, where she jadedly asks, “You cats know 
it’s double for both, right?” Lehnsherr jokingly refuses payment, offering instead, “We’ll show 
you ours, if you show us yours.” When Lehnsherr “shows” his ability to move metal objects with 
his mind, Angel smiles, understanding that he means mutant superpowers, but she nevertheless 
continues to strip, removing her fringed brassiere. Our view cuts to a shot of Angel’s back, from 
which she unfurls insect wings. Of all the young mutants, Angel alone works in the sex industry, 
using her beauty and sexuality to earn money, a fact that resonates with Kravitz’s emerging star 
image. Press on Kravitz carries three refrains: first, her beauty (Debruge, Grant, Wrenn and 
Murray); second, her modeling career (“5 Things,” Alemoru, Bloom, “Lenny,” Wilson); third, 
and most importantly, the beauty of her biracial celebrity parents, Lenny Kravitz and Lisa Bonet 
(“7 Sexy,” Aftab, “Lenny,” Wilson). Kravitz’s role in First Class continues a family tradition 
that her mother established in Angel Heart (Alan Parker, 1987), that of playing, in Bogle’s 
phrase, “the young sex kitten” and “the most exotic of tragic mulattoes” (291). Bonet’s character 
in Angel Heart has a sexual relationship with the white protagonist who, unknown to either of 
them, turns out to be her own father, and who has sold his soul to the Devil. In the last reel, 
someone murders her, off-screen, and our final view of her comes as police survey the crime 
scene. Zoë Kravitz’s Angel, whose name recalls Angel Heart, changes sides halfway through 
First Class, taking the white villain’s hand, and evoking the liminality of the tragic mulatto 
pulled between two social worlds. Angel appears in the sequel, X-Men: Days of Future Past, 
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only as a still photograph: the film’s principal villain murders her off screen, and our final view 
of her comes from the photo in her autopsy report. Like the “sex kitten” that her mother played 
in Angel Heart, Angel’s tragic arc ends in a nude corpse.81  
 
History, Memory, and Identification 
 First Class features two actors of color among its eleven named mutant characters, and 
this serves to charge the film with racial meanings beyond those immediately present in the 
dialogue. Kenyan-American actor Edi Gathegi plays Darwin, whose real name we never learn, 
and who dies shortly after his introduction. Before he dies, he participates in a scene that 
functions both to underscore the evil of the film’s villain and also to ethnically cleanse the X-
Men of people of color. Mutant villain Sebastian Shaw (Kevin Bacon), the former Nazi scientist 
who experimented on Erik Lehnsherr in the death camp, has attacked the CIA facility where the 
young mutants have assembled. Shaw confronts the six young mutants, who stand framed 
together in a medium shot; in a close-up counter-shot, Shaw invites them to join his war against 
normal humans: “When mankind discovers who we are and what we can do, each of us will face 
a choice,” he says: “Be enslaved, or rise up to rule.” At the word enslaved, our view cuts from 
Shaw to a close-up reaction shot of Darwin; this begins a shot-reverse-shot sequence as Shaw 
outlines his plan, such that we see the reactions of each of the six mutants individually, in turn. 
These close-ups also reveal that Shaw and the four white mutants all have blue eyes. When Shaw 
finishes, Angel steps forward and takes his hand, then turns back toward the other young 
mutants. “Come on,” she says, “We don’t belong here, and that’s nothing to be ashamed of,” her 
                                                
81 Berry does appear briefly as Storm in Days of Future Past, and she uses her weather-control 
powers (flying, throwing lightning) in a CG set-piece. However, by my count, Berry speaks only 
eleven words in the whole film, making the appearance little more than a cameo. White actors 
play the six central characters.  
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last line in the film.82 The framing of Angel makes unclear the object of her address, the whole 
group or just Darwin, making her speech ambiguous. Do the mutants not belong here among the 
normals? Or does Darwin not belong here among the blue-eyed whites working for the US 
government during Jim Crow? White spectators might read her line the first way, as Angel’s 
abandonment of liberal ideals of assimilation and coexistence, a radical and race-conscious 
choice that necessarily marks her as a villain. Black spectators might read her line the second 
way, as an implication that just as the film’s normals do not intend to cede their privileges to 
mutants, the real-life white establishment does not intend to cede its privileges to Blacks. After 
all, in 1962, that establishment resisted Black political demands with every means from white 
flight and judicial disobedience to mob violence and bombing. Just before Shaw departs with 
Angel, he murders Darwin by incinerating him, evoking the fires used by white lynch mobs to 
burn Black victims both before and after death.83 
                                                
82 Shaw also proposes that by joining him, the young mutants can live like “kings.” He then adds, 
softly, “and queens.” At queens, he looks at Angel, who subsequently takes his hand. In the 
preceding sequence, the CIA had captured Shaw’s white mistress, Emma Frost. Shaw’s 
recruitment of Angel therefore holds a double meaning: he recruits her to his cause but also as 
his new mistress, across the color line. Spectators familiar with X-Men comics will recognize the 
subtext still more clearly: in the comics, Emma Frost uses the codename White Queen. 
Angel’s changing of sides therefore includes an implicitly sexual element. Shaw’s Nazi 
past makes this element still more transgressive, but so does the whiff of incest coming from the 
film’s Oedipal narrative, in that Shaw functions as the film’s Obscene Father, who defies all laws 
and who “enjoys” too freely (for example, he sucks chocolate from his fingers while preparing 
an execution in the death camp). His speech to the adult Erik Lehnsherr, the film’s orphaned 
protagonist, plays as by-the-numbers talk for a superhero movie villain: “I don’t want to hurt 
you, Erik; I never did. I want to help you. This is our time, our age. […] You and me, son. This 
world could be ours.” If we read Shaw as the film’s evil father, then Angel’s acceptance of his 
offer of a sexual relationship recalls still more strongly the father-daughter interracial incest of 
Angel Heart. 
83 Blogger Phenderson Djèlí Clark described the response to this scene during the film’s 
midnight premiere at the UA Court Street Stadium 12 theater in Brooklyn: “the mostly Black 
theater erupted into awwww hell nawws, anger, boos even concession food throwing (at the 
screen) when Darwin died. one dude stood up, pointed and yelled ‘That sh*t is racist!’” [sic]. 
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Where the first X-Men cycle makes the Nazis part of the team’s traumatic prehistory, 
First Class makes a Nazi scientist its principal villain. In light of the biopolitical decision that 
Shaw demands of the young mutants, his warning about slavery could refer to the slave-labor 
extracted from the inmates of Nazi concentration camps; however, the film punctuates Shaw’s 
warning about slavery with a cut to the only one of the actors born in Africa, suggesting that we 
read Shaw’s comment as an allusion to transatlantic slavery in particular. Yet nobody has 
threatened the mutants with slavery in this or any other X-Men movie; in the first cycle, the 
government attempted to “register” mutants but abandoned the plan. Japanese internment would 
make a better historical analogue to the biopolitical categories of the Mutant Registration Act, 
and furthermore, in 1962, Blacks across the country fought segregation in the courts and in the 
streets. The film does not specify the location of the “covert CIA research base” where Professor 
Xavier assembles his team, but it seems near CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, where 
Xavier first persuades the agency to back his plan. From 1956 to 1959, Virginia experienced 
Senator Harry F. Byrd’s so-called “massive resistance,” a policy of administrative disobedience 
to federal mandates to desegregate Virginia schools, under which the state closed many schools 
rather than integrate them (“Massive”). Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court’s 1960 ruling in 
Boynton v. Virginia to end discrimination in public accommodations, many remained formally 
segregated until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Equal”). However, although First Class takes 
place partly in the American South during the Civil Rights Movement, it makes no reference to 
that movement or to whites’ resistance; other than the yellow stars that the death-camp inmates 
wear, the film makes no explicit reference to historical or political categories of race whatsoever. 
The film instead foregrounds a parade of straw-man visions of racism, from Shaw’s comment 
about mutant enslavement to his war crimes in the camp, while keeping silent about recent US 
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history. A film that portrays Nazi scientists as villains risks no controversy in the US, but a film 
that portrays American segregationists as villains does, insofar as many segregationists still live, 
or their children, grandchildren, and fellow legislators remember them fondly. Rather than risk 
alienating these whites, First Class keeps silent about 20th-century American racism, as did the 
Blade trilogy.84 
 Instead, the film appropriates the experiences of oppressed groups on behalf of an 
implied core audience of American white males. Although Professor Xavier’s status as a mutant 
positions him as Other within the film’s universe, he passes for a human—a white heterosexual 
male human, who inherits riches from his family, and who can thereby afford to convert his 
estate into a school for mutants. Erik Lehnsherr, Jewish mutant and Holocaust survivor, now 
lives in America, flush with gold expropriated from the Nazis he has hunted down; despite his 
trauma in the camp, he now counts as white for the purposes of American systems of racial 
hygiene. The film invites us to pity and admire these rich white men for the oppression they 
suffer as mutants, yet it tells us nothing of the experience of the film’s characters of color. Neil 
Shyminsky’s argument about X-Men comics as racial allegory applies to the film: “While the 
popularly accepted suggestion […] is that X-Men espouses a progressive politics of inclusion and 
tolerance, a deeper textual analysis would seem to reveal the opposite. [….] The allegorical 
affinity that mutants are supposed to share with oppressed peoples allows otherwise privileged 
                                                
84 The sequel, Days of Future Past, contains the X-Men movie franchise’s first explicit reference 
to American racism, but few viewers will notice it. The protagonists use a guided group tour of 
the Pentagon to gain entry to the building in order to commit a crime; as they duck away from 
the main group, we can still hear the guide’s voice fading down the hallway. A young child has 
asked, “Where’s the bathroom?” The guide—now off-screen, as the camera follows Wolverine 
and Professor X into a stairwell—replies, “The building was constructed during segregation, so 
the building has double the amount of bathrooms.” The film, set in 1973, presents “segregation” 
as ancient history, rather than the subject of bitter political disputes in recent memory; moreover, 
it presents that history as producing greater convenience for people of today. No Black people 
appear in the tour group.  
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white males to appropriate a discourse of marginalization” (388-389). First Class marginalizes 
its Black characters by silencing them, killing one and turning the other into a villain with no 
further dialogue. A desire to give the audience or the remaining X-Men another reason to hate 
Shaw might have motivated this excription by the screenwriters, but it functions to eliminate the 
only characters who would have experienced discrimination in the film’s 1962 setting not 
because of their mutant status, but because of their Blackness. As one media blogger puts it, X-
Men comics and movies excel at showing “White perceptions of race” and “White ideas of 
racism” (Reloaded). Twenty-first-century whites believe themselves to be not the beneficiaries of 
racism and race-consciousness, but its victims, and First Class helps them to identify with white 
men’s imagined experience of oppression.85 
 The stakes in popular and scholarly readings of these allegories of race, oppression, and 
opportunity include competing notions not just of America’s present but also its past. Social 
scientists have studied the ways that audiences respond to depictions of groups with which they 
identify, and one of their explanatory models proves useful here. So-called social identity theory 
holds that “[b]ecause people are motivated to attain a positive social identity and elevate their 
ingroups, they are drawn to content that not only references their ingroup but also depicts their 
ingroup in a positive way [….] Moreover, audiences may selectively avoid movies and programs 
which they believe would cast their ingroup in a negative light” (Weaver 370). Based on what 
social scientists know about white racial attitudes, social identity theory therefore predicts that 
films successful with whites would not contain references to de jure white supremacy, structural 
inequality, or anti-Black racism as normative parts of American culture even in the past. As a 
                                                
85 Although I have not found data on how the X-Men films performed among specific audience 
segments, the excription of Black characters from First Class and its lack of any major Black 
star may have contributed to its mediocre domestic gross of only $146M against a $160M 
budget. 
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corollary, films successful with Blacks would not show Blacks “in a negative light,” avoiding, 
for example, roles that Blacks would read as stereotyped or insulting.  
Yet as my analysis of Halle Berry’s role in the X-Men franchise shows, the intersection 
of star image, genre conventions, and marketing imperatives makes any character a tangle of 
competing representational motivations and functions; actual spectators, with their varied 
political, ideological, and personal commitments, may surprise scholars who expect more neatly 
oppositional or approving readings. As Yvonne Tasker has said of action movies, there exists “a 
contradiction between what ‘we’ know and what ‘we’ enjoy, since the kinds of fantasy 
investments at work in the pleasures taken from the cinema cannot be controlled by conscious 
political positions in the way that some criticism seems to imply” (136). My research into the 
popular reception of Black characters in superhero films has surprised me many times, as 
viewers have expressed unambiguous pleasure in characters that I had assumed would provoke 
opposition. Some of the variation in these responses depends on subject position and identity, 
some a matter of professional habit, and some a matter of personal taste. Scholars can work 
backward from these seemingly idiosyncratic responses to see what other viewers saw in the 
films, thereby revealing ambiguities that the politically-committed or tendentious viewer might 
miss or misread; at the same time, we can reveal the hegemonic function of characters that seem 
crafted to satisfy oppositional spectators. 
 
“When I’m asked, I don’t have to lie” 
 Lucius Fox, played by Morgan Freeman in the Batman films of the 2000s, appears 
crafted to this end. Freeman’s role in these films, and especially in Batman Begins (Christopher 
Nolan, 2005), merits scrutiny for three reasons. First, Lucius Fox essentially conforms to the 
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widespread turn-of-the-millennium cinematic stereotype of the Black person who helps a young 
white protagonist fulfill his potential. Spike Lee famously called this figure the Magical Negro, 
noting its recurrence of in a spate of films, including What Dreams May Come (Vincent Ward, 
1998), The Green Mile (Frank Darabont, 1999), The Legend of Bagger Vance (Robert Redford, 
2000); Lee argues that the figure represents a throwback to classical Hollywood’s depictions of 
Blacks as happily subservient to whites, one that plays to white nostalgia (Gonzalez, Okorafor-
Mbachu).86 Second, Freeman’s character warrants attention because despite its seemingly 
stereotyped nature, it generated largely positive responses from the Black press. For this reason, I 
read the character as an instance of an actor and his star image transcending a stereotyped role. 
Third, after the success of Batman Begins, Marvel Studios cast major Black stars as confidants 
and enablers to white heroes, thereby solving the “problem” of Black characters’ sexuality. 
Storm’s presence as a core member of the X-Men made salient her lack of romance, because all 
the other core members all had heterosexual relationships; however, by casting Blacks as helpers 
rather than heroes—sidekicks, rather than stars—Marvel can forgo giving them love interests. 
Nobody expects a sidekick to find love in the last reel.  
The neo-racist stereotype of the Magical Negro serves well the ideological needs of 
symbolic racism, in that it allows the narrative to appear progressive (to white audiences) for 
depicting an interracial “friendship” while it also allows the white character to attain or solidify a 
hegemonic position of power. Matthew Hughey defines the type as  
                                                
86 I prefer Lee’s term to Heather Hicks’s term, “Magical African American Friend” (MAAF) 
because of connotations of Lee’s: the dated and potentially offensive Negro suggests that the 
character type had clung to life since before the era of Black Power and Civil Rights. And, as 
Hicks points out, MAAFs “clearly are not friends. Nor are they saints. They are ghosts, or, at 
least, tips of a historical iceberg jutting into the present [….] The films themselves drip with 
nostalgia: nostalgia for the era of superman, for the ‘simpler’ times when white men’s authority 
was less assailable” (51). 
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a stock character that often appears as a lower class, uneducated Black person who 
possesses supernatural or magical powers. These powers are used to save and transform 
disheveled, uncultured, lost, or broken whites (almost exclusively white men) into 
competent, successful, and content people within the context of the American myth of 
redemption and salvation. (544) 
Hughey lists ten tropes of Magical Negro films, which he divides under the rubrics of “white 
normativity” and “antiBlack stereotypes.” Only one trope, “primordial magic,” requires a 
supernatural element, and then only metaphorically; the others, like “economic extremity,” 
“hegemonic whiteness,” and “spirituality/material detachment” derive from mundane social 
relations (555). Hughey does not mention Batman Begins in his article, but his observations 
apply with equal force to the technical wizard Lucius Fox. 
It would be hard to find an actor more widely admired than Morgan Freeman. Over a 
long and prolific career, he has acted in children’s educational television (Electric Company) and 
won an Obie Award for his 1980 stage performance as Coriolanus (“1980”); in film, he has 
played the President of the United States, Nelson Mandela, and Almighty God. The BBC 
summarizes Freeman’s star image as one of “gravitas” (“The Film”). Yet for all the dignity of 
Freeman’s star image, he built his Hollywood résumé on roles flattering to white stereotypes 
about Blacks. His first Oscar nomination came for the murderous pimp Fast Black in Street 
Smart (Jerry Schatzberg, 1987), whom the white journalist protagonist (Christopher Reeve) 
profiles for a story, which the journalist largely invents. Another Black character challenges the 
protagonist about his decision to profile Fast Black: “Why did you choose a subject that 
embodies the worst of Black people? [….] It might not be conscious racism, but it is racism.” 
Freeman’s second Oscar nomination came for the illiterate chauffeur Hoke in Driving Miss 
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Daisy (Bruce Beresford, 1989), who helps Miss Daisy (Jessica Tandy) maintain her social life, 
while Miss Daisy, a retired schoolteacher, teaches him to read. The film’s condescension toward 
Hoke and its other Black characters has led multiple writers to use Driving Miss Daisy as a 
metonym for benevolent white racism.87 Freeman’s third nomination came for The Shawshank 
Redemption (Frank Darabont, 1994), where Freeman’s character, the rightly imprisoned Red, 
helps the film’s wrongly imprisoned white protagonist escape prison. His fourth nomination, and 
his first win, came for Million Dollar Baby (Clint Eastwood, 2004). There Freeman plays 
boxing-gym janitor Scraps, who convinces the gym’s white owner to train a white boxing 
hopeful Maggie, who then enjoys a meteoric career; as in Shawshank, Freeman’s deep, 
mellifluous voice provides both voice-over and voice-off narration of the story, although his role 
remains peripheral and enabling. 
Freeman’s star image as a kindly, reserved, and apolitical uncle-figure rests on roles as a 
helper to white protagonists, but his role as God in Bruce Almighty (Tom Shadyac, 2003) 
constitutes his turn as a paradigmatic Magical Negro. Hughey discusses Freeman’s character in 
this film as exemplary of the trope of economic extremity, since God initially appears to Bruce 
“as a janitor, mopping floors in an unoccupied building” (556). In this empty industrial space, 
cylindrical concrete pillars support the ceiling, marching into the distance; the mysterious janitor 
tells Bruce that he knew Bruce’s father: “He didn’t mind rolling up his sleeves, either, son. 
People underestimate the benefit of good old manual labor. There’s freedom in it. Some of the 
happiest people in the world go home smelling to high heaven at the end of the day.” One could 
not ask for a clearer example of Spike Lee’s “happy slave” stereotype than this. Moreover, 
                                                
87 Ed Guerrero calls the film “a putrid fantasy on race relations” (245). For other examples, see 
Public Enemy’s “Burn, Hollywood, Burn,” Martin Lawrence’s You So Crazy (Thomas 
Schlamme, 1994), and Be Kind Rewind (Michel Gondry, 2008). 
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Batman Begins essentially duplicate this scene when Bruce Wayne first visits Lucius Fox: in 
both scenes, an elder, low-status Black character, played by Morgan Freeman, surprises a 
younger, high-status white character, named Bruce, by telling him that he knew Bruce’s father; 
in both scenes, the meeting marks the key step in the white protagonist’s fulfillment of his true 
potential. Even the mise en scène of the “dead end” post-industrial space, with its rows of 
concrete pillars, matches in the two films. Whether or not Christopher Nolan and David Goyer 
intended to copy the scene in Batman Begins, the visual and narrative parallels make clear the 
kinship of Freeman’s functions in both films.  
In Batman Begins, Lucius Fox’s role as helper depends on his economic extremity. A 
former executive of Wayne Industries, Fox’s unwillingness to cooperate with the profiteering 
board led to his demotion to Applied Sciences; he now occupies a position both figuratively and 
literally in the depths of the company, working in a storage basement. His abjection in this 
forgotten “dead end” (as the CEO put it to him) enables him to help Bruce, and because no one 
monitors Fox’s work, he can do as he pleases with the mothballed prototypes. Fox’s material aid 
to Bruce Wayne’s vigilantism thus functions as a dual affirmation of Bruce’s power. In the first 
sense, Fox avers that the prototypes belong to Bruce: “Mr. Wayne, the way I see it, all this stuff 
is yours anyway.” In the second, Fox advances Bruce’s goals without ever mentioning having 
goals of his own. As far as we know from the script, Fox lives only to serve. Moreover, Fox’s 
Roman-sounding given name evokes the history of African-American slaves given classical 
names by their owners as ironic commentary on slaves’ low status and lack of education 
(Patterson 56-57). This association may seem far fetched, but less than three minutes after Fox’s 
first appearance, Bruce Wayne’s butler Alfred refers explicitly to American slavery: as they 
explore the caverns beneath Wayne Manor, Alfred tells Bruce, “In the Civil War, your great-
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great-grandfather was involved in the Underground Railroad, secretly transporting freed slaves to 
the north, and I suspect these caverns came in handy.” In light of Alfred’s speech, the helpful and 
avuncular Fox, the film’s most prominent Black character, reads as a signifier of a Blackness 
comfortable under benevolent white patronage. Alfred’s speech turns America’s bloodiest war 
into an object of nostalgia and racially inflected self-esteem for the protagonist. The films never 
tell us how the Waynes made their fortune, though clearly they made it before the 1860s, for 
Wayne Manor dates back at least that far; Northern industrialists profited from slave labor and 
from the commodities that it kept cheap for the cotton mills and other manufacturers on the 
eastern seaboard. Yet Alfred’s speech does not implicate the Waynes’ capital in America’s 
history of the racialized expropriation of wealth but instead serves to redeem the Waynes as 
vigilante philanthropists. 
Fox also fulfills another function of the Magical Negro in that he provides what Hughey 
calls “spirituality/material detachment” (567). Morgan Freeman’s role as God serves as one of 
Hughey’s examples of this trope, where Magical Negroes “go to great lengths to teach the white 
character to eschew rampant materialism and to embrace a spiritual attitude toward the world” 
(567). Fox never asks Bruce Wayne for anything in exchange for logistical help. Moreover, 
Fox’s dismissal of military-industrial “bean-counters” who “didn’t think a soldier’s life was 
worth three hundred grand” helps model his rejection of the instrumental rationality of the 
corporation’s search of profit, as does his revelation that he worked on the Thomas Wayne’s 
philanthropic elevated train. This attitude has apparently separated Fox from the other executives 
of Wayne Industries, resulting in his demotion. Heather Hicks discusses a non-franchise 
superhero movie, Unbreakable (Shyamalan, 2000), in which a Black character helps a white hero 
fulfill his potential, but although her referent differs, Hicks’s observation applies to Fox:  
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the film invites the fantasy that Black men exist in a childlike relation to economic 
matters and would gladly cede their own rare material gains in order to be in a more 
certain—and nostalgic—set of social relations, one in which white men are always 
already heroes who have merely misplaced their capes, temporarily forgotten their innate 
power. (36) 
The young Bruce Wayne drops out of Princeton, abandons his wealth, and wanders the Earth; 
meanwhile, the CEO of Wayne Industries has Bruce declared legally dead so that he can take the 
company public. When Bruce returns to Gotham and meets Lucius Fox, Bruce Wayne begins 
reclaiming his wealth, power, and status, as well as Wayne Industries’ basement full of gadgets. 
The film’s denouement restores Wayne Industries to Bruce Wayne’s control, when Bruce buys a 
controlling interest; he then appoints Fox as the new CEO, raising him from basement to 
boardroom. The film thus restores and reaffirms the economic relations of its diegetic past, such 
that one man dominates the corporation, and Lucius Fox once more answers to a boss he calls 
Mister Wayne. Bruce’s seemingly progressive appointment of a Black CEO obscures the film’s 
restoration of white hegemony. 
 Yet against my reading of Fox as a Magical Negro, I found no similar criticisms of the 
role in Black press responses to the film. Instead, press citations of the role mention it in the 
context of Freeman’s busy schedule (Williams, “High”; “Morgan Freeman”) or the high box-
office returns of his films (Richardson; Hughes, Brown, and Robinson). Where I read Freeman’s 
character as “explicitly positive, but latently racist,” as Hughey describes the Magical Negro 
(544), Freeman’s turn in Batman Begins received a nomination for Outstanding Performance by 
an Actor in a Supporting Role from the 2005 Black Movie Awards committee (Butler). Freeman 
himself described Lucius Fox as “Batman’s version of Q,” the gadget-master of the James Bond 
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franchise (qtd. in Williams, “Morgan Freeman”). Why did none of these commentators read Fox 
as I did? I realized that my reading of Freeman’s role had failed to account for the possibility that 
Black spectators could approach the film not braced to resist its hegemonic meanings, but open, 
in Stuart Hall’s terms, to negotiate them (516). I had also failed to think about audience response 
historically, as Janet Staiger does (1-13), which would have required that I understand responses 
to Lucius Fox in terms of past superhero blockbusters, and Morgan Freeman’s evolving star 
image, and not just my orienting preoccupation with differing Black and white understandings of 
racism. One could generate approving readings of Lucius Fox by applying any one of three 
redemptive hermeneutics to the character: Lucius Fox’s “expert” role as a departure from 
stereotyped depictions of experts as white, Morgan Freeman’s dignified star image, or Fox as a 
victim of structural racism. 
Lucius Fox represents departs from mainstream films’ tendency to cast whites as 
technical experts. Karie Hollerbach notes this pattern in American television, where whites 
disproportionately play experts (612), but the pattern obtains in film as well. The 1980s 
Superman franchise did cast Richard Pryor as a computer genius in Superman III (Richard 
Lester, 1983), but the character also provided comic relief in the tradition of Mantan Moreland: 
the film’s poster shows a dignified Christopher Reeve carrying a panicked, bug-eyed Pryor high 
over the Grand Canyon. In Warner Brothers’ earlier Batman franchise, white actors played mad 
scientists Edward Nygma (Jim Carrey), Victor Fries (Arnold Schwarzenegger), Pamela Isley 
(Uma Thurman), and Jason Woodrue (John Glover). Although Blade cast N’Bushe Wright as a 
hematologist, it cast Kris Kristofferson as Whistler, who designs Blade’s vampire-killing 
gadgets. In other films and franchises, a white man nearly always plays the technological wizard, 
from Bernard Quatermass to James Bond’s Q, and from Egon Spengler of the Ghostbusters (Ivan 
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Reitman, 1984) to Angus MacGyver. Therefore, much as LeVar Burton broke ground for Black 
actors on the small screen by playing Geordi La Forge on Star Trek: The Next Generation, 
Morgan Freeman breaks ground for Black actors on the big screen by playing Fox. 
 Freeman’s star image also primes spectators to find dignity in his roles, so this alone 
may deactivate oppositional readings. He has played increasingly prestigious characters, moving 
from pimps and illiterates to school principals to statesmen, and he has done much voice-over 
narration for documentaries and nonfiction TV (e.g. the intro to CBS Evening News). In 2005, 
the year of Batman Begins, Freeman provided narration for both National Geographic’s March of 
the Penguins and Steven Spielberg’s War of the Worlds; media writer Esther Zuckerman 
identifies 2005 as the year “that Morgan Freeman Narrates Movies officially became A Thing.” 
Since then, it has also become a thing lampooned: “getting Morgan Freeman to narrate/read 
funny things has become an Internet staple, whether or not it’s actually Morgan Freeman doing 
the reading” (Zuckerman). The True Facts video series on YouTube parodies nature 
documentary narration, profiling creatures like the mantis shrimp and the koala, but its creators 
also made a “True Facts About Morgan Freeman,” which begins, “Morgan Freeman was born in 
1937. He narrated his own birth” (zefrank1). This joke unintentionally crystallizes one of the 
“true facts” about star image: it has the power to revise popular understandings of the past and to 
inflect understandings of the present. While Driving Miss Daisy became a metonym for white 
self-congratulation and condescension toward Blacks, Morgan Freeman became a metonym for 
gentle authoritativeness, the Voice of God. Parody can double as a high form of flattery; in the 
case of True Facts, it confirms Black Enterprise’s description of Freeman as “one of the most 
respected people in Hollywood” (Richardson). 
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 Resisting spectators may also read Fox as a victim of institutional racism. The film hints 
at the reasons for Fox’s demotion from the board, but the scenes in the boardroom offer a clue 
for those who look for it: the board appears entirely white. We see only one person of color in 
the boardroom scenes: Jessica, the white CEO’s Black receptionist. No character remarks on 
Fox’s race, but nobody has to. Wayne Enterprises seems consistent with what Eduardo Bonilla-
Silva calls “racism without racists” (2-4), ostensibly colorblind and universalist policies that 
function to exclude people of color from positions of power, maintaining white privilege “in 
covert, institutional, and apparently nonracial ways” (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 52). In this 
context, Fox appears to be a brilliant and virtuous Black man abused by an exclusively white 
power structure, and in this light, his conspiracy to help Bruce Wayne becomes a covert defiance 
of racist authority. Even Fox’s deference to Wayne becomes legible as irony, notably when he 
jokes about Wayne’s increasingly odd requests, as when Wayne goes looking for “lightweight 
fabrics” for his new hobby of “BASE jumping”:  
FOX: It’s called memory cloth. […] flexible, but put a current through it—molecules 
realign, becomes rigid. 
WAYNE: What kind of shapes can you make? 
FOX: It can be tailored to fit any structure based on a rigid skeleton. 
WAYNE: Too expensive for the army? 
FOX: Well, I don’t think they ever tried to market it to the billionaire, spelunking, BASE-
jumping crowd. 
WAYNE: Look, Mr. Fox— 
FOX: Yessir? 
WAYNE: If you’re uncomfortable— 
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FOX: Mr. Wayne, if you don’t want tell me exactly what you’re doing, when I’m asked, I 
don’t have to lie. But don’t think of me as an idiot. 
Fox tells Wayne and the audience not to mistake his compliance for servility or stupidity. We 
can read Bruce Wayne’s later appointment of Fox as the new CEO as one of Wayne’s tactics for 
ensuring that he can continue his vigilantism, but in light of Fox’s subtle resistance, the 
appointment also represents a vindication of Fox’s merit, not only as a technician but also as a 
survivor in a racist corporation. 
A resistant spectator could read Wayne’s appointment of Fox as redress, intentional or 
not, for the demotion and abuse that Fox suffered under the previous regime—abuse like the 
CEO’s gratuitous and mean-spirited firing of Fox in the third reel. If we read Fox’s appointment 
as redress, then it plays as an inversion of Bonilla-Silva’s notion of racism without racists, 
functioning as “affirmative action without race-consciousness”: that is, nobody mentions Fox’s 
Blackness, or the board’s whiteness, yet Fox nevertheless makes his way into a position from 
which he was formerly excluded, and which the film has primed all spectators to feel that he 
deserves. His appointment remains simultaneously overdetermined and ambiguous, happening 
for any of the above reasons. What I first read simply as a paternalistic gesture that solidified 
Bruce Wayne’s authority to hire and fire at will, a race-conscious spectator can read as redress 
for institutional racism. Donald Bogle argues that although many Black roles in Hollywood 
instantiate stereotypes, “The essence of Black film history is not found in the stereotyped role but 
in what certain talented actors have done with the stereotype” (xxii). Freeman’s nuanced 
performance, showing kindness, ingenuity, flint, and the willingness to subvert (white) authority, 
helped him transcend the stereotype of the Magical Negro, to present a character that Black and 
white audiences could enjoy. For Black spectators who identify with Lucius Fox, the film 
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interpellates them as intelligent, worthy of dignity, and resistant to the authority of whites who 
profess colorblindness even as they work to keep Blacks in marginal or abject positions. At the 
same time, white spectators who identify with Bruce Wayne can miss this dynamic entirely, 
seeing Fox instead as an avuncular helper and proof that Wayne and Wayne’s ancestors, even as 
far back as the Civil War, bear no guilt for racism. Much as Fox prefers not to have to lie to his 
superiors about why Bruce Wayne needs gadgets, Batman Begins prefers not to give a direct 
answer about the reasons for Wayne’s appointment of Fox as CEO. We provide our own. 
 
Interest Convergence and Global Hollywood 
 Since 2008 Marvel has developed the Marvel Cinematic Universe, a franchise of 
interconnected, self-produced film and television properties modeled on the continuities of 
Marvel’s comics titles. Following the example of Batman Begins, Marvel Studios has cast in its 
films high-profile Black actors—Samuel L. Jackson, Terrence Howard, Don Cheadle, and Idris 
Elba—actors who built their reputations in serious, social-realist, race-conscious films and 
television about Black experience. Their likenesses appear prominently in Marvel’s advertising, 
yet their roles are secondary, flat: they play sidekicks, allies, or enablers to white protagonists, 
and they operate within seemingly “colorblind” narratives. Nevertheless, they avoid the kinds of 
stereotypes that have provoked Black protest in years past. The Black press has generally 
celebrated these roles, praising the actors’ versatility, their global box-office power, and their 
service as role models for Black children. Marvel Studios’ self-produced films have succeeded 
beyond industry expectations both in the US and overseas, validating the studio’s strategy by 
grossing over $6 billion. The Hollywood Reporter has called the theatrical arm of Marvel “the 
only live-action brand that matters to mass audiences” (Masters). 
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 Marvel Studios has practiced successful market segmentation, appealing to Blacks 
without alienating whites. Texts on marketing to multicultural audiences stress the need for 
media texts to show “respect” for Blacks “because, after all these years, many African 
Americans still do not believe they are respected by society at large” (Miller and Kemp 19). In 
Multicultural Intelligence: Eight Make-or-Break Rules for Marketing to Race, Ethnicity, and 
Sexual Orientation, David Morse asks, “how do Blacks want to be perceived? First, and most 
important, they do not want to be stereotyped” [his emphasis] (66). Morse’s advice on 
advertising applies with equal force to the movies: “In the old days, multicultural marketing was 
easy [….] since African Americans rarely if ever appeared in ads as anything but distorted 
stereotypes, the trick was to include them, and don’t make them look too silly” (212). Another 
author warns white media creators against attempting to write Black vernacular because it may 
read as stereotyped or parodic (Mueller 66). Others warn that signifiers of racial difference can 
slip into stereotype even when the marketer has the best intentions (Nwankwo, Aiyeku, and 
Ogbuehi 233). Deracination seems the safe approach: cast the respectable Black actor in the 
feature-length commercial for your transmedia franchise, but make no unambiguous reference to 
race.  
To most white spectators, presence of Black characters as friends and helpers of white 
protagonists demonstrates that equality of opportunity obtains in the films’ post-racial diegetic 
world; to potentially oppositional Black spectators, the presence of acclaimed Black actors 
playing heroic, serious men signifies that the films respect both Black talent and Black 
audiences. However, this increase in Black representation in mainstream entertainments leads 
only to shallow and deracinated characters, “the paradox of market segmentation” in commercial 
media (Hollerbach 612). “Colorblind” blockbusters thus offer salient Black actors but show us 
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nothing about Black experience, only white fantasies of Black integration. When Marvel Studios 
replaced Terrence Howard with Don Cheadle in the role of Iron Man’s friend and sidekick James 
Rhodes between Iron Man and Iron Man 2, CEO Ike Perlmutter reputedly told a fellow 
executive, “no one would notice because Black people ‘look the same’” (Garrahan). Whether or 
not Perlmutter said it, he spoke the crypto-racist truth of the blockbuster: for the purposes of 
appealing to market segments, Black actors of a certain age and respectable star image do, 
functionally, “look the same.” That is, the movie needs a serious Black actor—any serious Black 
actor—in its ensemble, so that whites see the hero as “not racist” and so that Blacks see the 
movie as respectful to their demographic. The character’s shallowness means that substitution of 
actors makes little difference.  
Derrick Bell’s theory of interest convergence offers a complementary explanation for the 
salience of Black talent in Marvel’s films. Bell sought to explain why the federal government 
sought to end segregation in the 1950s and 1960s, and he found that the interests of the Black 
minority temporarily “converged” with those of the white majority during the Cold War. 
Washington intervened to end de jure segregation as part of a larger geopolitical strategy during 
the Cold War, desegregation made the US look liberal and progressive to potential Cold War 
allies and clients, and it undercut domestic Black radicalism (524).88 Only the external threat of 
Soviet power could motivate Washington to overcome whites’ resistance to giving up their racial 
privileges. “The interest of Blacks in achieving racial equality,” writes Bell, “will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites” (523). Applying this to 
superhero movies, we can read studios’ post-2005 policy of casting serious Black actors in 
                                                
88 NAACP lawyers, Supreme Court justices, and desegregationist legislators routinely cited the 
Cold War propaganda value of desegregation as a compelling point in its favor. See Mary 
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. 
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white-protagonist superhero blockbusters as a case of interest convergence in market 
segmentation. Whites want to feel that they merit the comforts they enjoy; Blacks want to see 
Black characters depicted with respect; studios want in maximum return on their tentpole films. 
The contraction of the DVD market between 2008 and 2010 meant that studios’ profit margins 
have shrunk, increasing the pressure on each blockbuster to make itself ideologically welcoming 
to the greatest number of audience segments. Blacks’ and whites’ differing interests converged 
with Hollywood’s, resulting in films adapted to all three pressures. 
 The trade press has noted with some surprise the global success of blockbusters starring 
Black actors. Hollywood’s conventional wisdom holds that race-conscious Black films do poorly 
overseas, but “colorblind” films, where “Will Smith, Denzel Washington, or Halle Berry play 
characters who just happen to be Black” can succeed (McNary). As franchises continue to 
dominate blockbuster production, some argue that individual stars matter less: “high-concept 
films or those based on popular books or comic books have replaced the star system as the 
engine behind foreign sales” (Ross). The success of Warner Brothers’ Batman cycle and 
Marvel’s Iron Man, each of which have re-cast supporting actors between sequels, suggests that 
brand identity and the tropes of a given franchise matter more than the particularity of actors, at 
least for actors not in lead roles. Variety reported Marvel’s huge overseas openings for Iron Man 
2 and Thor (Stewart “Iron Man 2,” “H’wood”); Avengers surpassed these (“Few”), and Iron Man 
3 then surpassed Avengers (“Iron Giant”). Domestic box office matters less and less. In April 
2014, Variety’s reporting on CinemaCon, a major industry convention, stressed the international 
thrust of franchise filmmaking: “With 70% of box office revenues coming from international 
returns, much of that on tentpole releases,” studios therefore focused on “special-effects 
extravaganzas and sequels, product that plays strongly overseas” (Cheney and Stewart). The 
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People’s Republic of China, in particular, presents a huge, emerging market for Hollywood 
product. Between 2010 and 2012, total Chinese box-office returns increased 29%, surpassing $2 
billion USD (Stewart, “H’wood”). In 2013, Chinese returns increased by 27%, “the first time a 
foreign market has eclipsed $3 billion” (Cheney and Stewart). Furthermore, China’s 
“unprecedented building of cinema screens at some 5,000 per year” has led to forecasts in the 
industry that China’s movie market will “soon equal that of North America’s” (Frater). During 
2015, Chinese box office figures grew by 48% (“China Box”). As the PRC’s urban development 
continues, we can expect Chinese demand for politically ambiguous, “colorblind” American 
blockbusters to grow. 
 Yet the example of China reveals dangers latent in the global success of even a Black-
starred blockbuster as well as the sometimes-excessive optimism of humanistic cultural studies 
on media audiences. In 2009, a quantitative study examined 345 Chinese high-school students’ 
attitudes toward African Americans, finding a direct correlation between use of American mass 
media and negative stereotypes of African Americans: “Although the correlation coefficients are 
small, the direction is consistent: the more use of American media, particularly television and 
movies, the more negative the stereotype” (Tan et al. “Stereotypes” 270). The students consumed 
more cinema than another American medium (269). Although the researchers did not list the 
titles of all the films or franchises that these students watched, they do mention Spider-Man (Sam 
Raimi, 2002) and Superman Returns (Bryan Singer, 2006) as “hits” in the Chinese movie market 
of the 2000s (265). Tan et al. made similar findings in their study of South Korean viewers of 
American mass media (“Cognitive” 569-70). We can assume that blockbusters constitute most, if 
not all, of the American film viewing of high school students in East Asia, since these films, and 
not art films, get wide distribution in Asian markets. Cultural studies has moved beyond the 
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Frankfurt School’s pessimistic vision of a culture industry that transmits ideology directly into 
passive audiences, but quantitative communications scholarship suggests that this model retains 
explanatory merit even if it fails to account for the full range of ways that audiences respond. In 
light of the correlation within the US between symbolic racism and attitudes traditionally 
understood as racist, then Tan et al.’s studies suggests that Hollywood blockbusters contribute 
not simply to ignorance about Black experience, but also to anti-Black affect and stereotypes 
worldwide.  
Chinese high-school students and other overseas audiences lack the cultural background 
that would enable them to construct negotiated or oppositional readings of the Black characters 
in these films. The “selective exposure hypothesis” of communication studies predicts that 
“audiences, in an attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance, are more likely to attune to, and to be 
affected by, media messages that are congruent with their existing predispositions” (Tan et al. 
“Cognitive” 583). For audiences overseas, their only “existing predispositions” about African 
Americans may come from American mass media. Media historians have studied Hollywood’s 
long history of cooperation with US government propaganda efforts, and the US government’s 
many interventions on behalf of Hollywood, ranging from tax breaks to diplomatic efforts to 
open markets overseas. Miller et al. summarize this partnership: “For all its rhetoric of pure 
competition […] the US government has devoted massive resources to generate and sustain its 
‘private sector’ film industry in the interests of ideology and money” (25). While I would not 
conclude that Hollywood simply “turns” foreigners into racists (or neoliberals or whatever), 
quantitative audience research suggests that America’s ideological exports include symbolic 
racism, which masks itself as racism’s opposite. Even as most white Americans congratulate 
themselves on having moved beyond racism, the culture industries in which whites own a 
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disproportionately large share and in which they exercise a disproportionately great authority 
may continue to export it. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis of Blackness in superhero films has focused on racial attitudes, ideology, 
and competing interpretative approaches, largely at the expense of discussing the movie industry 
as such, yet the disproportionate whiteness of Hollywood structures both American movies and 
our expectations about them. For the past decade the Writers Guild of America has 
commissioned reports on diversity in Hollywood, and they have borne one refrain: Hollywood 
remains one of the whitest industries in the United States. The Hollywood Reporter noted that 
according to the WGA’s findings, minorities remain “underrepresented by a factor of about 7 to 
1 among employed film writers” (Handel). UCLA’s Darnell Hunt noted that “after about a 
decade of being stuck at 6 percent—the minority share of film employment actually dropped a 
percentage point to 5 percent in 2009” (5). Hunt co-authored a study released this year by 
UCLA’s Ralph J. Bunche Center for African American Studies, which showed that although 
“minorities are overrepresented among the ranks of frequent moviegoers, those who contribute 
most to overall box office” (Hunt, Price, and Ramon 25). Even Variety discussed the report’s 
conclusion that the racial division of labor in Hollywood differs substantially (and increasingly) 
from “the actual demographics of the U.S. population” (McNary). Yet Variety stopped short of 
calling the situation a case of structural racism, or white opportunity hoarding, or a legacy of the 
Motion Picture Association of America’s three decades of opposition to federal affirmative 
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action programs.89 The Bunche Center report largely repeated the findings of an earlier NAACP 
Hollywood Bureau report on minority underrepresentation in the industry, which Bureau director 
Vicangelo Bulluck characterized as “a call to the marketing and sales executives who, in many 
ways, are the street-level dealers of ideas” (Bulluck iii). The NAACP report issued “a call to the 
viewers to be active in the process,” reminding them, “Remember, we can vote with our dollars” 
(iii). Yet the success of Marvel’s Avenger’s franchise since 2008 suggests that Hollywood has 
succeeded in maintaining its status quo: the industry’s racial division of labor has changed little, 
box office figures continue to climb, and “colorblind” blockbusters now open simultaneously on 
screens from Abu Dhabi to Shanghai.90 
Racial ideology protects inequalities of power and wealth formed during America’s 
centuries of de jure and de facto white supremacy, inequalities that continue to shape the stories 
Hollywood tells to an increasingly global and increasingly non-white audience. As David 
Hesmondhalgh and Anamik Salha have argued, “Cultural production in the modern world cannot 
be adequately understood without taking account of race and ethnicity, and their relation to 
oppression” (180). Because cultural production “significantly shapes the knowledge, values and 
beliefs that are circulated in society” (183), media scholars who seek a more just future have a 
                                                
89 See Quinn’s “Closing Doors: Hollywood, Affirmative Action, and the Revitalization of 
Conservative Racial Politics.” Journal of American History. 99.2 (2012): 466-491. 
90 At the time of writing, a minor flap had erupted about posters for Star Wars: The Force 
Awakens (J. J. Abrams, 2015) in the People’s Republic of China, which shrank the image of 
Black British actor John Boyega, despite his centrality to the film. The PRC’s English-language 
state-run newspaper Global Times claims that “analysts say they believe the change has nothing 
to do with racism” (Kou). In contrast, the alternative weekly Shanghaiist (a spinoff of the NYC-
based Gothamist) reports skeptically that “netizens would like to know what promotional 
methods specific for Chinese audiences called for minimizing the Black actor’s role in the film.” 
The PRC’s many projects in Africa, including their recent first of sending peacekeepers to South 
Sudan, suggest that Beijing has ample reason to deny Han Chinese racism against Blacks (as 
they have long denied Han Chinese racism against the PRC’s fifty-five non-Han ethnic 
minorities).  
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responsibility to understand and challenge the symbolic racism that shapes not only white 
American attitudes but also the products of the American media industries. The last twenty years 
have seen great changes in the ways mass media operate, but little change in who owns and 
controls them, except consolidation under fewer conglomerate umbrellas. Capitalism adapts to 
resistance by reconfiguring its commodities to appeal to those who would resist. Hollywood’s 
use of serious, respectable Black actors in superhero blockbusters represents one such adaptation.  
Yet resistant spectators can turn commodities into new occasions for resistance. The 
grassroots campaign for “racebending”—the casting of actors of color as characters originally 
written as white—has turned media franchises into such an occasion. By demanding minority 
representation in films, racebenders challenge Hollywood’s continuing history of under-
representing minorities, as well as the false equivalency with which reactionary whites attack 
cross-racial casting as “reverse racism” (“What is ‘Racebending’”). Groups in power tend not to 
share it unless they have no better choice, but the growing percentage of Americans who check a 
census box other then white may weaken whites’ ability to hoard opportunities in the media 
industries. Since 2000, Marvel Comics has made great changes to the ways it represents heroism, 
re-imagining Captain America as Black (Truth: Red, White, & Black, 2003; All-New Captain 
America, 2014-), Spider-Man as a Black Latino (Ultimate Comics: Spider-Man, 2011-2013; 
Miles Morales: Ultimate Spider-Man), and Thor as a woman (Thor, 2014-). Comics remain a 
niche market with low economic stakes, but media conglomerates use comics to test ideas that 
later make their way into mass-market texts. By explicating the politics of Black representation 
and reception in superhero blockbusters, scholars can help rising and future generations 
encourage and create media cultures that serve not an entrenched and self-deluding white 
supremacy but a diverse America and the world beyond. 
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